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Introduction: a perfect storm?
Lorenzo De Sio, Vincenzo Emanuele, Nicola Maggini and Aldo Paparo
This book is dedicated to the Italian general 
election of 2013. Like a series of recent elections in 
other European countries (Spain in 2011, France, 
Greece – twice – and the Netherlands in 2012) it 
yielded unprecedented results in terms of incum-
bent’s punishment and party system change. Such 
results have inevitably been related by most com-
mentators to the emergence not only of the finan-
cial and economic crisis, but most importantly to 
the austerity measures that have been enforced in 
most countries as a reaction to such crisis. Politi-
cal change stirred by such austerity measures has 
represented in all cases a serious challenge to the 
stability and performance of the party system.
This is clearly the case in Italy as well. However, 
in the Italian case we can argue that this external 
shock overlapped with (and to some extent rein-
forced and precipitated) other long-term processes. 
It has also combined with additional factors of 
instability.
The most relevant long-term process is un-
doubtedly the crisis of the Berlusconi leader-
ship in the centre-right camp [Chiaramonte and 
D’Alimonte 2012]. After securing a comfortable 
majority in both chambers in the 20081 general 
election and a honeymoon period of roughly two 
years, Berlusconi ended up facing mounting scan-
dals and judicial prosecution about his private life 
and business activity. This combined with an in-
creasing malaise within his own party (the PdL) 
and with rising scepticism among other European 
governments and international financial institu-
tions. A first parliamentary challenge occurred in 
December 2010 following a split inside the PdL led 
by Gianfranco Fini. Berlusconi survived the vote 
of no confidence by a very narrow margin. But his 
government was weakened further by mass pro-
tests over his sex scandals in February 2011, and fi-
1  The only time when such majority emerged, in the three 
elections held with this system, in 2006, 2008 and 2013.
nally fell in November 2011. By then he had lost his 
parliamentary majority also as a result of his lack 
of credibility in enforcing the austerity measures 
made necessary by the rapidly worsening finan-
cial situation. Berlusconi’s fall, albeit still far from 
representing the actual end of his political career, 
inevitably marked a deep crisis of leadership and a 
change of equilibria in the centre-right coalition. 
This affected to some extent the centre-left opposi-
tion as well, testifying how Berlusconi’s leadership 
had been a stabilizing force in Italian politics over 
the last twenty years.
The government crisis did not cause early elec-
tions. This was due to a lack of initiative by the left-
ist opposition and the strong belief held by Presi-
dent Giorgio Napolitano about the risk involved 
in an electoral campaign waged in the middle of 
a very serious financial crisis. Napolitano asked 
former EU Commissioner Mario Monti to form 
a technocratic government [Marangoni and Ver-
zichelli 2012] supported both by the PdL and the 
Pd (the two large rival parties, respectively center-
right and center-left) as well as the Udc (a minor 
centrist party). The Monti cabinet, after initially 
passing some controversial measures with the sup-
port of public opinion, lost its effectiveness after few 
months, paralysed by a series of vetoes of the two 
main parties on all controversial policy measures.
Two additional factors of instability need to be 
mentioned. On one hand, Berlusconi’s crisis in-
creased the distrust of rightist voters, thus weaken-
ing party-voter ties in that camp; on the other hand, 
as several commentators have observed [Bellucci 
and Segatti 2013] the formation of a technocratic 
government has strongly blurred in voters’ mind 
the government-opposition cleavage. The respon-
sibility of the Berlusconi government for the severe 
economic and financial situation became less clear. 
As a result the Monti cabinet strongly complicated 
the blame attribution process performed by vot-
ers. Perhaps, in our view, if elections had been held 
immediately the discontent of conservative voters 
would have been channelled into a normal incum-
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bent-punishment mechanism, benefiting a con-
structive opposition (and perhaps ensuring a stable 
parliamentary majority) without challenging the 
structure of the party system. Instead, the instal-
lation of a technocratic government prevented the 
effective functioning of such mechanism, and gave 
way to a protest vote directed against all parties.
Finally, there is one more factor that made the 
2013 Italian general election something close to a 
perfect storm: the Italian electoral system. Italy has 
a fully symmetrical bicameralism. The House and 
the Senate enjoy the same powers including that 
of giving and revoking the confidence to the gov-
ernment. However, the two chambers are elected 
by different electoral bodies: the voting age for the 
House is 18, that for the Senate is 25. In 2005 the 
Berlusconi government passed an electoral reform 
which introduced in both chambers a proportional 
electoral system with a strong majoritarian element 
provided by a majority bonus [D’Alimonte 2007]. In 
the House the party or coalition with the plurality 
of the vote at the national level gets 54% of the seats. 
In the Senate however the majority bonus is award-
ed at the regional level and not at the national level. 
This feature, combined with the difference in the 
electoral bodies of the two chambers, creates the 
possibility of different outcomes. In addition, the 
system provides no strong disincentives for third 
parties. In other words, what was clear before the 
elections was that the emerging anti-establishment 
Movimento 5 Stelle (M5S, 5-Star Movement) would 
find no serious obstacles in the electoral law, and 
that – in case of a strong success – it could prevent 
the formation of any majority in the Senate.
And this is precisely what happened, as detailed 
more systematically in the book. For the first time 
in Western Europe (excluding founding elections 
of a new democracy), a new party has achieved a 
similar percentage of votes in its first election. The 
M5S obtained – in part unexpectedly, according 
to previous polls – 25,6% of valid votes (excluding 
the Aosta Valley and the foreign constituency) and 
it became the largest party of the country. With 
this performance it prevented any majority in the 
Senate which would not include two of the three 
largest parties. Having declared its unwillingness 
to enter into any coalition, the result was a dan-
gerous stalemate. One of the consequences of such 
stalemate has been the re-election of Giorgio Na-
politano as president for another 7-year mandate 
(in fact it just happened that his first term expired 
just at this time). In turn the reelection of Napoli-
tano produced once again the formation of another 
oversized-majority government (this time with a 
political majority, as ministers were drawn from 
all the supporting parties), with Enrico Letta. A 
government which currently appears to be facing 
similar problems to those of Monti.
Before introducing the actual analyses pre-
sented in the book, it is worth spending few words 
about the predictability of such perfect storm. 
Could all of this be expected? With some immod-
est honesty, we argue that most of these elements 
were previously anticipated by analyses published 
online by the CISE before the elections. In par-
ticular, before the elections we concentrated [De 
Sio and Emanuele 2013] on some key aspects con-
nected to economic voting. First, we expected the 
economic crisis to play a role. The unprecedented 
results in all recent elections in a number of Euro-
pean countries provided ample evidence of that. At 
the same time, as we mentioned earlier it was plau-
sible to expect that the blame-attribution mecha-
nism might act against both the center-left and the 
center-right (and towards the new Monti list itself), 
given the sharing of responsibilities in the last year 
under the Monti government, and therefore that it 
would benefit the anti-system M5S.
We went further and also advanced some more 
articulated hypotheses about the actual causal 
mechanisms behind the effects of the economic cri-
sis, drawing upon the electoral results of regional 
elections in Sicily in October 2012. Sicily is a geo-
graphically peripheral region of Italy, albeit with a 
crucial position in the Mediterranean Sea, which 
explains its historical strategic value and its long-
standing close relationships with powers such as 
France, England and the United States. His political 
traditions, with the exception of limited rebellious 
populist movements immediately after WWII, have 
been consistently conservative. Sicilian voters sup-
ported consistently the DC (the large Christian-
Democratic party uninterruptedly in government 
in Italy from 1948 to 1992), and later Berlusconi. 
Historically such continuous government support 
was exchanged for a very large degree of autono-
my, and a generous distribution of resources from 
the central state, allowing for the development of 
a pervasive local patronage system. All this ended 
in the regional elections of 2012 (with very similar 
results in the general elections of 2013), as Sicily 
massively turned its cold shoulder to Berlusconi. 
The steep decline of electoral turnout (especially 
in urban districts more dependent from patron-
age) was coupled with the massive success of the 
M5S, leading to a new surge of anti-establishment 
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rebellious populism in Sicily, for the first time since 
1948. This suggested to us an additional mecha-
nism (compared to explanations based on tradi-
tional sociotropic or pocket-book economic voting) 
by which austerity measures impacted vote choices: 
the dramatic restriction of resources available for 
patronage politics. In our view, this might be a par-
simonious explanation of political change in Sicily 
from Berlusconi’s fortress to Grillo’s stronghold. 
Moreover this might explain in more general terms 
how Berlusconi’s appeal has decreased, although 
under his leadership – once he clearly reaffirmed 
it after the Sicilian elections – the PdL performed 
better than expected in the general elections. Along 
with the M5S performance this contributed to the 
dangerous stalemate that emerged.
The analyses included in this book give a more 
detailed picture of the outcome we outlined above. 
They are the product of the activity of the CISE – 
Centro Italiano di Studi Elettorali (Italian Center 
for Electoral Studies), which regularly publishes on 
its website (http://cise.luiss.it/) short online reports 
in Italian dedicated to Italian electoral politics. 
Such analyses, based both on aggregate data as well 
as on survey data collected independently by the 
CISE, are published first on line (shortly after the 
election day or the collection of survey data) and 
then have been put together into freely download-
able e-books since 2012, leading to four volumes. 
Such volumes (composing the CISE Dossier series) 
are dedicated respectively to the 2012 Italian local 
elections [De Sio and Paparo 2012], to the evolution 
in Italian public opinion before the 2013 general 
election [De Sio and Maggini 2012], to the results of 
various elections held in 2012 as anticipating trends 
for 2013 (covering Sicily, various European coun-
tries, and the Pd primary) [De Sio and Emanuele 
2013] and finally to the results of the 2013 general 
elections [De Sio, Cataldi and De Lucia 2013].
This book is partially derived from the fourth 
CISE Dossier. It presents a selection of short analy-
ses on the 2013 general elections, which have been 
translated and adapted for an international audi-
ence with little familiarity with Italian politics. 
Additional articles published by CISE scholars in 
international venues have been also included. This 
effort follows the same philosophy that led to the 
development of the CISE Dossier series. Our goal is 
to provide the large community of people interested 
in elections with short, simple yet rigorous empiri-
cal analyses. Such community ranges from journal-
ists to practitioners of politics, to scholars (not nec-
essarily of elections) to ordinary citizens interested 
in politics. Different audiences will find different 
materials of interest. But even electoral scholars 
might find suggestions for hypotheses, to be tested 
in-depth more systematically. The idea is to provide 
fresh information that might help foster the devel-
opment of more structured research questions.
The success of the CISE Dossier series in Ita-
ly prompted us to try a similar effort directed to 
an international audience, by providing a freely 
downloadable e-book on the latest Italian general 
elections. In this case we are aware of the addition-
al challenge of documenting and explaining Italian 
electoral politics to foreign journalists, practition-
ers and scholars who might not be familiar with 
it. We lived up to it by using a broader scope, dif-
ferent from the more specialized and technical ap-
proach usually found in international publications 
on Italian elections. We think such a publication 
performs a useful function. Italy is – after all – the 
third largest economy in the Eurozone and too of-
ten its politics is portrayed abroad in a superficial 
fashion without the support of fresh data and a 
proper understanding of the deeper processes ly-
ing underneath it. With this book, in spite of its 
limited scope, we hope to contribute to filling this 
gap, at least partially.
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How Berlusconi could yet pull off the unimaginable
Roberto D’Alimonte
Published in the Financial Times, February 14, 2013
Can Silvio Berlusconi do it? A few weeks ago the 
prospect that Italy’s former prime minister would 
stage a comeback was laughable. Now, with less 
than two weeks to go before polling day, it may be 
the media magnate and playboy former premier 
who has the last laugh. The last opinion polls pub-
lished before an official blackout period point to a 
closer race than many expected: the gap between 
Pier Luigi Bersani’s left-of-centre coalition and Mr 
Berlusconi’s right-of-centre alliance has narrowed 
to 5-6 percentage points.
In most western countries, such a lead in the 
last stretch of a campaign would be considered 
safe. Not in Italy. To start with, there are lingering 
doubts that the polls are a proper reflection of pub-
lic opinion. For many people, voting for Mr Berlus-
coni is a guilty secret not to be shared with a pesky 
pollster. There are ways to correct for this bias but 
there is no way to know if they really work.
The real uncertainty, however, is Mr Berlusconi 
himself. The man is still by far the best campaigner 
around. He is not a statesman – he is a showman. 
The media is his natural habitat (and the source of 
much of his wealth). In spite of everything – the 
scandals, judicial indictments, poor performance 
in office – 8m voters are still willing to vote for 
him and his illusory promises of tax paybacks and 
job creation. Combined with his allies’ support-
ers, they could be enough for a victory. Were this 
to happen, all the credibility Mario Monti’s tech-
nocratic government has painfully won for Italy 
in the past 14 months would disappear instantly. 
As Europe slowly sorts out its financial crisis, this 
would be a very serious setback.
But the magic and tricks of the consummate 
performer are unlikely to work as they used to. 
Many are comparing this campaign to that of 
2006, when Romano Prodi wasted a lead of 6 per-
centage points and ended up winning in the lower 
house with a margin of 0.1 per cent. Today the pic-
ture is different. Then it was a two-way race. Now 
there are four competitors: running alongside the 
two main ones are Mr Monti and Beppe Grillo, an 
anti-establishment comedian.
It is true that Mr Berlusconi has been able to win 
back some of his lost supporters since his return to 
the scene after he was forced to resign in November 
2011 in the midst of a dramatic financial crisis. But 
the easy gains are over; in a crowded field the extra, 
decisive votes are more elusive.
For this reason it is likely – though by no means 
certain – that Mr Bersani and his allies will win one 
vote more than anybody else in the lower house, 
which is all it takes to win a majority of the seats.
The senate is a different story. Here the majori-
tarian bonus is assigned region by region, creating 
a sort of US-style electoral college, where each re-
gion has a certain weight. To gain a solid majority, 
it is necessary to win the bonus in most of these 
regions and particularly in the big ones. Lombar-
dy, in the north, is crucial. It is a combination of 
Ohio and California. Like Ohio, it is up for grabs 
by either coalition but it carries a weighting similar 
to that of California. If Mr Bersani loses here, it 
is highly unlikely he can win an absolute majori-
ty. This scenario will open the door for Mr Monti’s 
participation in the next government. The paradox 
is that this will happen only if Mr Berlusconi wins 
Lombardy, since Mr Monti himself cannot.
A Bersani-Monti cabinet is the most likely out-
come. Yet one cannot entirely discard the most dis-
turbing possibility of all. Mr Berlusconi’s chance of 
increasing his share of the vote are limited – but Mr 
Bersani’s chances of decreasing his are not. If polls 
do not lie, the present leads should be safe. But, as I 
have said, polls may lie to some extent. What mat-
ters more now, however, is that in recent weeks the 
trend for Mr Bersani has been downwards.
A lacklustre campaign, Mr Berlusconi’s brava-
do and the derivatives scandal surrounding Mon-
te dei Paschi di Siena, the Tuscan bank, have all 
contributed to this trend. Mr Grillo has been the 
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main beneficiary. His Five Star Movement will be 
the surprise success of this election but it will not 
change the outcome. If the slide of Mr Bersani’s 
coalition continues, what was unimaginable just a 
few weeks ago could become possible: a victory by 
default for Mr Berlusconi in the lower house.
Even so, Mr Berlusconi will not win in the sen-
ate. Electoral arithmetic makes this a fact, not a 
guess. The outcome then would be a house-senate 
split. The government needs a confidence vote in 
both. Where would Mr Berlusconi find the extra 
seats he would need?
For Italy – and Europe – the answer to that 
question is no laughing matter. The reappearance 
of Mr Berlusconi is bad enough. The prospect of 
Italy plunging once more into chronic instability 
is worse. 
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2013 Italian Parliamentary Election Pre-Election Report
Aldo Paparo
Published in The Monkey Cage, February 19, 2013
On February 24th and 25th Italian parliamen-
tary elections will be held. The electoral system in 
place is referred to in Italy as the “Calderoli law”, 
approved in 2005 and already used in the 2006 and 
2008. Both the Chamber of Deputies and the Sen-
ate are elected with a proportional system with a 
majority premium. The two systems however are 
not identical.
For the Chamber of Deputies it is a majority-as-
suring system. The party or coalition of parties 
that gets a plurality of the votes at the national level 
is guaranteed 54% of the seats (340) regardless of 
its percentage of votes. In the case of coalitions the 
votes of all its parties are counted for determin-
ing who gets the majority bonus. The remaining 
seats are allocated proportionally among the losers 
which meet the conditions for gaining representa-
tion. For parties running alone the threshold for 
getting seats is 4%. For parties running in coalition 
the threshold is 2%, provided their coalition gets at 
least 10% of the votes. For each coalition with more 
than 10% the largest party below the 2% threshold 
is entitled to receive seats. Party lists are closed.
For the Senate the system is similar to that of 
the Chamber but it is not majority-assuring. The 
major difference is that the majority bonus is allo-
cated at the regional level. In 17 out of 20 regions 
the party or coalition of parties that gets a plurality 
of the votes is guaranteed 55% of the seats assigned 
to each region regardless of its percentage of votes. 
In the case of coalitions the votes of all parties in 
the coalition are counted for determining who gets 
the majority bonus. The remaining seats are allo-
cated proportionally among the losers which meet 
the conditions for gaining representation. For par-
ties running alone the threshold for receiving seats 
is 8%. For parties running in coalition the thresh-
old is 3%, provided their coalition gets at least 20% 
of the votes. Party lists are closed.
The regional allocation of the majority premi-
ums in the Senate makes it difficult achieving an 
absolute majority of seats. Even a party or coalition 
with a 5-8 percentage point lead at the national lev-
el might not be able to get 158 out of 350 seats. This 
can happen if it loses in 2 of the largest regions and 
it is particularly true in a multipolar situation such 
as exists now.
An important element to consider is that in our 
parliamentary system the government must receive 
a confidence vote by both Houses. A non-confi-
dence vote by either of the two legislative houses 
entails the resignation of the government.
Another important difference between the 
Chamber and the Senate electoral systems is vot-
ing age: all citizens above 18 years can vote for the 
Chamber, but only those who are at least 25 can 
vote for the Senate. So there are nearly 5 million 
Italians who only vote for the Chamber of Deputies. 
It’s about 10% of total voters. There is no guarantee 
that the results will be the same in the two hous-
es. In 2006 Prodi’s coalition won a plurality in the 
Chamber but Berlusconi’s received more votes in 
the Senate. It was only thanks to the 6 seats allocat-
ed in the constituency for “Italians living abroad” 
that Prodi was able to get a majority of one.
Five years ago, in the previous general elec-
tion, Berlusconi’s coalition received 46,8% of valid 
votes for the Chamber gaining the 340 seats. His 
party, PdL, had 37,4% and 272 seats. His older and 
most loyal ally, the Northern League, gained 60 
seats with 8,3% of the votes; the Movement for au-
tonomies (MpA), the third party of the coalition, 
gained 8 seats even though it had only 1,1% of the 
vote. The Democratic Party (PD) had 33,2% of val-
id votes and 211 seats, its coalition ally, Di Pietro’s 
IdV got 28 seats with 4,4% of the vote. The only 
other party who obtained representatives was Cas-
ini’s UdC: 5,6% of the votes and 36 seats. A total of 
6 national parties entered the Chamber1. This was a 
1  See D’Alimonte and Chiaramonte [2010]
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very low number for Italian political system. Only 
two years earlier, in the 2006 general elections, 10 
parties gained representation with the same elec-
toral system2.
In the Senate Berlusconi won 12 regions. This 
was enough to gain an absolute majority because 
the 5 regions where he lost contributed less than 
20% of total senatorial seats. His coalition had a 
total of 174 seats against the 136 of the center-left 
and the 3 of UdC. So for the third time in Italian 
history he formed a government at the beginning 
of the legislature.
In late 2010 the government suffered the de-
fection of the President of the Chamber Fini and 
a group of his followers who formed a new party: 
Future and Liberty for Italy (FLI). This defection 
forced a no-confidence vote on December 14th: the 
government barely survived thanks to defections 
from opposition groups.
In November 2011, after having lost an explicit 
majority in the Chamber and with the spread be-
tween Italian and German 10 year Treasury bonds 
above 500 points, Berlusconi finally resigned on 
the 12th. The President of the Republic Napolitano 
appointed as prime minister Mario Monti, an ac-
ademic economist and former UE commissioner 
who had never run for office before. His govern-
ment, entirely composed by experts, received a very 
large confidence vote in both Houses, being sup-
ported by PdL, PD, UdC and FLI. The tally in favor 
was 281 votes in the Senate and 556 in the Chamber.
The top priority of the new cabinet was reas-
suring financial markets and UE partners through 
austerity measures. The first and most important 
measure was the reform of the pension system. 
Another important reform was the reintroduction 
of a property tax that had been abolished by Ber-
lusconi. In the first months the new government 
was perceived as the county savior and had an ex-
ceptionally high popularity rating, in spite of the 
tough reforms carried forward. Parties were un-
able to do anything but support the government’s 
proposals.
During 2012 the government tried to make a se-
ries of reforms, but the parties gradually regained 
leverage and were able to stop or change them so as 
not to hurt their constituencies. This happened for 
example with the labor-market reform which fell 
short of what the government wanted to achieve 
2  See D’Alimonte and Chiaramonte [2007]
because of the resistance of the unions and the 
PD. The same is true of the new law on corruption 
which was diluted as a result of PdL opposition. 
In the meantime the economic recession hit even 
harder and the social crisis became worse, leaving 
the government in a difficult position that cost it 
much of its earlier popularity.
In November the center-left coalition orga-
nized primary elections to select its candidate for 
prime minister. The members of the coalition are 
the Democratic Party (PD), Italian Socialist Par-
ty (PSI), Democratic Center, and Left Ecology and 
Freedom (SEL). Pierluigi Bersani, the PD secre-
tary, won against Florence major Renzi in the sec-
ond round (December 2nd)3. At that time all polls 
showed his coalition with a large advantage over 
its rivals. It was was running above 40% and re-
mained at that level until the end of the year4. As a 
front runner Bersani considered himself the “rab-
bit on the run” and he developed a very conserva-
tive campaign strategy that has probably cost him 
some votes in the long run.
On December 6th PdL secretary Alfano an-
nounced in a parliamentary speech the intention 
of his party to withdraw its support to the Monti 
cabinet. Two days later Monti announced his resig-
nation, to become effective after the budget bill for 
fiscal year 2013 had been approved.
A few days later Berlusconi said he would not 
run if Monti would accept an offer to lead a cen-
ter-right coalition, formed by PdL, UdC, FLI and 
maybe Northern League. Monti refused the offer 
and soon after announced his decision to run. He 
presented his political program, referred to as the 
‘Monti agenda’, declaring that his goal was to unite 
reformers both on the left and on the right of the 
political spectrum in order to overcome the rigidi-
ty of what he considered an obsolete bipolar pattern 
of competition. He followed the announcement 
with the creation of his own party, Civic Choice, 
which entered a coalition with UdC and FLI. In the 
Senate the three parties chose to run as a single list 
because of the 8 % threshold.
Berlusconi then recreated his traditional al-
liance with the Northern League. Originally the 
League had resisted this option but its resistance 
dropped when Berlusconi agreeded to support the 
3  For a detailed report of this primary election, see De Sio 
and Emanuele [2013].
4  On this, see Emanuele [2013].
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League leader, Roberto Maroni, in his bid to be-
come governor of Lombardy, the most important 
Italian region. Lombardy regional election will be 
held the same day of the national elections. Besides 
the League the Berlusconi coalition includes oth-
er minor allies whose number varies from region 
to region. After organizing the coalition, Berlus-
coni started a massive campaign of television in-
terviews and talk show appearances which paid 
off in the polls. His main issue has been tax relief, 
including the reimbursement of the property tax 
introduced by the Monti government for whom his 
party had voted in Parliament. He also started to 
blame Monti and his policies for the worsening of 
the economic situation, describing him (Monti) as 
his (Berlusconi’s) biggest political regret.
In the last weeks of the campaign the one can-
didate who has been very visible, and the only one 
who is bringing the crowds out, is Beppe Grillo. He 
is a former television comedian and the founder of 
the 5 star movement (M5S). For the past two years 
this movement was present only in local elections. 
Being a populist and anti-establishemnt movement 
it is very hard to locate on a right-left axis. It has at-
tracted votes both from former center-left and cen-
ter-right voters. Thanks to the “Tsunami tour” of its 
leader, it is gaining attention and votes and is now 
in third place with a chance to move to second. The 
recent corruption scandals like the Monte dei Pas-
chi and Finmeccanica have given to it a big boost.
As of February 9th no polls can legally be pub-
lished in Italy. The last data published (see above) 
show a lead of 5-6 percentage points in favor of 
Bersani, with Berlusconi around 28 % and Mon-
ti and Grillo at 15%. If they are correct the most 
probable outcome of the vote is a Bersani win in 
the Chamber. At least 10 parties will get seats, even 
if Civil Revolution (the union of parties on PD’s 
left) should remain below the 4% threshold.
It is tougher to predict the result of the Senate 
since the electoral system creates a sort of lottery of 
17 regional premiums. Berlusconi is expected to win 
in Sicily and Veneto. if he manages to conquer one 
of the other battleground regions (Lombardy, Cam-
pania, Friuli, Apulia, Piedmont), Bersani would not 
have an absolute majority. In that case a Monti-Ber-
sani cabinet is the most likely outcome. This is a key 
point in the campaign strategy of all major parties. 
Bersani has repeatedly said that even if he won an 
absolute majority, he would ally himself with all 
Figure 1. Weekly polls by IPSOS for the TV program Ballarò.
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truly Europeanist and anti-populist forces in order 
to solve together Italy’s huge problems. His major 
ally, SEL’s leader Vendola, has taken a different po-
sition, questioning the possibility of governing with 
Monti. The incumbent prime minister replied that 
if Bersani wants to cooperate with him he needs to 
choose between him and the extremists. All of this 
sounds however as campaign posturing. At the end 
of the day, if polls do not lie, after February 25th It-
aly will be governed by a coalition that will include 
Vendola, Bersani and Monti with Bersani as prime 
minister. How long will it last is a different matter.
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Table 1. Senate seats according to regional polls by Tecnè for SkyTv published on February 7th.
Region Region  seats
Majority  
premium 
seats
Bersani’s 
coalition 
seats
Monti’s  
coalition 
seats 
Berlusconi’s 
coalition 
seats
Grillo’s 5 
star mov. 
seats
Other  
parties  
seats
Piedmont 22 13 13 2 5 2 0
Lombardy 49 27 27 5 12 5 0
Veneto 24 14 5 2 14 3 0
Friuli-Venezia Giulia 7 4 1 1 4 1 0
Liguria 8 5 5 1 1 1 0
Emilia-Romagna 22 13 13 2 4 3 0
Tuscany 18 10 10 1 5 2 0
Umbria 7 4 4 1 1 1 0
Marche 8 5 5 1 1 1 0
Lazio 28 16 16 3 6 3 0
Abruzzo 7 4 4 1 1 1 0
Campania 29 16 16 3 6 4 0
Apulia 20 11 11 2 4 3 0
Basilicata 7 4 4 1 1 1 0
Calabria 10 6 6 1 2 1 0
Sicily 25 14 4 3 14 4 0
Sardinia 8 5 5 1 2 0 0
Molise 2 - 1 0 1 0 0
Trentino-Alto Adige 7 - 4 2 1 0 0
Aosta valley 1 - 0 0 0 0 1
Foreign constituency 6 - 3 1 1 0 1
Total 315   157 34 86 36 2
NOTE: in red the regions where the majority bonus is assigned to the Bersani’s coalition; in blue the regions as-
signed to the Berlusconi’s coalition.
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There is an electoral scenario that up to now al-
most nobody has taken seriously into account, and 
this is Silvio Berlusconi’s victory at the Chamber 
of Deputies. The issue whether Pierluigi Bersani 
should win in this arena was, and still is, some-
thing taken for granted by most people. For several 
weeks, analyses have been focused on the lottery 
of the Senate, where, as a matter of fact, there is 
no assurance that the Bersani-Vendola (PD-SEL) 
coalition will win the absolute majority of seats. It 
will depend on the results of the elections in the 
following identified and monitored key regions: 
Lombardy, Sicily, and Campania. Further, what if 
the real unknown was the Chamber of Deputies? 
Several exit polls published last Friday gave a mar-
gin of five to six percentage points between the two 
major coalitions. In times of normality and a few 
days before the elections, there should be a safety 
margin to win at the Chamber of Deputies, where 
a single vote that separates one coalition from its 
competitors is enough for that coalition to get the 
majority bonus. But these are not times of normal-
ity. It is possible that the exit polls do not give us 
a fully accurate picture of the public opinion’s cli-
mate. Within the numbers could be the so-called 
Berlusconi effect, similar to the Bradley effect in 
the United States. Bradley, the first black mayor 
of Los Angeles, was a gubernatorial candidate in 
the 1982 California elections. His popularity in 
the exit polls was systematically overestimated 
because many white electors felt ashamed in ad-
mitting that they were not prone to voting for a 
black man. Nowadays, with Berlusconi, something 
similar to the Democrazia Cristiana at the time of 
the First Republic could happen. And maybe, to 
some extent, it could also be true for Beppe Grillo. 
There are “techniques” to correct this bias, but it 
is not certain whether they will work. This is also 
a reason why exit polls give differences that could 
be very significant. Together with the above-men-
tioned examples is another poll that recorded a 
difference of only four points last week and anoth-
er one, that of Euromedia Research (the company 
closest to Berlusconi), that estimated a difference of 
less than two points. Such minor differences that 
were unimaginable a few weeks ago are no longer 
unimaginable.
There are two ways to win the elections: One is 
by running after your competitor and overtaking 
him by getting one vote more. Another way is by 
looking at your competitor losing votes. Up to now, 
the analytical perspective for winning these elec-
tions has been the first. With the PD-SEL coalition 
gaining over 35% of the votes at the Chamber, it 
was not conceivable that Berlusconi could win. He 
could not get there, and he cannot. But what we 
have witnessed during these last weeks of the elec-
toral campaigns is not only the largely foreseeable 
regain of Il Cavaliere, but also the slow wearing 
away of the PD and its ally, SEL. It is the combi-
nation of these two phenomena that puts into dis-
cussion some given certainties. We do not believe, 
and we have already written in this newspaper, that 
there are wide recovery margins for Berlusconi. 
This time, compared with 2006, he has too many 
competitors, among whom is Grillo, in a big rec-
lamation in this phase. Nonetheless, if the fall of 
the PD and SEL continues, Berlusconi gaining a bit 
more than what he has now will be enough to make 
a comeback in the game being played at the Cham-
ber of Deputies. If the threshold for winning drops 
and stays a bit above 30%, it is a totally different 
issue. At this point, an important difference can be 
made by the useful vote both at the Chamber and 
at the Senate. 
As of mid-December, the PD has lost almost six 
percentage points, and the coalition as a whole has 
lost almost eight points (data provided by Ipsos). A 
series of different factors have contributed to this 
trend. Some are understandable, with others less 
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understandable. It was obvious that after the big de-
ployment of the primary elections, things would be 
a blur. But it has lasted too long. It is fine to have a 
campaign branch out of Bersani, but why is the PD 
not among people like Grillo? Where are the vol-
unteers that have given life to the confrontation for 
the primary elections? Social media are not enough 
to make an electoral campaign. One also needs the 
masses and the door-to-door campaign. Obama is 
a good example. And then, obviously, there are the 
scandals and omissions. It goes without saying that 
among the first of these scandals is Banca Monte 
dei Paschi di Siena, which undoubtedly has caused 
damage to the image and bucket of consensus of 
the PD. As for the omissions, one should know that 
they are many, but one clamorously stands out: a 
convincing and obsessively communicated pro-
posal on the costs of politics. This is a reform that 
stands at the top of the Italians’ wishes and costs 
nothing.
These elections will be won not by the stronger, 
as it has always been during the Second Republic, 
but by the party less weak. With a few votes, the 
winner will receive the whole jackpot. It is a con-
flict between two weaknesses in a changing world. 
The end of February will be pretty hot despite the 
temperature these days. But who knows, perhaps 
the resignation of the pope will change something. 
References
D’Alimonte, R., and Vassallo, S. [2006], Chi è arrivato 
primo?, in ITANES (ed.), Dov’è la vittoria, Bologna, Il 
Mulino, pp. 13–34.
De Sio, L. [2006], Elettori «convertiti», elettori «traghet-
tati», in ITANES (ed.), Dov’è la vittoria, Bologna, Il 
Mulino, pp. 61–76.
De Sio, L. [2007], Al di là delle apparenze. Il risultato del-
le elezioni, in Chiaramonte, A., and D’Alimonte, R. 
(eds.), Proporzionale ma non solo. Le elezioni politiche 
del 2006, Bologna, Il Mulino, pp. 243–304.
De Sio, L. [2007], For a Few Votes More: The Italian Gen-
eral Elections of April 2006, South European Society 
and Politics 12 (1), pp. 95-109.
Legnante, G., and Sani, G. [2007], Campagna elettorale 
e sondaggi, in Chiaramonte, A., and D’Alimonte, R. 
(eds.), Proporzionale ma non solo. Le elezione politiche 
del 2006, Bologna, Il Mulino, pp. 243–304.
Sani, G. [2006], Vincere la campagna, perdere le elezioni, 
in ITANES (ed.), Dov’è la vittoria, Bologna, Il Mulino, 
pp. 49–60.
De Sio L., V. Emanuele, N. Maggini and A. Paparo (eds.), The Italian General Elections of 2013: A dangerous stalemate?, 
Rome, CISE, 2013
ISBN (print) 978-88-98012-10-7 / ISBN (online) 978-88-98012-09-1
The uncertainty of Monti’s electoral hold
Roberto D’Alimonte
Published in Il Sole 24 Ore, February 22, 2013
The country’s next government will depend on 
the vote at the Senate. This is true in both of the 
following cases: if Silvio Berlusconi wins at the 
Chamber of Deputies or if Pierluigi Bersani wins, 
which seems pretty likely, given the most recent 
trends. In this branch of the Parliament, anything 
can happen. In 2006, Berlusconi’s CdL1 placed first 
in 7 out of 17 regions, and this was enough to give 
Il Cavaliere 155 seats against the 154 seats of Ro-
mano Prodi’s Unione2. It went like that because the 
CdL won in many so-called heavy regions: Lom-
bardy, Piedmont, Veneto, Lazio, Apulia, and Sicily 
(together with Friuli-Venezia Giulia). Prodi saved 
himself, thanks to Campania, where he placed 
first with 49.6% of the votes against 49.1% of the 
center-right coalition. Without that margin of 0.5 
percentage points, the history of the country would 
have taken another direction.
In 2013, if Berlusconi wins in the same seven 
regions, he will get 124 seats (i.e., 31 less than last 
time)—this without considering his percentage 
of votes. This data alone tells how much the pres-
ent situation has changed compared with 2006. 
The difference is represented by Mario Monti and 
Beppe Grillo. In 2006, the competition had two ma-
jor players. Today, there are four. Indeed, there are 
four coalitions which are able to get more than 8% 
of the votes at the Senate, thus getting seats. This 
means that the coalition that loses the bonus in a 
region loses many more seats than it had in 2006 
because it does not get all the seats meant to be giv-
en to the losers. In fact, it has to share these with 
the other two competitors. Hence, in order to win 
today, one should place first in many more regions. 
Actually, one should win in virtually all regions. 
Only in this way can one hold a solid majority. 
1  CdL (Casa delle Libertà – House of Freedom) was in 
2006 the name of the center-right political coalition led 
by Berlusconi.
2  L’Unione (The Union) was in 2006 the name of the cen-
ter-left political coalition led by Prodi.
With that said, there are three possible outcomes 
of the Senate’s lottery. The first is that Bersani and 
Nichi Vendola get the absolute majority of the seats 
as Berlusconi did in 2008, when he managed to 
elect 174 senators. It is difficult but not impossible 
that this happens again this time. In any case, there 
are different kinds of majority. Also, that of Pro-
di was a majority. But it was very narrow. Let us 
imagine that the center-left wins in all 17 regions. 
In this case, it would total up to 178 seats. A good 
result. But Lombardy, Veneto, and Sicily are unani-
mously considered regions in a precarious balance. 
It would suffice that Bersani loses Lombardy and 
would go down to 162 seats, only four seats above 
the majority threshold. To lose 16 seats in a single 
region is drastic and illustrates well the line of rea-
soning above. Losing the bonus in heavy regions—
with Lombardy being the heaviest—means going 
from heaven to hell. But Lombardy alone is not 
enough. As a matter of fact, even if the center-left 
won here but with Berlusconi winning in Veneto 
and Grillo (or Berlusconi) in Sicily, the center-left 
coalition would stop at 159 seats: definitely too few 
for a safe navigation. Winning in Sicily would not 
be enough for Bersani to have the absolute majori-
ty, even if he very narrowly loses in Lombardy and 
Veneto. In other words, the possibility that Ber-
sani and Vendola succeed in winning the majority 
themselves exists, but it is very fragile. 
The most likely outcome of the elections is that 
the center-left needs Monti to form a government. 
This result may stem from different combinations 
of gained or lost regions. In the table below, we have 
made some hypotheses, but obviously, one could 
make others. The last two simulations show what 
would happen if the center-left lost all three regions 
in a precarious balance: it would have 143 seats, but 
with 33 from Monti’s list, the eventual government’s 
coalition could count on a majority of 176 seats. As 
is shown, we have also considered the hypothesis 
that Grillo and not Berlusconi might win the ma-
jority bonus in Sicily, but this circumstance would 
not change anything for the center-left. For Bersani, 
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the victory in these regions is very important, but 
provided that he is not the winner, it is irrelevant 
who the winner will be between the other two. 
On the contrary, what really matters for Bersani 
is Monti’s electoral hold. In the table, we have consid-
ered the hypothetical case that the premier’s list goes 
below 8% in some regions. This way, its total would 
go down from 33 to 27 seats. A loss of six seats re-
duces the majority of the eventual future government 
with Bersani but does not jeopardize it. Everything 
would change, though, if Monti does not go above the 
threshold of 8% in other heavy regions. For instance, 
if we added Lombardy to the regions considered in 
the table, Monti’s list would go down to 22 seats, 
making the foreseeable postelectoral majorities with 
Bersani much more difficult as well as opening the 
way to the third possible outcome of these elections. 
If Berlusconi wins in the uncertain regions and 
reverse the forecasts in others where he is currently 
taken as a loser and if, at the same time, Monti’s 
list was below expectations, the sum of Vendola’s, 
Bersani’s, and Monti’s seats could not be 158. In 
this case, the only possible governments would be 
either the big coalition (without Grillo) or a gov-
ernment together with Grillo. There is no need to 
highlight the risk of instability with such a scenar-
io. Luckily, it is the least probable scenario.
These days, nothing is really certain with the 
exception of one thing: Berlusconi cannot get the 
absolute majority of the seats at the Senate. This 
is one of the few absolute certainties of these elec-
tions. For this to happen, it should be enough that 
the center-left wins—and this will be the case—in 
Tuscany, Emilia, Marche, Umbria, and Basilica-
ta. But this leads us to a final question: if Berlus-
coni won at the Chamber of Deputies, how could 
he form a government given that he could not get 
the absolute majority of seats at the Senate? With 
whom could he form an alliance? And with which 
perspectives for the country?
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Table 1. Distribution of seats in the Senate based on different scenarios for uncertain regions
Winning coalition in uncertain 
regions Distribution of seats, Senate
Distribution of seats, Senate 
with Monti under the threshold in Liguria, 
Emilia, Tuscany, Umbria, and Marche
Lombardy Veneto Sicily CL Monti CR M5S CL Monti CR M5S
                     
C-L C-L C-L 178 33 60 42 178 27 64 44
C-R C-L C-L 162 33 76 42 162 27 80 44
C-L C-R M5S 159 33 70 51 159 27 74 53
C-R C-R C-L 153 33 85 42 153 27 89 44
C-R C-R M5S 143 33 86 51 143 27 90 53
C-R C-R C-R 143 33 95 42 143 27 99 44
Note: The other 14 regions with the bonus are assigned to the center-left. One of the seats of Molise is given to 
the M5S and one to the center-right. Four of the seats of Trentino-Alto Adige are given to the center-left (together 
with SVP), two to the coalition of Monti, and one to the center-right. Three out of the six seats of the Italians resid-
ing abroad are given to the center-left, one to the center-right, one to Monti, and one to an independent party. 
The seat of the Aosta Valley is given to a local independent party of any other coalition. The simulations are built 
on the basis of hypothetical percentages.
De Sio L., V. Emanuele, N. Maggini and A. Paparo (eds.), The Italian General Elections of 2013: A dangerous stalemate?, 
Rome, CISE, 2013
ISBN (print) 978-88-98012-10-7 / ISBN (online) 978-88-98012-09-1
The 2013 Senate lottery: Possible scenarios
Aldo Paparo
February 23, 2013
A few days before the elections, it is already 
clear that a decisive match is to be played at the 
Senate and, in particular, in some key regions, 
the victory of which may move many seats. The 
result of the elections in these regions will be 
decisive in the gaining or losing of the major-
ity and thus the formation of the next govern-
ment. In this article, we try to sum up which 
scenarios we might see on Monday evening. 
First of all, we present the Senate’s compositions 
resulting from simulations which differ from one 
another on the basis of the results of the three big 
uncertain regions: Lombardy, Veneto, and Sicily. 
For the analysis of these, the basic data are from 
the last regional polls published before they were 
banned by law. On the basis of these data, we have 
partially moved up the M5S’s percentages in ac-
cordance with the hypothesis of an underestima-
tion in the surveys and with a possible rise in the 
last two weeks before the elections. Besides this, we 
have classified the seats not allotted with the bo-
nus (Aosta Valley, Trentino, Molise, and abroad) 
according to our own evaluations. We have then 
considered, in the subsequent simulations, the hy-
pothesis to have minimum variations of the origi-
nal data in order to get the desired result.
As one can see, the center-left can get the the-
oretical maximum of 178 seats in case of victory 
in all 17 regions with the bonus and maintain a 
good majority despite losing one (either Sicily or 
Veneto). In case of loss in another region besides 
Lombardy, Bersani could no longer do without the 
support of the present premier, Monti: the sum of 
the seats of the center-left and of Monti would also 
ensure a majority of 175 senators in case of losses 
in the three regions taken into consideration. We 
have also considered the hypothesis of a slight drop 
in Monti’s list that would preclude the attainment 
of 8% in some regions. In the middle of the table, 
this debacle happens in the five regions where the 
polls preceding the blackout used to show its big-
ger weakness. All in all, the loss involves six seats, 
where four are taken by the center-right and two by 
the M5S. None are taken by the center-left, which 
gets, in these regions, the seats of the majority bo-
nus, regardless of Monti’s result. In the right part of 
the table, we have added Lombardy to the regions 
where Monti goes above the threshold. In this case, 
five seats would be lost all at once: two taken by 
the M5S and three by the big coalition losing the 
region (center-right or center-left in the different 
hypotheses). In reality, Friuli-Venezia Giulia is also 
uncertain. We have not included it as a variable 
in the table because it would have made the table 
overly heavy and also because of the scarce num-
ber of electoral seats of the region. In any case, for 
each scenario of the table, it is enough to subtract 
three seats from the center-left and add them to the 
center-right in order to get the result if the latter 
wins in Friuli. 
As we have seen, the first row of the above ta-
ble shows the best possible result for the center-left, 
and on that basis, the different possible debacles 
are considered. We now want to show the extreme 
limit on the other side: how it would end up in case 
of an extraordinary success of the center-right, the 
most realistic according to our view. In these simu-
lations, Bersani would win only in the four regions 
of the “red zone” and in Liguria, Lazio, Sardinia, 
and Basilicata. Berlusconi would instead conquer 
the bonus in the majority of the regions, the re-
maining nine. How the seats are distributed in this 
case is shown in table 2.
In this case, we have also considered the hy-
pothesis of the defeat of Monti’s list, with respect to 
the background scenario. In an attempt to sketch 
the best possible scenario for Il Cavaliere, we have 
put together the results below the threshold in the 
regions allotted to the center-left in a way to maxi-
mize the conquest by the center-right of the seats 
lost by Monti: first, only in four regions of the “red 
zone” and then in all eight regions of Bersani. We 
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can observe how the center-right cannot get the 
absolute majority of the seats at the Senate. Also, 
in the best hypothesis, they would miss more or 
less 20 seats to reach 158. In case Bersani wins as 
Veltroni had in 2008, winning in Lazio, Liguria, 
and Sardinia would not be enough. The maximum 
result reachable by the coalition led by Berlusconi 
seems to be that of making the formation of any 
government impossible, unless this government 
was supported by an unlikely reedition of the big 
coalition.
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February 25, 2013, 12:58: The geographical data 
regarding the electoral turnout seems to be favorable to 
the center-left.
While waiting for the polls to close and for the 
scrutiny to begin, we present here an analysis on 
the electoral participation that may allow us to 
foresee how things are going to turn out.
We correlated the variation in the turnout from 
previous general elections—registered yesterday 
night at 2200 in various provinces—with the re-
sults obtained by the two coalitions (and their re-
spective major parties) in the political elections of 
2008.
As can be seen in table 1, all the correlations 
calculated are both high and extremely significant. 
For instance, the variance in turnout, which can be 
explained by the difference between the center-left 
and the center-right in 2008, almost reaches 17%. 
In general, it can be observed that the electoral 
strength enjoyed by the center-left and by the PD 
in 2008 is positively correlated to the increase in 
turnout. On the contrary, the correlation between 
votes obtained by the center-right and by the PdL 
in 2008 and the growth in participation is negative. 
This means that the decrease in electoral turnout 
has been extremely pronounced in areas where, 
five years ago, the center-right had been more suc-
cessful; on the other hand, it has been more mod-
erate in areas where the center-left obtained its best 
results. We cannot conclude that the center-right 
voters truly represented the majority of those who 
stayed away from the polls; however, based on 
these analyses, it is possible to presume the exist-
ence of an asymmetric abstention that could ben-
efit Bersani.
February 25, 2013, 16:18: The result at the Senate is 
still very much uncertain.
The simulations for the composition of the Sen-
ate based on the instant polls presented in these 
first hours (very favorable for the center-left), in 
reality, still leave results at the Senate considerably 
uncertain. Too many important regions are still 
hanging in the balance, and we do not know yet in 
how many and which regions Monti’s Scelta Civica 
will go beyond the 8% threshold. For instance, if 
Berlusconi wins only in Veneto and Friuli and Ber-
sani reaches the majority in all other regions, the 
center-left seats would be 167. On the other hand, if 
Berlusconi also reaches the majority in Lombardy, 
Piedmont, and Sicily, the center-left seats would 
decrease to 134. In this case, not even a postelector-
al agreement with Monti could ensure a majority.
Table 1. Ecological correlations (at the provincial level, N=109) between turnout variation (2008-2013) and vari-
ous indicators (measured in 2008):
C-L  − C-R gap in 
2008 (%) C-L 2008 (%) PD2008 (%) C-R2008 (%) PdL 2008 (%)
r 0.41 0.38 0.34 −0.4 −0.37
R2 0.1674 0.1409 0.1155 0.1614 0.1339
p-value 0.0000 0.0001 0.0003 0.0000 0.0001
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February 25, 2013, 17:27: The first simulation of 
the Senate, with 15% of the polling stations already 
scrutinized.
The simulation of the Senate with 15% of the to-
tal number of polling stations already scrutinized 
is as follows: it must be kept in mind that the num-
ber of scrutinized polling stations is not homoge-
neous among various regions; in particular, poll-
ing stations scrutinized in Lazio and Lombardy are 
far below the average.
Table 2. Simulation for the composition of the Sen-
ate, according to scrutiny results at 17:27
Region Bersa-ni Monti
Berlu-
sconi Grillo Other
Piedmont 4 2 13 3 0
Lombardy 12 4 27 6 0
Veneto 4 2 14 4 0
Friuli-Vene-
zia Giulia 4 1 1 1 0
Liguria 5 0 1 2 0
Emilia-Ro-
magna 13 1 4 4 0
Tuscany 10 1 3 4 0
Umbria 4 1 1 1 0
Marche 5 1 1 1 0
Lazio 6 0 16 6 0
Abruzzo 2 0 4 1 0
Molise 1 0 1 0 0
Campania 7 0 16 6 0
Apulia 4 1 11 4 0
Basilicata 4 0 2 1 0
Calabria 2 0 6 2 0
Sicily 5 0 14 6 0
Sardinia 5 0 1 2 0
Trentino-Alto 
Adige 5 1 1 0 0
Aosta Valley 0 0 0 0 1
Overseas 3 1 1 0 1
Total 105 16 138 54 2
February 25, 2013, 17:45: At the second simulation 
of the Senate, 20% of the polling stations are already 
scrutinized.
The simulation of the Senate with 20% of the to-
tal number of polling stations already scrutinized 
is as follows: it must be kept in mind that the num-
ber of scrutinized polling stations is not homoge-
neous among various regions; in particular, poll-
ing stations scrutinized in Lazio and Lombardy are 
far below the average (2% and 7%, respectively).
Table 3. Simulation for the composition of the Sen-
ate, according to scrutiny results at 17:45
Region Bersa-ni Monti
Berlu-
sconi Grillo Other
Piedmont 4 2 13 3 0
Lombardy 12 4 27 6 0
Veneto 4 2 14 4 0
Friuli-Vene-
zia Giulia 4 1 1 1 0
Liguria 5 0 1 2 0
Emilia-Ro-
magna 13 1 4 4 0
Tuscany 10 1 3 4 0
Umbria 4 1 1 1 0
Marche 5 1 1 1 0
Lazio 6 0 16 6 0
Abruzzo 2 0 4 1 0
Molise 1 0 1 0 0
Campania 6 2 16 5 0
Apulia 4 1 11 4 0
Basilicata 4 1 1 1 0
Calabria 6 0 2 2 0
Sicily 5 0 14 6 0
Sardinia 5 0 1 2 0
Trentino-Alto 
Adige 5 1 1 0 0
Aosta Valley 0 0 0 0 1
Overseas 3 1 1 0 1
Total 108 19 133 53 2
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February 25, 2013, 17:56: At the third simulation of 
the Senate, Piedmont  now goes to Bersani (25% of the 
polling stations already scrutinized).
The simulation of the Senate with 25% of the to-
tal number of polling stations already scrutinized 
is as follows: it must be kept in mind that the num-
ber of scrutinized polling stations is not homoge-
neous among various regions; in particular, poll-
ing stations scrutinized in Lazio and Lombardy are 
far below the average (3% and 9%, respectively).
Table 4. Simulation for the composition of the Sen-
ate, according to scrutiny results at 17:56
Region Bersa-ni Monti
Berlu-
sconi Grillo Other
Piedmont 13 2 4 3 0
Lombardy 12 4 27 6 0
Veneto 4 2 14 4 0
Friuli-Vene-
zia Giulia 4 1 1 1 0
Liguria 5 0 1 2 0
Emilia-Ro-
magna 13 1 4 4 0
Tuscany 10 1 3 4 0
Umbria 4 1 1 1 0
Marche 5 1 1 1 0
Lazio 6 0 16 6 0
Abruzzo 2 0 4 1 0
Molise 1 0 1 0 0
Campania 7 0 16 6 0
Apulia 4 1 11 4 0
Basilicata 4 0 2 1 0
Calabria 6 0 2 2 0
Sicily 5 0 14 6 0
Sardinia 5 0 1 2 0
Trentino-Alto 
Adige 5 1 1 0 0
Aosta Valley 0 0 0 0 1
Overseas 3 1 1 0 1
Total 118 16 125 54 2
February 25, 2013, 18:04: At the fourth simulation of 
the Senate, Calabria goes to Berlusconi (30% of the poll-
ing stations already scrutinized).
The simulation of the Senate with 30% of the to-
tal number of polling stations already scrutinized 
is as follows: it must be kept in mind that the num-
ber of scrutinized polling stations is not homoge-
neous among various regions; in particular, poll-
ing stations scrutinized in Lazio and Lombardy are 
far below the average (4% and 13%, respectively). 
In all other regions, this proportion is at least 20%.
Table 5. Simulation for the composition of the Sen-
ate, according to scrutiny results at 18:04
Region Bersa-ni Monti
Berlu-
sconi Grillo Other
Piedmont 13 2 4 3 0
Lombardy 12 4 27 6 0
Veneto 4 2 14 4 0
Friuli-Vene-
zia Giulia 4 1 1 1 0
Liguria 5 0 1 2 0
Emilia-Ro-
magna 13 1 4 4 0
Tuscany 10 1 3 4 0
Umbria 4 1 1 1 0
Marche 5 1 1 1 0
Lazio 6 0 16 6 0
Abruzzo 2 0 4 1 0
Molise 1 0 1 0 0
Campania 6 2 16 5 0
Apulia 4 1 11 4 0
Basilicata 4 0 2 1 0
Calabria 2 0 6 2 0
Sicily 5 0 14 6 0
Sardinia 5 0 1 2 0
Trentino-Alto 
Adige 5 1 1 0 0
Aosta Valley 0 0 0 0 1
Overseas 3 1 1 0 1
Total 113 18 129 53 2
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February 25, 2013, 18:35: There has never been such a 
low turnout in political elections since 1946.
The historical series of electoral participation 
for political elections points to an unmistakable 
fact: today’s electoral turnout stops at 75%, an all-
time low in the history of the republic (the graph 
has been later used in the article “Turnout: An ac-
celerated decline”).
February 25, 2013, 18:46: The simulation of the 
Senate, when  50% of the polling stations are already 
scrutinized.
The simulation of the Senate with 50% of the to-
tal number of polling stations already scrutinized 
is as follows: The regions certainly going to the 
center-left are Emilia-Romagna, Tuscany, Umbria, 
Marche, Basilicata, Liguria, and Sardinia. Those 
certainly going to the center-right are Lombardy, 
Campania, Apulia, and Veneto. The regions hang-
ing in the balance (for which the result is still un-
certain) are Lazio, Piedmont, Friuli Venezia-Gi-
ulia, Abruzzo, Calabria, and Sicily.
Table 6. Simulation for the composition of the Sen-
ate, according to scrutiny results at 18:46
Region Bersa-ni Monti
Berlu-
sconi Grillo Other
Piedmont 4 2 13 3 0
Lombardy 12 4 27 6 0
Veneto 4 2 14 4 0
Friuli-Vene-
zia Giulia 4 1 1 1 0
Liguria 5 0 1 2 0
Emilia-Ro-
magna 13 1 4 4 0
Tuscany 10 1 3 4 0
Umbria 4 1 1 1 0
Marche 5 1 1 1 0
Lazio 16 0 6 6 0
Abruzzo 2 0 4 1 0
Molise 1 0 1 0 0
Campania 6 2 16 5 0
Apulia 4 1 11 4 0
Basilicata 4 0 2 1 0
Calabria 2 0 6 2 0
Sicily 5 0 14 6 0
Sardinia 5 0 1 2 0
Trentino-Alto 
Adige 5 1 1 0 0
Aosta Valley 0 0 0 0 1
Overseas 3 1 1 0 1
Total 114 18 128 53 2
February 25, 2013, 18:53: Turning point elections.
In these first hours, there is an endless stream 
of contradictory results: exit and instant polls, pro-
jections, and simulations based on official data. 
Simulations, in particular, show a remarkable in-
stability: notwithstanding the high proportion of 
already-scrutinized polling stations, whenever data 
relative to new polling stations is made available, 
the simulation results change significantly. What 
is the reason for this instability and contradictory 
behavior? There are at least three elements for this 
reflection: First, the number of regions hanging in 
the balance is very high. Results for Piedmont, Fri-
uli, Lazio, Abruzzo, Calabria, and Sicily are still so 
very uncertain that whenever new polling stations 
get scrutinized, more than one region switches 
from one coalition to the other. This significantly 
changes the composition of the Senate. In the past, 
it had been possible to predict the overall result 
with only 15% of polling stations already scruti-
nized; today, not even 50% seems enough to clearly 
define the situation. However, in reality, there is a 
more important problem. 
Second, the reference points of Italians’ voting 
behavior seem to have radically shifted. In particu-
lar, Grillo’s jump into the political stage seems to 
have cut through the traditional political spectrum 
in a completely cross-cutting way. From a social, 
political, and territorial point of view, he was so 
transversal that it created huge problems for the 
current analytical models of electoral projections 
based on sample polls.
Third, the crisis in the relationship between 
Italians and political parties seems to have reached 
a critical level, whereby even the traditional tools 
used for the analysis of political behaviors (i.e., 
statistically representative samples, interviews, 
surveys) appear to be poorly suited to understand 
and interpret change. This is an absolutely funda-
mental point when considered that the methodolo-
gies used in Italy are the same ones applied in the 
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United States and in other European countries, 
which almost always allow the prediction of elec-
toral results with a fair amount of accuracy. Why 
were these same instruments unable to reflect the 
change in Italians’ electoral behavior? What affect-
ed the public opinion so deeply?
February 25, 2013, 19:19: Maps of the electoral turnout 
for the Chamber of Deputies by province.
(The maps have been later used in the article 
“Turnout: An accelerated decline”)
February 25, 2013, 19:35: Simulation of the Senate, 
with 66% of the polling stations scrutinized.
The simulation of the Senate with 66% of the total 
number of polling stations already scrutinized is as 
follows: The regions certainly going to the center-left 
are Emilia-Romagna, Tuscany, Umbria, Marche, Ba-
silicata, Liguria, Sardinia, and Lazio. Those certainly 
going to the center-right are Lombardy, Campania, 
Apulia, Veneto, and Sicily. The regions hanging in 
the balance are Piedmont, Friuli Venezia-Giulia, 
Abruzzo, and Calabria. In all these regions, the mar-
gin between the two coalitions does not go beyond 
one percentage point. If Berlusconi also won in Friuli, 
the center-right would reach 130 seats; if Piedmont, 
Abruzzo, and Calabria went to Bersani instead, the 
center-left would gain 128 seats in total.
Table 7. Simulation for the composition of the Sen-
ate, according to scrutiny results at 19:35
Region Bersa-ni Monti
Berlu-
sconi Grillo Other
Piedmont 4 2 13 3 0
Lombardy 11 4 27 7 0
Veneto 4 2 14 4 0
Friuli-Vene-
zia Giulia 4 1 1 1 0
Liguria 5 1 1 1 0
Emilia-Ro-
magna 13 1 4 4 0
Tuscany 10 1 3 4 0
Umbria 4 1 1 1 0
Marche 5 1 1 1 0
Lazio 16 0 6 6 0
Abruzzo 2 0 4 1 0
Molise 1 0 1 0 0
Campania 6 2 16 5 0
Apulia 4 1 11 4 0
Basilicata 4 1 1 1 0
Calabria 2 0 6 2 0
Sicily 5 0 14 6 0
Sardinia 5 0 1 2 0
Trentino-Alto 
Adige 5 1 1 0 0
Aosta Valley 0 0 0 0 1
Overseas 3 1 1 0 1
Total 113 20 127 53 2
February 25, 2013, 20:05: The simulation of the 
Senate, when 75% of the polling stations are already 
scrutinized.
The simulation of the Senate with 75% of the 
total number of polling stations already scruti-
nized is as follows: The regions certainly going to 
the center-left are Emilia-Romagna, Tuscany, Um-
bria, Marche, Basilicata, Liguria, Sardinia, and 
Lazio. Those certainly going to the center-right are 
Lombardy, Campania, Apulia, Veneto, and Sicily. 
The regions hanging in the balance are Piedmont, 
Friuli Venezia-Giulia, Abruzzo, and Calabria. In 
all these regions, the margin between the two coa-
litions does not go beyond one percentage point. 
If Berlusconi also won in Friuli, the center-right 
would reach 130 seats; if Piedmont, Abruzzo, and 
Calabria went to Bersani instead, the center-left 
would gain 128 seats in total.
Table 8. Simulation for the composition of the Sen-
ate, according to scrutiny results at 20:05
Region Bersa-ni Monti
Berlu-
sconi Grillo Other
Piedmont 4 2 13 3 0
Lombardy 11 4 27 7 0
Veneto 4 2 14 4 0
Friuli-Vene-
zia Giulia 4 1 1 1 0
Liguria 5 1 1 1 0
Emilia-Ro-
magna 13 1 4 4 0
Tuscany 10 1 3 4 0
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Umbria 4 1 1 1 0
Marche 5 1 1 1 0
Lazio 16 0 6 6 0
Abruzzo 2 0 4 1 0
Molise 1 0 1 0 0
Campania 6 2 16 5 0
Apulia 4 1 11 4 0
Basilicata 4 1 1 1 0
Calabria 2 0 6 2 0
Sicily 5 0 14 6 0
Sardinia 5 0 1 2 0
Trentino-Alto 
Adige 5 1 1 0 0
Aosta Valley 0 0 0 0 1
Overseas 3 1 1 0 1
Total 113 20 127 53 2
February 25, 2013, 20:41: The simulation of the Sen-
ate, with 80% of the polling stations already scrutinized.
The simulation of the Senate with 80% of the to-
tal number of polling stations already scrutinized is 
as follows: The regions certainly going to the center-
left are Emilia-Romagna, Tuscany, Umbria, Marche, 
Basilicata, Liguria, Sardinia, and Lazio. Those cer-
tainly going to the center-right are Lombardy, Cam-
pania, Apulia, Veneto, and Sicily. The regions hang-
ing in the balance are especially Piedmont (0.5) and 
Friuli Venezia-Giulia (0.5). The coalition winning in 
Piedmont would gain nine seats, therefore obtain-
ing the plurality of the seats in the Senate.
Table 9. Simulation for the composition of the Sen-
ate, according to scrutiny results at 20:41
Region Bersa-ni Monti
Berlu-
sconi Grillo Other
Piedmont 4 2 13 3 0
Lombardy 11 4 27 7 0
Veneto 4 2 14 4 0
Friuli-Vene-
zia Giulia 4 1 1 1 0
Liguria 5 1 1 1 0
Emilia-Ro-
magna 13 1 4 4 0
Tuscany 10 1 3 4 0
Umbria 4 1 1 1 0
Marche 5 1 1 1 0
Lazio 16 0 6 6 0
Abruzzo 2 0 4 1 0
Molise 1 0 1 0 0
Campania 6 2 16 5 0
Apulia 4 1 11 4 0
Basilicata 4 1 1 1 0
Calabria 2 0 6 2 0
Sicily 5 0 14 6 0
Sardinia 5 0 1 2 0
Trentino-Alto 
Adige 5 1 1 0 0
Aosta Valley 0 0 0 0 1
Overseas 3 1 1 0 1
Total 113 20 127 53 2
February 25, 2013, 20:43: The simulation of the Cham-
ber, with 50% of the polling stations already scrutinized.
The simulation of the Chamber composition 
with 50% of the total number of polling stations 
already scrutinized is as follows: It is worth noting 
that, even at this stage, victory in the Chamber and 
the consequent achievement of the majority prize 
is still uncertain. In this count, 13 seats (one for 
Aosta Valley and 12 seats for the overseas constitu-
ency) are still excluded.
Table 10. Simulation for the composition of the 
Chamber, according to scrutiny results at 20:43
List Seats at the Chamber
PD 297
SEL 35
CD 5
SVP 3
Tot. C-L 340
PdL 92
LN 18
FdI 9
Tot. C-R 119
Scelta Civica 39
UdC 7
Tot. Monti 45
M5S 112
Total 617
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February 25, 2013, 21:13: The simulation of the Cham-
ber, with 66% of the polling stations already scrutinized.
The simulation of the Chamber composition 
with 66% of the total number of polling stations 
already scrutinized is as follows: It is worth noting 
that, even at this stage, victory in the Chamber and 
the consequent achievement of the majority prize 
is still uncertain. In this count, 13 seats (one for 
Aosta Valley and 12 seats for the overseas constitu-
ency) are still excluded.
Table 11. Simulation for the composition of the 
Chamber, according to scrutiny results at 21:13
List Seats at the Chamber
PD 293
SEL 36
CD 4
SVP 7
Tot. C-L 340
PdL 94
LN 19
FdI 9
Tot. C-R 122
Scelta Civica 38
UdC 7
Tot. Monti 45
M5S 110
Total 617
February 25, 2013, 21:28: The simulation of the Sen-
ate, 90% of the polling stations are already scrutinized.
The simulation of the Senate with 90% of the 
total number of polling stations already scruti-
nized is as follows: The regions certainly going to 
the center-left are Emilia-Romagna, Tuscany, Um-
bria, Marche, Basilicata, Liguria, Sardinia, and 
Lazio. Those certainly going to the center-right are 
Lombardy, Campania, Apulia, Veneto, and Sicily. 
The regions hanging in the balance are especially 
Piedmont (0.5) and Friuli Venezia-Giulia (0.5). The 
coalition winning in Piedmont would gain nine 
seats, therefore obtaining the plurality of the seats 
in the Senate.
Table 12. Simulation for the composition of the Sen-
ate, according to scrutiny results at 21:28
Region Bersa-ni Monti
Berlu-
sconi Grillo Other
Piedmont 4 2 13 3 0
Lombardy 11 4 27 7 0
Veneto 4 2 14 4 0
Friuli-Vene-
zia Giulia 4 1 1 1 0
Liguria 5 1 1 1 0
Emilia-Ro-
magna 13 1 4 4 0
Tuscany 10 1 3 4 0
Umbria 4 1 1 1 0
Marche 5 1 1 1 0
Lazio 16 0 6 6 0
Abruzzo 2 0 4 1 0
Molise 1 0 1 0 0
Campania 6 2 16 5 0
Apulia 4 1 11 4 0
Basilicata 4 1 1 1 0
Calabria 2 0 6 2 0
Sicily 5 0 14 6 0
Sardinia 5 0 1 2 0
Trentino-Alto 
Adige 5 1 1 0 0
Aosta Valley 0 0 0 0 1
Overseas 3 1 1 0 1
Total 113 20 127 53 2
February 25, 2013, 22:33: Berlusconi wins at the 
Chamber if …
According to our calculations, assuming that in 
the remaining 7.327 polling stations, the turnout 
will be equal to that of the 54,119 already-scruti-
nized polling stations, Berlusconi will win at the 
Chamber if he achieves a 6.6 percentage point mar-
gin over Bersani in the remaining polling stations.
February 25, 2013, 23:09: The simulation of the Sen-
ate, Bersani takes the lead back in Piedmont.
In Piedmont, the center-left surpassed the 
center-right in the vote count. With these results, 
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although not yet final, Bersani would gain the rela-
tive majority at the Senate.
Table 13. Simulation for the composition of the Sen-
ate, according to scrutiny results at 23:09
Region Bersa-ni Monti
Berlu-
sconi Grillo Other
Piedmont 13 2 4 3 0
Lombardy 11 4 27 7 0
Veneto 4 2 14 4 0
Friuli-Vene-
zia Giulia 4 1 1 1 0
Liguria 5 1 1 1 0
Emilia-Ro-
magna 13 1 4 4 0
Tuscany 10 1 3 4 0
Umbria 4 1 1 1 0
Marche 5 1 1 1 0
Lazio 16 0 6 6 0
Abruzzo 1 0 4 2 0
Molise 1 0 1 0 0
Campania 6 2 16 5 0
Apulia 4 1 11 4 0
Basilicata 4 1 1 1 0
Calabria 2 0 6 2 0
Sicily 5 0 14 6 0
Sardinia 5 0 1 2 0
Trentino-Alto 
Adige 5 1 1 0 0
Aosta Valley 0 0 0 0 1
Overseas 3 1 1 0 1
Total 121 20 118 54 2
February 25, 2013, 23:17: Update: Berlusconi wins at 
the Chamber if …
With more than 95% of the scrutinized poll-
ing stations, Bersani has an advantage of roughly 
215,000. This means that if the turnout in the re-
maining polling stations equals that of the already-
scrutinized polling stations, Berlusconi should 
gain a margin of over 10 percentage points in order 
to surpass the rival and gain the 340 seats given as 
the majority bonus at the Chamber. 
February 25, 2013, 23:38: Update: Berlusconi wins at 
the Chamber if …
In the last 3.5% of the polling stations (2,136), 
Berlusconi should win over Bersani with a margin 
of over 16 percentage points in order to surpass 
Bersani and therefore gain the majority bonus at 
the Chamber.
February 26, 2013, 00:11: The Chamber goes toward 
Bersani. 
Only 1,234 polling stations (2% of the total) are 
missing. Bersani has roughly 150,000 votes in his 
favor. Berlusconi should win with a margin of more 
than 22 percentage points over Bersani in order to 
get the majority in the Chamber. At this point, this 
occurrence seems very unlikely.
February 26, 2013, 00:32: At the Senate, only the over-
seas constituency votes are missing. Bersani gets closer to 
gaining the relative majority. 
Scrutiny in Piedmont has ended; therefore, the 
Italian result is final (only a few polling stations are 
missing, and they are not decisive for any region). 
The final data for the six seats elected overseas are 
still missing, but it seems highly unlikely that Ber-
lusconi could invert the trend there. In order to 
achieve this, he should win in the North American, 
African, Asian, and Oceanian constituencies. For 
this reason, it appears that, with a high probability, 
the relative majority at the Senate will go to Ber-
sani; he, however, will be very far from having the 
absolute majority (even with a possible agreement 
with Monti’s senators).
Table 14. Simulation for the composition of the 
Senate, according to scrutiny results on Feb 26, at 
00:32
Region Bersa-ni Monti
Berlu-
sconi Grillo Other
Piedmont 13 2 4 3 0
Lombardy 11 4 27 7 0
Veneto 4 2 14 4 0
Friuli-Vene-
zia Giulia 4 1 1 1 0
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Liguria 5 1 1 1 0
Emilia-Ro-
magna 13 1 4 4 0
Tuscany 10 1 3 4 0
Umbria 4 1 1 1 0
Marche 5 1 1 1 0
Lazio 16 0 6 6 0
Abruzzo 1 0 4 2 0
Molise 1 0 1 0 0
Campania 6 2 16 5 0
Apulia 4 1 11 4 0
Basilicata 4 1 1 1 0
Calabria 2 0 6 2 0
Sicily 5 0 14 6 0
Sardinia 5 0 1 2 0
Trentino-Alto 
Adige 5 1 1 0 0
Aosta Valley 0 0 0 0 1
Overseas 4 2 0 0 1
Total 122 21 117 54 1
February 26, 2013, 00:46: Almost definitive seats at the 
Chamber.
The simulation of the seats at the Chamber—
with only 421 polling stations still to be scruti-
nized—is as follows: the seats for Aosta Valley and 
the overseas constituency are still missing.
Table 15. Simulation for the composition of the 
Chamber, according to scrutiny results on Feb 26, 
at 00:46
List Seats at the Chamber
PD 292
SEL 37
CD 6
SVP 5
Tot. C-L 340
PdL 97
LN 18
FdI 9
Tot. C-R 124
Scelta Civica 37
UdC 8
Tot. Monti 45
M5S 108
Total 617
February 26, 2013, 01:00: The map for the Chamber: 
Differences in the electoral results between Bersani and 
Berlusconi, by province. 
Here is the map of the differences in the elec-
toral results between the center-left and the center-
right coalitions at the provincial level. The number 
in each province represents the percentage points 
of such difference.
Figure 1. map of gap between center-left and 
center-right (percentage points) by province
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February 26, 2013, 01:05: The sign of change: Some 
“bigs” remain outside the Parliament.
From our calculations, some notable candidates 
remain outside the Parliament. Among them are 
some members of FLI, such as Fini, Bocchino, Gra-
nata, Briguglio, Perina, Bongiorno, and Baldas-
sarri (only Della Vedova should be elected in Fini’s 
party), and those of Rivoluzione Civile, such as 
Ingroia, Di Pietro, Diliberto, Bonelli, and Ferrero. 
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Outside of the Parliament also remain the former 
president of the Senate, Franco Marini (PD), and 
important elements of the center-right, such as 
Napoli, Paniz, Crosetto, Storace, Lombardo, and 
Miccichè.
February 26, 2013, 11:24: Senate, the final seats by 
list.
The table with the composition of final seats at 
the Senate, divided by list, is as follows:
Table 16. Final composition of the Senate
PD SEL Crocetta SVP C-L PdL LN GS C-R M5S Monti VDA
Piedmont 13 13 3 1 4 3 2
Lombardy 11 11 16 11 27 7 4
Veneto 4 4 9 5 14 4 2
FVG 4 4 1 1 1 1
Liguria 5 5 1 1 1 1
Emilia R. 13 13 4 4 4 1
Tuscany 9 1 10 3 3 4 1
Umbria 4 4 1 1 1 1
Marche 5 5 1 1 1 1
Lazio 14 2 16 6 6 6
Abruzzo 1 1 4 4 2
Molise 1 1 1 1
Campania 5 1 6 16 16 5 2
Apulia 3 1 4 11 11 4 1
Basilicata 3 1 4 1 1 1 1
Calabria 2 2 5 1 6 2
Sicily 4 1 5 14 14 6
Sardinia 4 1 5 1 1 2
TAA 3* 2 5 1 1 1
VDA 1
Overseas 4 4 2
Total 112 7 1 2 122 98 18 1 117 54 21 1
* Two out of three senators elected with the center-left in Trentino (here assigned to PD) are in reality autono-
mous personalities, independent from the party to which they were assigned.
43
The live coverage on the CISE website on election day
February 26, 2013, 11:24: Chamber, the final seats by 
list. 
The table with the composition of final seats at 
the Chamber is as follows:
Table 17. Final composition of the Chamber
PD SEL CD SVP C-L PdL LN FdI C-R M5S SC UdC Other
Piedmont 1 11 2 13 3 1 4 4 2
Piedmont 2 10 1 11 3 1 1 5 4 2
Lombardy 1 21 2 23 5 2 1 8 6 3
Lombardy 2 20 2 22 7 6 13 6 4
Lombardy 3 8 1 9 2 1 1 4 2 1
TAA 3 1 5 9 1 1 1 1
Veneto 1 13 1 14 5 3 8 6 2 1
Veneto 2 9 1 10 2 2 4 4 2
FVG 6 1 7 1 1 2 2 1
Liguria 9 1 10 2 2 3 1
Emilia-R. 28 2 30 5 1 6 7 2
Piedmont 23 2 1 26 4 1 5 5 2
Umbria 5 5 1 1 2 1
Marche 9 1 10 2 2 3 1
Lazio 1 21 3 24 6 1 7 8 2 1
Lazio 2 7 1 8 3 1 4 3 1
Abruzzo 6 1 7 3 3 3 1
Molise 2 2
Campania 1 14 2 1 17 7 1 8 5 1 1
Campania 2 12 2 14 6 1 7 4 2 1
Apulia 15 5 1 21 9 1 10 8 2 1
Basilicata 3 1 4 1 1 1
Calabria 9 1 1 11 4 4 4 1
Sicily 1 10 1 11 6 6 6 1 1
Sicily 2 10 1 1 12 6 6 7 1 1
Sardinia 8 1 1 10 3 3 4 1
VDA 1
Estero 5 5 1 1 1 2 3
Total 297 37 6 5 345 98 18 9 125 109 39 8 4
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Turnout: An accelerated decline
Federico De Lucia and Matteo Cataldi
March 7, 2013
For almost 50 years, Italy has had rates of par-
ticipation in the elections considered absolutely 
high and unknown in almost all the other liberal 
democracies. From 1948 to 1976, the participation 
rate of the political elections has remained above 
90%. As of the 1979’s elections (and including up 
to those of 2001), diachronic comparisons with 
preceding and following phases unfortunately be-
come pretty difficult because in the calculation of 
the electors, Italians residing abroad are also taken 
into account. The latter, having very low rates of 
electoral participation, significantly lower the vot-
ers’ percentage. The graphic below, which shows 
with a line the data concerning the period of cal-
culation of Italians residing abroad, makes it clear 
that the rates—even though still pretty high—en-
ter a declining phase during the early 1980s. How-
ever, if in the final phase of the First Republic one 
has experienced sudden falls (1983, 1992), but also 
important bounces (1987), as during the start of 
the so-called Second Republic, the fall, on the one 
side, has become a constant variable. On the other 
side, it has shown itself in a much stronger way in 
the occasion that the elections are fixed ahead of 
the normal expiry of the legislature (1996, 2008).
A significant component of such a fall in turn-
out, which has affected both the Second Republic 
and the final part of the First Republic, is connect-
ed to the unavoidable decline of the ideological 
tension of the Italian political system after almost 
Figure 1. Turnout trend in elections for the Chamber of Deputies (1948–2013)
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50 years of struggle between fiercely opposing vi-
sions of the world. It is, in other words, a phenome-
non linked to the generational turnover. Older age 
cohorts, socialized in periods of strong ideological 
contrast and great organizational strength by the 
parties (and thus characterized by extremely high 
rates of electoral participation), have been progres-
sively replaced by younger age cohorts, often not 
ideologically characterized and pretty far from the 
active political militancy.
Figure 2. Turnout by province – elections for the Chamber of Deputies (2013)
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Another component, which has particular-
ly characterized the last 20 years, seems instead 
linked to the perception of the inefficiency of the 
new political system and to the disillusion that 
such a perception has slowly created in the elec-
toral body. The fall of turnout would accelerate on 
the occasion of the anticipated elections because it 
is then that the above inefficiency and disillusion 
show themselves more clearly.
However, both these interpretations are not 
Figure 3. Turnout variation 2008–2013 (percentage points)
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enough to explain the phenomenon registered in 
2013: a participation rate of 75.2%, 5.3 percentage 
points less than that of 2008. And this occurs at the 
end of a legislature that has lasted almost the whole 
expected five years. An impressive, unprecedent-
ed phenomenon in the country’s history: the last 
five years’ legislatures ended with a fall in turnout 
that was three times smaller. It is then impossible 
not to connect this fast acceleration with the deep 
political crisis experienced by the country and, in 
particular, with what happened in the final part 
of the last legislature: the absolute and uncondi-
tional drawback of the parties facing the financial 
instability of November 2011; their acceptance of 
austerity policies by the technocratic government 
during the following year, but with their electoral 
campaign strongly critical of these policies at the 
same time; the nonrenewal of the two main poles; 
the incapacity of reforming the electoral law; the 
continuous succession of every sort of judiciary 
scandal; and a populist climate against every caste 
that has characterized these last years. The com-
bined effect of these elements has produced a sort 
of failure of the political system of the Second Re-
public, even in its last configuration as being al-
most bipartisan (the electoral order generated by 
the elections of 2008) and its almost total delegit-
imation. The electorate has reacted: Turnout has 
declined by 2.5 million voters. 
In figures 2 and 3, we can see the turnout for 
each province over the national territory. In the 
first map, we take the percentage of voters at the 
Chamber of Deputies in the most recent elections; 
in the second map, we consider the difference be-
tween the turnout registered in 2013 and that of 
five years ago. The differences marked in color re-
group the provinces in quartiles. 
    In one province out of four, the turnout has 
been smaller than 70%. The totality of these cases is 
found in the south and in the islands, where there 
are only few exceptions. In the central regions, the 
turnout presents data above the average (75.2 %) in 
Lazio and in the “red zone,” with peaks at its heart: 
eastern and central Tuscany, Marche and northern 
Umbria, Romagna, and Emilia up to Reggio. In the 
north, there is instead a clear distinction between 
the northeast (in particular, eastern Lombardy and 
Veneto), where the turnout remains at around or 
above 80% and the northwest (Varese, Como, and 
eastern Piedmont), where turnout falls below the na-
tional average. Above that average remain, but only 
slightly, the metropolitan provinces of Milan and 
Turin. Considering the second map, very similar to 
the first, the geographical articulation of the turnout 
with respect to 2008 shows how the most hit zones 
are the following two: the south and the islands, no-
tably Sicily, and the zone between Lombardy and 
Piedmont. Instead, the turnout has remained steady 
in most of the “red zone” and in the Triveneto, as in 
the metropolitan areas of Rome and Turin.
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An electoral tsunami hits Italy: 50 provinces washed away from 
PD and PdL
Matteo Cataldi and Vincenzo Emanuele
Published in Il Sole 24 Ore, February 27, 2013
The tsunami that came to shore during last Sun-
day’s and Monday’s elections was named Beppe 
Grillo. His exploits were the main novelty of the 
2013 elections. With 8,689,000 votes (26.6%) M5S 
became the first party in Italy at the expense of the 
PD and PdL. It is unprecedented in the history of 
Western Europe that a new party obtained such an 
extreme level of support in its first national elec-
tions. In order to find a similar example, we must 
look back upon the successes of FI in 1994; how-
ever, even then, Silvio Berlusconi’s party only ob-
tained 21% of the Italian vote. Considering the his-
tory of the Italian Republic, it is worth highlighting 
how similar percentages have only been obtained 
by the two main parties of the period. In the First 
Republic, the DC and the PCI were the only parties 
to reach similar numbers. Only later during the 
Second Republic, starting after 1992, were FI, the 
PdL, and the PD able to attain such numbers. The 
success of M5S in 2013 is therefore a monumental 
result in Italian politics.
At this point, it is interesting to analyze the ter-
ritorial characteristics of Grillo’s success. The map 
below shows how the territorial distribution has 
changed looking at the percentage of votes for the 
leading party in each Italian province. In recent 
elections, the PD and the PdL dominated the politi-
cal scene. In 2008, Berlusconi’s party was victorious 
in 67 provinces, winning almost everywhere but in 
the “red zone,” where the PD was strongest. Today, 
M5S is the party that won the most provinces (50) 
and also the majority of regions (11). Grillo was 
hugely successful in Sicily, where his party came in 
first everywhere but Messina, reaching 40% in Tra-
pani and 39% in Ragusa. Grillo’s wave did not just 
stop on the island, where he had already obtained 
first place with 15% during the regional elections 
last October. Instead, he went on to win in many 
other areas of the country, taking 41 provinces that 
were previously center-right as well as 9 that were 
center-left. Furthermore, M5S was able to win in 
some regions that were thought to be strongholds 
of FI and LN, such as the northeast, Cuneo, and 
western Liguria. It was also victorious in other ar-
eas like Marche, Torino, and Genoa, which were 
previously pro-PD.
The PD, led by Pierluigi Bersani, maintained 
its traditional strongholds in the “red zone,” where 
it won with percentages between 30% and 44% 
in Emilia-Romagna, Umbria, and Tuscany (with 
the exception of Lucca, ex-enclave of the DC, won 
by Grillo). In the entire midsouth, Bersani’s party 
only had the relative majority in three provinces. 
Interestingly, in Lombardy, the Democrats won al-
most everywhere, perhaps taking advantage of the 
decisive regional bonus in the Senate, benefiting 
from regional elections and the unusual structure 
of the election (five parties winning above 10% of 
the vote and therefore reducing the winners’ quota 
well below 30%). The exceptions there are Sondrio 
(LN) and Como (PdL). The latter represents the only 
province in the midnorth where Berlusconi has the 
relative majority, whereas five years ago, he had 22. 
The remaining 16 provinces in which the PdL holds 
a lead are concentrated in the south, particularly in 
Apulia and in the provinces of Lazio and Campania. 
Grillo’s tsunami has swept away the histori-
cal stability of the Italian electoral map,1 where, 
election after election, the different areas of the 
country followed similar trends. Only time will 
tell us if these are temporary changes or if we have 
witnessed the emergence of new Italian electoral 
characteristics. 
1  On the historical characteristics of the Italian elector-
al geography, see the analysis of Dogan [1967], Galli et 
al. [1968], Corbetta et al. [1988], Caciagli and Spreafico 
[1990], and Diamanti [2009].
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Figure 1. Map of winning parties by province (values are percentages)
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One of the most relevant results of the 2013 gen-
eral elections, compared with those from 2008, is, 
without any doubt, the electoral decline of the two 
coalitions of the center-left and the center-right.1 
Indeed, the two main coalitions have collectively 
lost nearly 11 million votes. In particular, the cent-
er-right has lost a little more than 7 million votes 
(i.e., 42% of its 2008 consensus), while the center-
left has lost more than 3.5 million votes (i.e., 27% 
of its 2008 consensus). Once again, almost half of 
the center-right’s electorate decided not to vote for 
Silvio Berlusconi’s coalition. This is mirrored by 
the center-left, which was abandoned by almost a 
fourth of its electorate. This electoral meltdown has 
involved both coalitions, even though the center-
right is the political coalition that registered the 
biggest losses, winning 46.8% in 2008 but free-
falling to 29.2% in 2013. Furthermore, in 2008, 
the two coalitions together represented 84.4% of 
the total valid votes, while in 2013, they represent 
“only” 58.7%. All this indicates strongly how the 
Italian party system2 has entered a restructuring 
phase with increasing electoral volatility.3
The center-right lost votes in all regions of Italy, 
but particularly in Liguria (−51%), Sicily (−49%), 
Sardinia and Trentino-Alto Adige (−48%), Marche 
(−46%), and Emilia-Romagna and Friuli-Venezia 
Giulia (−45%). Conversely, the losses registered in 
the majority of southern regions and in Umbria 
are below the national average. In similar fashion, 
the center-left electoral decline occurs in all the re-
1  For a thorough analysis of the 2008 election results, see 
D’Alimonte and Chiaramonte (2010).
2  For an analysis of the evolution of the party system in 
Italy, see Chiaramonte (2007, 2010).
3  For further information on the concept of electoral vola-
tility, see Pedersen (1979) and Bartolini (1986).
gions in Italy (with the exception of Trentino-Alto 
Adige). The most significant losses, those above the 
national average, occur in the southern regions, 
especially in Molise (−40%), where it was known 
that Antonio Di Pietro’s party no longer belongs 
to the coalition. The losses continued in Abruzzo 
(−38%), Sicily (−34%), Sardinia, Apulia, Campa-
nia, Calabria (−31%), Liguria (−32%), and Marche 
(−36%). The losses registered in many of the former 
“red zone”4 regions and in the north are either near 
the average or below it.
The inability of the main political coalitions to 
gather support may be caused by some concurrent 
phenomena. First, with respect to 2008, the elec-
toral turnout5 decreased by approximately 5 per-
centage points (i.e., almost 2.6 million votes). This 
drop is deeper than just the physiological decline 
of participation due to the generational turnover 
(to be estimated at two percentage points in the 
downward). One can therefore hypothesize that a 
good portion of the total votes for the two main 
coalitions in 2008 ended in abstention in 2013. 
Moreover, during the most recent general elec-
tions, the M5S was incredibly successful, obtain-
ing more than 8.5 million votes in the Chamber, 
winning 25.6% of the seats. This is can be attrib-
uted to the success of M5S  and Beppe Grillo to ob-
tain votes from the other two main center-left and 
center-right coalitions. Grillo has been able to col-
lect votes nationally at a pretty homogeneous level, 
represented most strongly in Sicily (33.5%), Marche 
4  For a thorough examination of the characteristics of 
the red subculture and of the electoral behavior of the re-
gions within it, see Baccetti and Messina (2009), Diamanti 
(2010), Floridia (2010), and De Sio (2011).
5  For an analysis of the evolution in Italian electoral turn-
out, see Tuorto (2010).
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The center-right and center-left coalitions lose almost 11 million votes
and Liguria (32.1%). It is important to highlight 
that both Liguria and Sicily are the regions where 
the center-right lost the most votes compared with 
the 2008 elections (almost half of the votes), and 
at the same time, they are two regions where the 
center-left (always compared with 2008) saw losses 
above the national average. As for the center-left, 
it is important to note how the coalition’s small-
est loss was recorded in Lombardy (−18%), where 
the M5S only reached 19.6%, the worst percentage 
obtained by Grillo’s movement with the exception 
for Trentino-Alto Adige (14.6%). The only region of 
the former “red zone” where the losses for the cent-
er-left are above the national average, as we have 
already seen, is Marche, one of the regions where 
the M5S was most successful. 
Finally, Mario Monti’s coalition, compared 
with the UdC in 2008, increased, in absolute terms, 
its votes in all regions except in Sicily, where it lost 
almost 50,000 votes compared with 2008 (−19%). 
In Sicily, Monti and his coalition could not surpass 
5.9% in the Senate and failed to get any candidates 
elected. At the national level, the center coalition 
led by Monti obtained almost 3.5 million votes, 
while the UdC obtained more than 2 million votes 
by itself in 2008. In the diachronic comparison, 
it is important to point out that Monti’s coalition 
showed a territorial distribution of votes notably 
different from that of the UdC in 2008. The regions 
where it saw an increase in votes are Trentino-
Alto Adige (+229%), Lombardy (+164%), Ligu-
ria (+145%), Piedmont (+119%), Emilia-Romagna 
(+108%), Veneto (+104%), and Friuli-Venezia Giulia 
(+102%). The biggest electoral growth occurred 
in these northern regions. In this respect, it is re-
markable that the regions where Monti’s list does 
not reach the electoral threshold of 8% minimum 
in the Senate are all midsouth regions: Lazio, Sar-
dinia, Abruzzo, Calabria, and Sicily. 
Therefore, these elections mark an evident 
electoral decline for the two main coalitions of 
the center-left and center-right, both incapable of 
keeping a significant share of their own electorates. 
This increased electoral volatility can be explained 
to some extent by the growing disaffection toward 
politics and the subsequent increase in abstentions. 
On the other hand, there is now a different com-
petitive dynamic in Italian politics: no longer are 
there only two main coalitions (bipolar); rather, 
now there are four (quadripolar). In particular, a 
new political force, the M5S, has been highly com-
petitive and a viable and popular choice for many 
electors who had previously cast their ballot for the 
center-right or center-left in 2008. 
References
Baccetti, C., and Messina, P. [2009], L’eredità. Le subculture 
politiche della Toscana e del Veneto, Torino, Liviana. 
Bartolini, S. [1986], La volatilità elettorale, in Rivista Itali-
ana di Scienza Politica, vol. 16, pp. 363–400.
Chiaramonte, A. [2007], Il nuovo sistema partitico italiano 
tra bipolarismo e frammentazione, in D’Alimonte, R., 
and Chiaramonte, A. (eds.), Proporzionale ma non 
solo. Le elezioni politiche del 2006, Bologna, Il Mulino, 
pp. 369–406.
Chiaramonte, A. [2010], Dal bipolarismo frammentato 
al bipolarismo limitato? Evoluzione del sistema par-
titico italiano, in D’Alimonte, R., and Chiaramonte, A. 
(eds.), Proporzionale se vi pare. Le elezioni politiche del 
2008, Bologna, Il Mulino, pp. 203–228.
D’Alimonte, R., and Chiaramonte, A. (eds.) [2010], 
Proporzionale se vi pare. Le elezioni politiche del 2008, 
Bologna, Il Mulino.
De Sio, L. (ed.) [2011], La politica cambia, i valori restano? 
Una ricerca sulla cultura politica dei cittadini toscani, 
Firenze, Florence University Press.
Diamanti, I. [2010], Le subculture territoriali sono finite. 
Quindi (re)esistono, in Baccetti, C., Bolgherini, S., 
D’Amico, R., and Riccamboni, G. (eds.), La politica e 
le radici, Torino, Liviana.
Floridia, A. [2010], Le subculture politiche territoriali in 
Italia: epilogo o mutamento?, in Baccetti, C., Bolgh-
erini, S., D’Amico, R., and Riccamboni, G. (eds.), La 
politica e le radici, Torino, Liviana.
Pedersen, M. N. [1979], The dynamics of European party 
systems: Changing patterns of electoral volatility, in 
European Journal of Political Research, vol. 7, pp. 1–26.
Tuorto, D. [2010], La partecipazione al voto, in Bellucci, 
P., and Segatti, P. (eds.), Votare in Italia: 1968–2008, 
Bologna, Il Mulino, pp. 53–79.

De Sio L., V. Emanuele, N. Maggini and A. Paparo (eds.), The Italian General Elections of 2013: A dangerous stalemate?, 
Rome, CISE, 2013
ISBN (print) 978-88-98012-10-7 / ISBN (online) 978-88-98012-09-1
Italian parties’ loss of support and the success of a new political 
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One of the most relevant elements emerging 
from the political elections of 2013 is the backward 
trend of the two main center-right and center-left 
parties, PdL and PD, with respect to the previous 
election of 2008. In this paper, we will try to ana-
lyze the trends of the main Italian parties with a 
diachronic comparison, which includes the 2006 
elections as well. As can be seen in Table 1, M5S 
was the party to receive more votes at the Cham-
ber “(excluding Aosta Valley and the foreign con-
stituency); this party obtained little more than 8.5 
million votes, with a percentage of 25.6%, despite 
its first time at these political elections. This is in-
deed an impressive feat: never in the history of the 
republic after the elections of 1946 has a new party 
obtained a similar percentage at its first political 
elections. The success of Beppe Grillo’s movement, 
for certain, occurred to the detriment of the other 
main parties, PD and PdL. The draining of votes 
from PD and PdL can be explained only partially by 
the competition represented by the M5S; the second 
relevant factor is the decrease in electoral turnout of 
roughly five percentage points with respect to 2008 
(dropping from 80.5% to 75.2%). This decline equals 
slightly more than 2.6 million voters, a figure that 
exceeds the physiological reduction in the turnout 
given by the generational turnover (estimated at 
around two percentage points). The decline will be 
even more consistent if the data from 2006, when 
turnout was 83.6%, is considered. For this reason, it 
is possible to assume that part of the votes given to 
PD and PdL in 2008 turned to abstention. 
In fact, Pierluigi Bersani’s party went from 33.2% 
in 2008 to 25.4% in 2013, dropping almost 3.5 mil-
lion votes along the way. The comparison with the 
L’Ulivo list1 is unflattering as well: the lost votes 
1  L’Ulivo (Olive Tree) is an electoral list of the center-left 
coalition formed in 2006 by the merger of DS and DL.
in this case are again roughly 3.3 million. The de-
crease for Silvio Berlusconi’s PdL has been even 
more marked, both as a percentage and as an abso-
lute value. PdL indeed went from 37.4% in 2008 to 
21.6% in 2013, a decrease of 15.8 percentage points. 
More than 6 million voters abandoned Berlusconi’s 
party. In 2006, FI and AN together obtained almost 
14 million votes. Today, this support declined by 
half. Even by summing the votes gained by the two 
“splinter” parties (FLI and FdI), only a little more 
than 8 million votes are reached, which is far less 
than the 13.6 million of 2008. Today, PdL has less 
votes (both in absolute terms and as a percentage) 
than FI in 2006. The other new political actor of 
these elections is Mario Monti’s list, which gained 
almost 3 million votes, representing 8.3% of the to-
tal. At the Chamber, Monti’s list has surely damaged 
its allies: FLI and UdC. In particular, Pierferdinan-
do Casini’s list currently does not even reach the 2% 
threshold, from 6.8% obtained in 2006 and 5.6% in 
2008: it lost 2 million votes in the past seven years. If 
we sum the votes of the LN and those of GS-MpA, it 
could be said that Roberto Maroni’s party regained 
more or less the levels of 2006 (when it allied itself 
with MpA). Regarding center-right minority par-
ties, Francesco Storace’s LD, with its 0.6%, reached 
the same percentage obtained by FT in 2006.
Considering the center-left, it can be noted that 
the SEL obtained roughly the same amount of votes 
(and the same percentage) of SA in 2008, while RC 
obtained less votes of both IdV in 2008 (one of 
the parties converged in RC) and SA (also formed 
by parties now part of RC). In 2006, the PRC, the 
PdCI2, and the Verdi3 gained—when summed to-
2  PdCI (Partito dei Comunisti Italiani – Party of the Ital-
ian Communists) is a left-wing party founded in 1998.
3  I Verdi (The Greens) is an environmentalist party found-
ed in 1990.
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gether—almost 4 million votes. Today, the SEL and 
RC together do not reach 2 million. This represents 
an overall draining of support for the “radical” left 
parties. 
If we consider the results of the Senate (Table 2), 
the most important differences with respect to the 
Chamber include the PD being the first party with 
27.4% of votes, followed by the M5S with 23.8%. 
The worst performance of the M5S at the Senate 
(and the better performance of PD) might be due 
to the different electorate (citizens have to be 26 or 
older to vote for the Senate) and the possibility of 
expressing different preferences for the Senate and 
Chamber. Faced with the option to vote differently 
for the two institutions, the perception of what was 
at stake in some regions might have provided an 
incentive for some of Grillo’s voters to vote for the 
PD at the Senate in order to achieve the regional 
majority bonus.
In addition to this, Monti’s coalition ran with a 
united list, which obtained 9.1% at the Senate (al-
most the same percentage reached by UdC, FLI, 
Table 1. Votes to parties at the Chamber (general elections of 2006, 2008, and 2013)
Chamber lists
2006
Chamber lists
2008
Chamber lists
2013
absolute 
values %
absolute 
values %
absolute 
values %
L’Ulivo 11.928.362 31.3 PD 12.092.973 33.2 PD 8.644.187 25.4
CD 167.170 0.5
PRC 2.229.604 5.8 SA 1.124.435 3.1 SEL 1.089.442 3.2
PdCI 884.912 2.3
Verdi 783.944 2.1 RC 765.172 2.3
IdV 877.159 2.3 IdV 1.593.487 4.4
RnP1 991.049 2.6 PS2 355.513 1.0 PSI _ _
Socialisti Craxi3 115.105 0.3
SVP 182.703 0.5 SVP 147.666 0.4 SVP 146.804 0.4
FI 9.045.384 23.7 PdL 13.629.068 37.4 PdL 7.332.667 21.6
AN 4.706.654 12.3 FdI 665.830 2.0
AS Mussolini4 255.410 0.7 FLI 159.332 0.5
FT 231.313 0.6 FT-LD 885.226 2.4 LD 219.769 0.6
LN-MpA 1.748.066 4.6 LN 3.024.758 8.3 LN 1.390.156 4.1
MpA 410.490 1.1 GS-MpA 148.552 0.4
UdC 2.579.951 6.8 UdC 2.050.331 5.6 UdC 608.210 1.8
  SC Monti 2.824.065 8.3
            M5S 8.689.458 25.6
             FiD 380.756 1.1
Total Others 173.263 0.5 Total Others 2.527.104 6.9 Total Others 770.954 2.3
Total valid 38.151.407 100 Total valid 36.452.259 100 Total valid 34.002.524 100
Note: This summary excludes the foreign constituency and Aosta Valley.
1 RnP (Rosa nel Pugno – Rose in the Fit) is a center-left electoral list formed in 2005 by the merger of SDI (Social-
isti Democratici Italiani – Italian Democratic Socialists) and RI (Italian Radicals).
2 PS (Partito Socialista – Socialist Party) is a center-left party founded in 2007 by the merger of some minor 
social-democratic parties and groups (among them the most important one was SDI). In 2009 the party was 
renamed PSI (Partito Socialista Italiano – Italian Socialist Party) as the old Italian Socialist Party founded in 1892.
3 I Socialisti (The Socialists) is a center-left party founded by Bobo Craxi (son of Bettino Craxi) in 2006.
4 AS (Alternativa Sociale – Social Alternative) is a coalition of right-wing parties. It was founded in 2004 by 
Benito Mussolini’s granddaughter Alessandra Mussolini and in the 2006 general elections AS was a member of 
Silvio Berlusconi’s coalition.
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and SC together at the Chamber, 10.6%). Monti’s list 
at the Senate gained more votes, both as a percent-
age and in absolute terms, than UdC both in 2008 
and 2006 (when Casini’s party, still allied with Ber-
lusconi, performed best out of all the three previous 
political elections). In general, when compared with 
the past, the observations made for the other par-
ties at the Chamber is also valid for the Senate. 
In conclusion, these political elections regis-
tered an increased electoral volatility that affected 
the majority of Italian parties forced to face the in-
creasing disenchantment and alienation of the citi-
zens with respect to politics in general (outlined by 
a significant increase in abstention) and the emer-
gence of new political actors in particular (first of 
all, Grillo’s M5S).
All these elements suggest that we are undergo-
ing a phase of electoral realignment and the possi-
ble destructuration of Italian political system. 
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Table 2. Votes to parties at the Senate (general elections of 2006, 2008, and 2013)
Senate lists 2006
Senate lists
2008
Senate lists
2013
absolute 
values %
absolute 
values %
absolute 
values %
DS + DL 9.701.748 28.4 PD 11.042.452 33.7 PD 8.400.161 27.4
CD 163.375 0.5
Il megafono1 138.581 0.4
PRC 2.518.361 7.4 SA 1.053.228 3.2 SEL 912.308 3.0
Insieme con 
L’Unione 2
1.423.003 4.2
RC 549.995 1.8
 IdV 986.191 2.9 IdV 1.414.730 4.3
RnP 851.604 2.5 PS 284.837 0.9 PSI 57.688 0.2
Socialisti Craxi 126.431 0.4
FI 8.202.890 24.0 PdL 12.511.258 38.2 PdL 6.829.587 22.3
AN 4.235.208 12.4
AS Mussolini 214.526 0.6 FdI 590.083 1.9
FT 204.498 0.6 FT-LD 686.926 2.1 LD 221.114 0.7
LN-MpA 1.530.667 4.5 LN 2.642.280 8.1 LN 1.328.555 4.3
MpA 355.361 1.1 GS+PDS-MpA3 170.718 0.5
UdC 2.309.442 6.8 UdC 1.866.356 5.7 SC Monti 2.797.486 9.1
            M5S 7.285.850 23.8
            FiD 278.396 0.9
Total Others 1.858.046 5.4 Total Others 916.911 2.8 Total Others 893.648 2.9
Total valid 34.162.615 100 Total valid 32.774.339 100 Total valid 30.617.545 100
Note: This summary excludes the foreign constituency, Aosta Valley, and Trentino-Alto Adige.
1 Il Megafono (The Megaphone) is a center-left electoral list presented by Rosario Crocetta (governor of Sicily) in 
the 2013 general elections only for the Senate in Sicily.
2 Insieme con l’Unione (Together with the Union) is a center-left electoral list formed by Verdi, PdCI and Con-
sumatori Uniti (United Consumers) for the 2006 Senatorial election.
3 PDS (Partito dei Siciliani – Party of the Sicilians) is the regional section of MpA in Sicily.
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Votes to coalitions at the local level: Berlusconi takes the lead in 
small towns, and Bersani wins in the cities
Vincenzo Emanuele
March 4, 2013
This article analyzes the electoral performance 
of the four main coalitions in the 8,018 Italian mu-
nicipalities (Aosta  Valley is excluded) ranked ac-
cording to categories of demographic dimension. 
At the national level, Pierluigi Bersani’s coalition 
won by a small margin (29.5% against 29.2% of the 
center-right), while the M5S gained third place with 
25.6%. The result of the coalition headed by Mario 
Monti was disappointing: it reached only 10.6% 
(see Table 1). However, looking more in depth at 
the demographic dimension of the municipalities, 
the previous picture shows interesting details.
The center-right lost votes with the increase in 
the municipality dimension, especially thanks to 
the contribution of LN, whose voters are mainly 
gathered in small urban centers. The center-left 
experienced the opposite, even though the pres-
ence of the separatists of Südtirol of SVP attenu-
ated the underrepresentation in municipalities 
with up to 5,000 inhabitants (SVP is so strong in 
the small municipalities of the Bolzano province 
that it managed to reach 1.4% at the national lev-
el). The consequence of this dichotomy between 
city and countryside that affects the two main 
coalitions is highlighted in Figure 1: Silvio Ber-
lusconi’s coalition placed first in municipalities 
with up to 50,000 inhabitants, while the center-
left managed to surpass the rivals and win the 
majority premium at the Chamber, only thanks 
to the votes obtained in middle and big urban 
centers. In big cities, the center-left achieved four 
percentage points more than in middle-sized 
urban centers, reaching 33.4%, while the center-
right conversely dropped down to 25% and was 
surpassed by even the M5S.
If results are disaggregated for the various geo-
political areas, further empirical evidence emerge 
that are worth noting here.
The most striking difference can be seen in 
the northwest. Here, the various coalitions seem 
to achieve remarkably different results whether 
the three major cities or the dense regional net of 
tiny municipalities1 (especially in Piedmont and 
Liguria) are considered. Up to 5,000 inhabitants 
indeed, the center-right is ahead with respect to 
Beppe Grillo’s party, while the center-left places 
only third, almost seven points behind. Starting 
from small centers, while the center-left begins 
its recovery, the center-right, however, experi-
ences a loss of votes. So in this category, it is the 
M5S that wins first place. On the other hand, in 
the municipalities with more than 15,000 inhab-
itants, the center-left closes the gap and surpasses 
its two rivals; its head start increases in the next 
two “urban” categories until reaching, in big cities, 
more than 12.5 points over the center-right, which 
slides down to 21.6%. In the northeast, a similar 
trend can also be observed, but here, Grillo’s rela-
tive weakness and the Northern League’s hold over 
the region, support the center-right in maintain-
ing first place until the middle-sized urban centers. 
On the other hand, in big cities, Bersani manages 
to overcome Berlusconi and gain an advantage of 
more than five points over him. The northeast is 
also the area where Monti’s coalition is stronger; in 
fact, it has reached 12.2% and 14.2% in big cities, 
while it remains confined to single-digit percent-
ages south of the Po river. 
In the “red zone” (namely, an area where the 
center-left is historically dominant, which com-
prises Emilia-Romagna, Tuscany, Umbria, and 
Marche), the supremacy of the center-left is un-
challenged, even taking into account the loss of 10 
percentage points with respect to Veltroni’s per-
formance in 2008. The center-right, already his-
torically weak in this area, drops to 21.1% and is 
1  Municipalities with fewer than 5,000 inhabitants.
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surpassed by the M5S. In big cities, the divide be-
tween progressives and conservatives goes beyond 
22 points (42.1% vs. 19.7%). 
These results underline how, after 15 years of 
center-right supremacy, Bersani’s coalition im-
proved its competitiveness in the northeast by 
reducing Berlusconi’s advantage to roughly five 
points. At the same time, the “red regions” still 
remain off-limits, and the leadership of the left 
there remains unchallenged. The trend for the 
three main coalitions in the south is quite curious. 
When the overall result for the south is considered, 
the center-right places first by far with respect to 
the rivals, and the center-left places third, sur-
passed even by Grillo. If, on the other hand, the 
results for the different municipalities are disag-
gregated based on their demographic dimension, 
Bersani seems to have the advantage, although 
small, in municipalities with fewer than 5,000 in-
habitants (30% to 29.9%). In small urban centers 
(5,001-15,000 inhabitants), however, it suffers from 
a relevant loss of 4.5 points, while both Berlusconi 
and Grillo gather more consents and become first 
and second, respectively, for all the middle demo-
Table 1. Votes to main parties and coalitions by town size
Italy Town size Center-left Center-right M5S Monti
  0–5,000 28.5 31.8 23.6 11.1
  5,001–15,000 28.0 31.0 25.4 10.4
  15,001–50,000 28.5 29.6 26.6 10.2
  50,001–100,000 28.9 28.4 27.3 10.4
  Above 100,000 33.4 25.0 25.2 10.7
  Total 29.5 29.2 25.6 10.6
Northwest 0–5,000 24.9 31.7 28.3 11.5
  5,001–15,000 27.0 28.3 29.8 11.3
  15,001–50,000 29.4 26.1 29.2 11.3
  50,001–100,000 29.7 25.5 28.8 11.8
  Above 100,000 34.2 21.6 28.0 11.7
  Total 29.1 26.8 28.8 11.5
Northeast 0–5,000 26.6 35.9 20.3 11.8
  5,001–15,000 25.2 34.8 23.1 11.5
  15,001–50,000 28.0 31.4 23.3 11.9
  50,001–100,000 30.0 31.3 21.0 12.7
  Above 100,000 32.6 27.4 20.0 14.2
  Total 27.7 32.8 21.9 12.2
“Red zone” 0–5,000 34.7 24.7 27.2 9.0
  5,001–15,000 38.6 21.3 26.6 8.7
  15,001–50,000 38.8 21.0 26.3 9.1
  50,001–100,000 37.5 20.7 27.0 9.6
  Above 100,000 42.1 19.7 23.0 9.8
  Total 38.9 21.1 25.7 9.2
South 0–5,000 30.0 29.9 23.8 10.9
  50,01–15,000 25.6 32.7 26.4 10.0
  15,001–50,000 23.9 33.4 28.3 9.5
  50,001–100,000 25.2 30.9 29.2 9.8
  Above 100,000 29.6 27.3 27.9 9.3
  Total 26.8 30.8 27.3 9.8
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graphic categories (municipalities with between 
5,000 and 100,000 inhabitants). In big cities, as 
usual, the center-left recovers and gains first place, 
while the center-right is surpassed by the Five Star 
Movement and places third.
Considering all 20 categories of demographic 
dimension in which the municipalities have been 
divided (five demographic ranges in each one of 
the four geopolitical regions), the following can 
be observed: the center-left is first in 11 categories 
(including big cities in all regions, the entire “red 
zone”, “belt municipalities2” and middle-sized ur-
ban centers in the northwest, and tiny municipali-
ties in the south), the center-right takes the lead in 
eight categories (including tiny municipalities in 
the northwest, the entire northeast except for big 
cities, small centers, belt municipalities, and mid-
dle-sized urban centers in the south), and Grillo’s 
party surpasses all the others in small centers in 
the northeast.
Another useful tool to understand electoral 
results achieved by the coalitions in the Italian 
municipalities are position indexes, such as the 
quartiles. These are obtained by ordering the 8,018 
Italian municipalities based on the percentage of 
2  Municipalities with between 15,000 and 50,000 inhabi-
tants, often belonging to the greater metropolitan area of 
the main urban center.
votes obtained by each coalition and then consid-
ering the 25% of municipalities where the coalition 
performed best and the 25% where it performed 
worst. Table 2 reports for the three coalitions the 
total number of municipalities included in the top 
and bottom quartiles, divided by categories of de-
mographic dimension. The center-left confirms 
its markedly urban character: the top quartile in-
cludes 24 out of 46 big cities, while only 4 are in the 
bottom quartile (Giugliano in Campania, Andria, 
Latina, and Catania). This city-oriented profile of 
the progressive coalition is sidetracked by the pres-
ence of SVP, which, as mentioned before, is rooted 
in the tiny municipalites of the Alto Adige. In fact, 
it always reaches more than 50% of the votes in 
these municipalities, bringing about an overrep-
resentation of the category of municipalities with 
less than 5,000 inhabitants in the top quartile of 
Bersani’s coalition. The center-right, on the other 
hand, witnesses a strengthening of its rural charac-
ter with respect to 2008: only two cities (Giugliano 
in Campania and Andria) with more than 100,000 
inhabitants and eight middle-sized urban centers 
appear in its top quartile.
In general, among 141 municipalities with 
over 50,000 inhabitants, only 10 (7%) appear in 
the center-right top quartile, while 45 (almost 
one-third) appear in its bottom quartile (this list 
includes some of the most important cities of the 
country: Venice, Florence, Bologna, Genoa, Turin, 
Figure 1. Trend for the three coalitions in Italian municipalities
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and Rome). If we consider all the municipalities 
with more than 15,000 inhabitants, only 101 out of 
722 (14%) appear in the center-right top quartile, 
while double that number (200) is present in its 
bottom quartile.
In this picture, the result obtained by the M5S 
resembles more that of the center-left than that 
of the center-right. Although, as was said before, 
Grillo’s party is generally unrelated to demograph-
ic dimension, it appears weak in tiny municipali-
ties (only 22% of these appear in its best quartile), 
while it is overrepresented in the other four cate-
gories, especially in the belt municipalities and in 
the middle-sized urban centers. Considering cities 
with more than 50,000 inhabitants, Grillo’s party 
appears more city-oriented than Bersani’s coali-
tion, with 50 municipalities in its top quartile and 
only 13 in its bottom quartile. If we consider all 
municipalities with above 15,000 inhabitants, this 
feature is even more marked: 35% is included in 
Grillo’s top quartile, while only 10% is included in 
the bottom quartile (the difference for the center-
left is less notable, 23% to 19%).
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Table 2. Municipalities included in the top and bottom quartiles for the three main coalitions
   Municipalities by category Center-left Center-right M5S
  BEST 25%
Italy N N % N % N %
0–5,000 5,629 1,482 26.3 1,542 27.4 1,249 22.2
5,001–15,000 1,666 356 21.4 362 21.7 503 30.2
15,001–50,000 582 120 20.6 91 15.6 203 34.9
50,001–100,000 95 23 24.2 8 8.4 38 40.0
Above 100,000 46 24 52.2 2 4.3 12 26.1
TOTAL 8,018 2,005 25.0 2,005 25.0 2,005 25.0
    WORST 25%
Italy N N % N % N %
0–5,000 5,629 1,442 25.6 1,394 24.8 1,665 29.6
5,001–15,000 1,666 429 25.8 410 24.6 270 16.2
15,001–50,000 582 113 19.4 155 26.6 57 9.8
50,001–100,000 95 17 17.9 25 26.3 6 6.3
Above 100,000 46 4 8.7 20 43.5 7 15.2
TOTAL 8,018 2,005 25.0 2,004 25.0 2,005 25.0
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Volatile and tripolar: The new Italian party system
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The extraordinary success of Grillo and the elec-
toral collapse of the PdL and the PD deeply trans-
formed the landscape of the Italian party system. 
A “limited bipolar” party system emerged after 
the 2008 general elections, with two parties, PdL 
and PD, collectively getting more than 70% of the 
votes [Chiaramonte 2010]. This represented a great 
innovation with respect to the “fragmented bipo-
lar” system that had characterized the recent years, 
a system in which many small parties could exert 
considerable power upon the two main political 
coalitions. Additionally, this represents an innova-
tion with respect to the First Republic, in which the 
competitive dynamic between the two main par-
ties (the PCI and the DC) played on strong ideo-
logical polarization and an international context 
that hindered any sort of alternation.
The Italian party system has once again changed 
its nature with the most recent election. A party un-
dergoing its first electoral test was able to achieve 
25.6% of the vote, a truly unique event in Western 
European history (excluding the foundation of 
democratic regimes). Even the unprecedented suc-
cess of FI in 1994 (21%) was exceeded. Moreover, for 
the first time, three parties each received more than 
20% of the vote, thus transforming the Italian po-
litical system from a bipolar system, which charac-
terized the Second Republic, into a tripolar system. 
The index of bipolarism (Figure 1) is the sum of 
the vote shares (or seats) received by the two main 
coalitions. As it appears in the figure, the two curves 
register a true breakdown. The total votes assigned 
to the two largest coalitions had grown through-
out the Second Republic, reaching its peak in 2006 
(99.1%), in an election characterized by a perfectly 
bipolar competition. Then in 2008 the, bipolar na-
ture of the system lost some strength (84.4%); how-
ever, it remained at about the same level from 1994 
to 2001. Today, it registers a breakdown of almost 
26 points, as only 58.7% of the votes were won by 
the two main political options, and more than 40% 
of voters betrayed the classic bipolar dynamic of the 
election. The same trend can be observed through 
the variation in seats, although in a less striking 
way due to the disproportional mechanism of the 
electoral law that favors the main political options. 
Today, one-fourth of the seats in the Chamber are 
assigned to the representatives of the third (and the 
fourth) pole. 
The sizable drop in the two-party index, which 
measures the shares of votes and seats collected 
by the two main electoral lists, is an obvious con-
sequence of a system where three parties surpass 
more than 20% of the votes. Today, the index has 
dropped to 51%, from 70.6% in 2008 (represent-
ing the peak since 1979). This share is greater than 
those encountered during the Second Republic 
(figure 2) but still is not comparable to the num-
bers seen in other Western democracies. Today, ap-
proximately half of the voters do not vote for either 
of the two main parties.
If we widen our analysis beyond the three main 
political options, we observe the reappearance of 
small parties in the 2013 elections. In fact, 10 lists 
received 1% of the vote, the same number repre-
sented in the Parliament. These lists, however, are 
not the same: RC (2.2%) and FiD (1.1%) will not 
enter into the Parliament, while the CD, led by 
Tabacci, and the South Tyroleans of the SVP had 
access to seats despite having only 0.5% and 0.4%, 
respectively, of the votes. 
These numbers signal an inversion with respect 
to the tendencies registered in 2008, when there 
were nine parties receiving over 1% of the votes, 
but only six of their lists were represented in Par-
liament. The political choices of party leaders had 
produced a drastic reduction of the fragmentation 
compared with the previous election. Today, even 
though the same electoral system is in place, differ-
ent choices have generated an increasing number of 
political parties. The effective number of electoral 
lists (namely, the Laasko-Taagepera index [1979]) 
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provides a synthetic measure of the number of 
parties competing in the electoral arena (in terms 
of votes) or in Parliament (seats). It is an effective 
way to count parties while highlighting their ac-
tual electoral strength. For instance, in the case of 
a perfect two-party system, if the two electoral lists 
each receive 50% of the votes, then the index has 
a value of 2. As it appears in figure 4, the number 
of effective parties in 2013 has increased to 5.3% 
from 3.8% in 2008, closer to the 2006 value of 5.7%. 
As for the number of effective parties in the Parlia-
ment, it has increased only slightly compared with 
2008, remaining at 3.5%.
The complex and sometimes contradictory dy-
namics in the Italian electoral system is very re-
strictive for the parties outside of political coali-
tions (the representation threshold in the Chamber 
is 4%), but quite open for those within a coalition 
(2% with an admission clause for the first-place 
finisher under the threshold). This can essentially 
explain the difference in the fragmentation be-
tween the electoral and the parliamentary arenas. 
In fact, this system, which allows parliamentary 
representation of up to 10 parties, produced the 
highest disproportionality of our republic’s histo-
ry in the conversion between votes and seats (fig-
ure 5). This disproportionality can be measured 
through the Gallagher Index (1991), which exam-
ines the difference between the votes and seats at-
tributed to the various political parties: the greater 
this difference is, the greater the bias induced by 
the electoral system and therefore the higher the 
Gallagher Index. 
As it appears, the index retained extremely low 
levels throughout the First Republic (1948–1992) 
due to the almost purely proportional electoral law. 
Figure 1. Index of bipolarism (Chamber of Deputies, 1994–2013).
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Note: The index of bipolarism is the sum of the votes (or seats) of the two strongest coalitions. In particular, in the 
elections between 1994 and 2001, it is the joint percentage of the majoritarian/uninominal votes of the “en-
larged” coalitions (including eventual territorial differences and partial alliances) of the center-right and center-
left. For the 2006 and 2008 elections, it represents the joint percentage of the proportional votes of the two 
strongest coalitions (as defined by the same coalition leader).
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The introduction of the 4% representation thresh-
old for all the electoral lists in 1994 produced an in-
crease in the index, which reached its maximum in 
2001 (10.2). With the introduction of the Porcellum 
electoral law, the system became more proportion-
al again as the two main political coalitions tried to 
ensure representation of the smaller lists, enabling 
them to avoid the 4% threshold. Today, the Dispro-
portionality Index has shot up to 17.3, more than 
three times the 2008 value. This was made possible 
by the fact that the winning coalition has received 
54%, with only 29.5% of the votes. On the contra-
ry, in the 2006 elections, the center-left coalition 
(L’Unione) had a majority in the Chamber with 
49.8%, while the PdL and the LN received 46.8% 
of the votes. This bias in the representation mecha-
nism ranked Italy second in Western Europe, just 
below France (17.7) and ahead of the UK (15.1) in 
2010. Notwithstanding, both France and the UK 
have majoritarian electoral systems, while Italy has 
a (formally) proportional one. 
There are no doubts that the 2013 elections has 
created a turning point, bringing with it the crisis of 
the two-party system, an increase in fragmentation, 
and disproportionality at an all-time high. De-
spite these, the evidence indicates that the greatest 
change is not one of the previous; rather, it is the in-
dex of aggregate volatility. This index simply meas-
ures the net aggregate switch in votes between two 
successive elections [Pedersen 1979; Bartolini 1986], 
and it is calculated by summing up the differences 
in terms of votes shares among parties between an 
election and the previous one. Volatility is therefore 
a measure of stability for a political system. 
In 2013, Italian volatility reached an incred-
ible value of 39.1 (the index ranges between 0 and 
100), more than four times the value registered in 
2008. Mair (2011) indicates that a highly volatile 
election is one scoring higher than 20, making the 
value of 39.1 very significant. Looking at a sample 
of 279 elections in 16 countries since WWII, only 
the dramatic Greek elections of May 2012 and the 
Figure 2. Two-party index (Chamber of Deputies, 1994–2013)
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Note: The two-party index represents the sum of the votes (or seats) cast for the two biggest electoral lists. In 
2006, DS and DL were considered separately instead of a unitary list of the center-left (Ulivo).
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Spanish elections in 1982 have shown a greater 
volatility than that of Italy in 2013. These numbers 
provide an idea of the historical extent of the ongo-
ing realignment of party system changes that seem 
to change with each election. In 1994, the index 
scored an analogous peak (Figure 6) and that elec-
tion was characterized by the fall of the old par-
ties (primarily the DC) and the rise of new ones 
(FI being the main one). In that moment, the First 
Republic was brought to a close, and the Second 
Republic was born. Only time will tell if the 2013 
elections will be the catalyst for the birth of the 
Third Republic.
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Figure 5. Disproportionality Index (Chamber of Deputies, 1948–2013)
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Figure 6. Total volatility (Chamber of Deputies, 1994–2013)
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A “media divide” in the vote of February 25?
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The M5S is undeniably the main winner of the 
elections of February 24 and 25, with an achieve-
ment that has consigned to a new political party 
more than 8.5 million votes. One of the central as-
pects of the M5S’s success lies in its crosscutting 
nature: in geographical terms, cutting across the 
traditional Italian geopolitical areas (see Cataldi 
and Emanuele in this volume); in political terms, 
with the ability of attracting votes from the cen-
ter-left and the center-right coalitions in a com-
pletely crosscutting manner (see the analyses of 
various vote shifts in Turin and Palermo; Monza, 
Pavia, and Varese; and Florence and Rome); finally, 
in social and demographic terms, with its great in-
terclass spreading ability (see the analysis by Luca 
Comodo with Ipsos data in Il Sole 24 Ore, March 
10, 2013).
The consequence is thus a curious paradox. 
The M5S stands out for the apparent lack of any 
characterization of its own electorate: not political 
nor geographical nor sociodemographic, if we are 
to exclude a strong underrepresentation among 
retirees. But what is then the main feature identi-
fying Grillo’s voters? To answer this question, it is 
necessary to make use of survey data: we take into 
account the data from the third wave of the CISE 
Electoral Panel. These are preelectoral interviews 
(the fourth postelectoral wave is still ongoing), but 
they reveal important dynamics that are coher-
ent with other analyses and the electoral result. 
The first hypothesis that we have advanced is that 
generational features might be relevant: a sort of 
generational revolt, with the M5S triumph in the 
youngest social strata. Apparently, this hypothesis 
is substantially confirmed, but some aspects differ 
from expectations (see Table 1).
The border between “youngster” and “less-
young people” is curious: among the former, we 
find those up to 54 years old (whose votes for the 
M5S are seven percentage points greater than the 
whole sample), while the M5S performs much 
worse in the last two age-groups. More impor-
tantly, generational effects do not affect the other 
parties, as the PD is not dramatically underrepre-
sented among younger voters, and the SEL is even 
overrepresented (while the PdL is suffering more 
among younger citizens). In other words, it does 
not look like we are in the presence of a proper 
generational divide. So we have started to suspect 
that there could have been something more behind 
Beppe Grillo’s success. We have thus examined 
what we deemed as another key variable: the re-
spondents’ declared prevalent source of political 
information. The key hypothesis was that those 
who informed themselves through the Internet 
would have rewarded the M5S more, for it is wide-
Table 1. Vote intentions for the main parties by age 
cohorts: Preelectoral data from the CISE Electoral 
Panel, reweighted for the actual results (N = 1,673)
Vote 
intention
Age cohorts
Whole 
sample18–
29
30–
44
45–
54
55–
64 65+
PD 20.2 20.4 23.6 29.8 32.9 25.4
SEL 5.9 3.2 2.5 3.9 1.8 3.2
PdL 15.2 16.7 19.3 22.0 33.7 21.6
LN 1.3 5.2 4.5 4.4 3.5 4.1
M5S 38.4 35.4 32.3 14.2 8.8 25.6
Monti 9.5 8.7 6.7 8.9 8.2 8.3
Others 9.6 10.4 11.2 16.8 11.1 11.8
Total 100 100 100 100 100 100
N 187 452 347 321 366 1673
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spread and systematically present on the Internet, 
indigenous to the web.
    As predicted, not only were we right, but we 
have also found much more predictive power than 
what was expected. Table 2 shows the very strong 
relationship between the main information source 
and the voted party. 
Table 2. Vote intentions for the various parties by 
the prevalent media source of political information: 
Preelectoral data from the CISE Electoral Panel, 
reweighted for the actual results (N = 1,592)
Vote 
intention
Prevalent media source of 
political information
Whole 
sample
Newspa-
pers TV Internet
PD 34.5 23.3 21.7 25.4
SEL 3.2 2.2 5.5 3.1
PdL 21.9 26.3 9.4 21.9
LN 4.5 4.4 2.7 4.1
M5S 17.2 23.1 42.5 25.7
Monti 8.4 7.8 9.6 8.3
Others 10.4 12.9 8.7 11.5
Total 100 100 100 100
N 351 919 323 1592
The relationship is so powerful that it is already 
visible in qualitative terms: the three main political 
parties are neatly divided according to the leading 
role for three different publics. The PD is neatly the 
most preferred party among newspapers readers, 
with an advantage of twelve percentage points over 
the PdL and even seventeen percentage points over 
the M5S (such percentage values are particularly 
similar to those frequently mentioned in the pub-
lic debate in newspapers, close to the elections!). 
Among TV viewers, the leading party is instead 
the PdL, with three percentage points more than 
the PD and the M5S. More importantly, it is espe-
cially among those using the Internet as their main 
source of information that the strongest character-
ization is more evident. In first place stands M5S, 
with 42.5%, which is seventeen percentage points 
greater than the whole sample and even twenty-one 
percentage points more than the second party (the 
PD, with 21.7%). The PdL registers a percentage 
even smaller than 10% (9.4%). This is not a small 
share of the electorate: The share of respondents 
that inform themselves mainly through the Inter-
net has already reached one-fifth of the sample in 
our case1. Such a powerful effect clearly cannot de-
pend simply on a spurious generational effect (e.g., 
the younger generations of “Internet natives” vot-
ing for the M5S actually because of their young-
er age). In fact, we can observe that the choice of 
media stands as a more powerful explanation by 
disaggregating the vote for Grillo by information 
source and age cohort (see Table 3). 
Table 3. Vote shares for the M5S by main media 
source of political information and age cohorts: 
Data from the preelectoral wave of the CISE Elector-
al Panel, reweighted for the actual results (N=1592)
Age 
cohort
Main media source of political 
information
Whole 
sample
Newspa-
pers TV Internet
18–29 33.3 33.6 43.0 37.8
30–44 30.5 32.8 42.4 35.6
45–54 28.6 29.7 53.6 33.0
55–64 7.2 15.6 27.6 14.0
65+ 7.0 7.9 34.6 9.0
Whole 
sample
17.2 23.3 42.5 25.8
As it appears, a strong difference between those 
who inform themselves mainly through the In-
ternet and the others persists within age cohorts: 
the difference is greater than 10 percentage points 
in every age cohort, reaching even 25 percentage 
points for those aged 45–54.
1  Our sample is, however, the third wave of a panel study, 
implying some self-selection bias towards respondents 
with a higher level of political involvement. Other polls 
report figures around 10% for the share of voters with the 
Internet as their main source of political information.
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In a nutshell, this early evidence seems to sug-
gest the existence of a “media divide”: what differ-
entiates the electorate of various parties (particu-
larly the M5S) seems to be the styles and sources 
of political information. Although this hypothesis 
will have to be scrutinized more in depth, our im-
pression is that we have assisted different electoral 
campaigns, especially during the 2013 elections, 
because the voters were informing themselves 
through different media sources. Each media 
source had its agenda, its discourse, and its own 
salient issues. This is also partly visible in oth-
er analyses (not presented here), showing the ab-
sence of marked differences in the basic political 
attitudes (e.g., interest in politics, ideological posi-
tioning, position regarding specific issues) between 
the three “publics” analyzed. As such, our guess is 
that these marked differences in vote choice must 
somehow be related to different perceptions of the 
credibility of political parties. The PdL shows min-
imum levels in all three publics, while the PD is 
deemed credible by the three publics in terms of 
economic issues, but much less in relation to the 
reform of politics according to Internet users. At 
the present stage, we found clues to the existence of 
a “media divide”: intuitions which we deem worth 
developing.
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Beppe Grillo’s movement is the first party at the 
Chamber of Deputies. As emphasized in another 
article,1 the geographical distribution of the M5S’s 
success shows unprecedented features. To confirm 
a fundamental trait of the present elections, we are 
in the presence of a real paradigm shift that throws 
consolidated territorial alignments into crisis. At 
this point, the doubt that not only the territorial 
alignments but also the social and political ones 
are in a transition phase emerges. Where does 
Grillo’s support come from then? What are the so-
cial strata that have rewarded him? What are their 
political choices?
It is clear that answering these questions re-
quires thoughtful analyses and reflections that in-
volve not only the change in the Italians’ choices 
but also the crisis of trust in the whole political 
system. Notwithstanding, what we can do initially 
is answer the following simple questions: From 
which parties do the M5S’s votes proceed? Which 
ones have suffered more from Grillo’s electoral 
competition?
To start answering these questions, we have 
conducted some analyses of vote shifts for the cities 
of Turin and Palermo, respectively. Piedmont and 
Sicily (along with Veneto) are the big Italian regions 
where Grillo represents the first party in almost 
every province. Nevertheless, they represent, at the 
same time, two extremely different cases: Turin is 
an industrial and postindustrial city, with a strong 
tradition of grassroots political participation, tra-
ditionally rewarding left-wing parties. Palermo has 
a complex and problematic social reality, plagued 
by unemployment, crime and a key role of patron-
age politics, and is traditionally dominated by the 
center-right. Two tables are presented reporting 
the vote shifts matrix for the two cities, estimated 
through the Goodman model on polling-station-
1  See Cataldi and Emanuele in this volume.
level data. 
Each column refers to the 2008 electorate of 
a single party: values on the various rows report 
how many voters from that party have switched to 
various parties or coalitions in 2013 (to make the 
analysis compact, we have aggregated parties be-
longing to the same 2013 coalition). Obviously, we 
will focus on the M5S’s row. 
We start from Turin. In this case, the fundamen-
tal fact is that Grillo hit hard, especially on the left. 
Values are very high for both SA and for IdV (both 
leftist parties): out of the 2008 voters, about 42% for 
SA and even about 60% for the IdV (although with a 
considerable margin of error) would have switched 
to Grillo in 2013. The PD’s coefficient is remarkable 
as well: it has been estimated that about 14% shift 
toward Grillo. Given the noteworthy dimension 
of the PD, this fact appears as a determinant fac-
tor for the electoral success of the M5S in Turin. In 
this sense, the neat contrast with the center-right 
is evident. On this political side, the one who suf-
fers more from Grillo’s competition is not only the 
LN (losing about one-fifth of its voters), but also the 
PdL, which loses apparently one-tenth of its 2008 
electorate. The picture arising from Turin suggests 
that Grillo’s support proceeds to a greater extent 
from the center-left (about 50%) and that it has pe-
nalized to a lesser extent the center-right. 
The case of Palermo appears radically differ-
ent. In fact, excluding the electorate for the SA (al-
though the estimates for smaller parties are often 
unstable), Grillo’s electoral spreading cuts extraor-
dinarily across political parties: all political parties 
lose symmetrically toward the movement of the 
comedian from Genoa, with shares of their elec-
torate ranging between 23% and 30%. 
The two situations are thus divergent. The ability 
to collect different (and potentially conflicting) re-
quests and extremely heterogeneous points of view 
testifies the actual strength of the M5S. In Turin, 
maybe also as a consequence of protest movement 
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against the TAV (high-speed railway construc-
tion), it becomes visible that the original partici-
patory and bottom-up nature of the movement 
grows in a postindustrial context characterized 
by a tradition of political participation. It is not by 
chance that the first successes of Grillo in the pre-
vious municipal elections took place in the center 
and the north, namely, in contexts characterized 
by high civic traditions. Vice versa, the top-down 
component of Grillo’s success seems to manifest in 
Palermo, namely, the personal appeal of the leader 
(often with strongly populist elements). It leverages 
on antiestablishment protests (gaining support 
from the right as well) in a crosscutting way in con-
texts characterized by strong social exclusion and 
a lack of a specific tradition of participation. These 
are the two fundamental components from which 
Grillo’s success originated; up to this point, they 
managed to coexist without damaging the move-
ment, although with some tension. It is undeniable 
that the entrance of a numerous group of the M5S 
in the Parliament and the need to face complicated 
political challenges could rapidly lead to the matu-
ration of this inconsistency. In any case, this is a 
picture that has to be analyzed with different lenses 
than those of the past.
Note: The estimates have been produced with 
the Goodman model on polling-station-level data. 
Greater levels of uncertainty characterize the val-
ues for the smaller parties.
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Analysis of vote shifts in Monza, Pavia, and Varese
Aldo Paparo and Matteo Cataldi
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Table 1. Vote shifts in Monza: Destinations of the electorates in 2013 for various parties in 2008
Vote 2013
Vote 2008
SA IdV PD UdC PdL LN Others No vote
Bersani coalition 15% 25% 75% 11% 0% 8% 41% 0%
Monti coalition 0% 9% 2% 25% 23% 10% 0% 0%
Berlusconi coalition 0% 0% 6% 0% 54% 32% 16% 0%
Five Star Movement 45% 59% 7% 0% 0% 46% 41% 10%
Others 0% 7% 0% 0% 10% 4% 2% 1%
No vote 39% 0% 10% 64% 13% 0% 0% 89%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Table 2. Vote shifts in Pavia: Destinations of the electorates in 2013 for various parties in 2008
Vote 2013
Vote 2008
SA IdV PD UdC PdL LN Others No vote
Bersani coalition 40% 77% 55% 37% 0% 13% 48% 10%
Monti coalition 0% 11% 9% 24% 17% 0% 0% 3%
Berlusconi coalition 3% 3% 0% 39% 41% 46% 52% 11%
Five Star Movement 49% 0% 22% 0% 0% 36% 0% 7%
Others 0% 10% 4% 0% 5% 0% 0% 1%
No vote 7% 0% 10% 0% 36% 5% 0% 67%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
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Analysis of the vote shifts in Florence
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Table 3. Vote shifts in Varese: Destinations of the electorates in 2013 for various parties in 2008
Vote 2013
Vote 2008
SA IdV PD UdC PdL LN Others No vote
Bersani coalition 40% 33% 69% 24% 0% 7% 0% 1%
Monti coalition 0% 34% 0% 38% 21% 9% 3% 2%
Berlusconi coalition 0% 0% 2% 0% 50% 58% 0% 4%
Five Star Movement 51% 17% 12% 38% 2% 21% 18% 4%
Others 7% 0% 3% 0% 3% 5% 12% 0%
No vote 1% 16% 14% 0% 23% 0% 67% 90%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Table 4. Sources from 2008 electorates of 2013 votes for the M5S in the analyzed provincial capitals 
Municipality
Vote 2008
Total
SA IdV PD UdC PdL LN Others No vote
Monza 7% 16% 12% 0% 0% 44% 6% 14% 100%
Pavia 10% 0% 47% 0% 0% 31% 0% 12% 100%
Varese 9% 5% 23% 13% 5% 33% 4% 8% 100%
Table 1. Vote shifts in Florence: Destinations of the electorates in 2013 for various parties in 2008
Vote 2013
Vote 2008
SA IdV PD UdC PdL LN Others No vote
Civil Revolution 21% 13% 0% 1% 0% 6% 3% 2%
Bersani coalition 15% 59% 80% 25% 0% 0% 7% 3%
Monti coalition 0% 12% 1% 46% 21% 31% 0% 0%
Berlusconi coalition 0% 0% 2% 0% 49% 17% 6% 3%
Five Star Movement 12% 13% 17% 0% 0% 42% 31% 18%
Others 6% 0% 0% 2% 5% 4% 5% 1%
No vote 45% 2% 0% 26% 24% 0% 47% 74%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
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Table 2. Vote shifts in Florence: Sources from 2008 electorates of 2013 votes for various parties
Vote 2013
Vote 2008
SA IdV PD UdC PdL LN Others No vote
Civil Revolution 0% 0% 6% 2% 0% 3% 8% 15%
Bersani coalition 2% 6% 87% 2% 0% 0% 1% 2%
Monti coalition 0% 6% 3% 20% 67% 4% 0% 0%
Berlusconi coalition 0% 0% 5% 0% 86% 1% 2% 5%
Five Star Movement 4% 4% 51% 0% 0% 3% 12% 26%
Others 11% 0% 0% 3% 60% 2% 14% 10%
No vote 7% 0% 0% 3% 22% 0% 10% 57%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
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The elections in Rome through an analysis of vote shifts 
Matteo Cataldi and Aldo Paparo
March 6, 2013
In the present article, we examine the results 
of the general and regional elections in the Italian 
capital by making use of the readings of electoral 
flows. In particular, our focus is on the reconstruc-
tion of the two concurrent elections as well as on 
the movements that occurred between them in 
terms of the pools of votes for 2008. This is par-
ticularly interesting in light of what has happened: 
the results for the general and the regional elec-
tions are very different, and both results are quite 
distant from those registered in 2008.
Five year ago, at the previous political elec-
tions, the center-left coalition led by Veltroni had 
prevailed by about 2% on the center-right in a 
neatly bipolar competition (43.7% against 41.4%). 
The PD got 39.2% of the votes, while its ally, Italia 
dei Valori, received 4.6%. The Sinistra Arcobaleno 
got 3.4%, and the Unione di Centro stood at 4.3%. 
Turnout resulted at 80.4%, equaling the nation-
wide level. 
Today, the electoral competition has become 
multipolar also in Rome: Bersani’s coalition has 
received exactly one-third of the valid votes, con-
firming the PD as the first party in Rome. The M5S 
has reached 24.3%; Berlusconi’s coalition, 23.4%; 
and Monti did not do better than 9.7%. Finally, the 
abstention rate in Rome has increased, although 
less than in the whole country. A total of 22.7% of 
the Roman voters did not cast their ballot, while 
the Italians’ share reached 24.8%. The concurrence 
of the regional elections has maybe determined 
this divergence. 
The center-left candidate to the presidency of 
the region (Zingaretti) nearly achieved the absolute 
majority with 45.5%. Moreover, he has received 
170,000 votes more than Bersani at the Chamber 
of Deputies. Also, Storace received more votes than 
Berlusconi, although these were less than 20,000; 
his percentage result equaled 24.9%. The candidate 
of the M5S (Barillari) was penalized, getting 20.1% 
of the votes and losing 120,000 vote preferences 
with respect to the result for the Chamber. The re-
sult for Giulia Bongiorno was very negative, as she 
has received less than half of the 155,000 votes for 
Monti’s coalition at the Chamber, namely, 4.3%.
From this picture evidently appears that many 
voters behaved differently in the two elections. At 
the regional ballot, the direct election of the presi-
dent and the subsequent majority premium at the 
regional council have favored the bipolarity of the 
competition, namely, the concentration of the votes 
on the candidates of the two main political poles. 
The strategic call for a “useful vote” seems to have 
disproportionally favored the center-left more. 
We shall now look at the flows of votes that have 
determined the observed result. Table 1 shows the 
destinations of the various electorates of 2008. PD 
has been confirmed by about two-thirds of its own 
votes and presents the highest level of loyalty. It 
has lost 1 out of 10 votes in favor of the M5S, a lit-
tle more that that to the abstention, and 6% of the 
votes toward Monti. The PdL was voted again by 
about half of its voters in 2008, while one out of five 
has preferred the M5S instead, and 1 out of 10 vot-
ed in favor of Monti. The abstention rate’s pattern 
is thus similar to the one for the PD. Among the 
voters for the Unione dei Democratici Cristiani, 
only one-third voted for Monti, while one-fourth 
did not vote. Finally, the M5S managed to mobilize 
a significant proportion of the abstainers.
Table 2 shows instead the electorates’ compo-
sition for 2013. The M5S has received about one-
third of its own votes from the PdL, one-fourth 
from the center-left, and the same share from the 
those who did not vote. Monti seems to have caught 
more votes from the center-right as well: about half 
of the votes proceed from this political area, while 
only one-third come from Veltroni’s voters. 
Studying the analysis relative to the regional 
elections (table 3), we observe that Zingaretti did 
not lose Bersani’s votes. The former president of 
the province further received more than 40% of 
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the votes for Monti and one-fifth of those for the 
M5S. From these two sources proceed 9% and 13%, 
respectively, of his own votes. Anyway, Barillari 
has received the electoral support of two-thirds of 
M5S’s voters at the Chamber, while Bongiorno re-
ceived less than one-third, suffering a further de-
fection in favor of Storace (14%).
Storace’s confirmation rate in the flows of votes 
is quite high, although inferior to that of the win-
ner. Overall, he is further widely defeated in terms 
of outflows from all the electorates: the ratio equals 
3:1 among both Monti and Grillo supporters. The 
inflow rate in favor of Zingaretti also reaches dou-
ble among former voters of smaller parties.
Table 4 shows the composition of the elector-
ates for the regional elections in 2008. Compar-
ing these values with those reported in table 1, 
we can observe how the current voters for Monti 
and Grillo at the Chamber, but not at the regional 
elections, would have voted in 2008. Moreover, we 
can observe which pools of votes have determined 
the greater support for Zingaretti with respect to 
Bersani.
Giulia Bongiorno’s electoral defectors are fairly 
distributed in the various pools for 2008: substan-
tially, all the inflows got halved. As for the M5S, 
there are no significant differences between the co-
efficients for the votes toward the electoral list at 
the Chamber and Barillari at the regional elections 
among PdL, UdC, and SA voters. Conversely, both 
the votes proceeding from the Democratic Party 
and the former abstainers got halved. Voters for 
the IdV were much less attracted by Grillo at the 
regional elections, given the 10% reduction; half 
cast their ballot in favor of Zingaretti, with respect 
to one-third that voted for Bersani. The regional 
Table 1. Vote shifts in Rome: Destination of the electorates in 2013 for various parties in 2008
Vote 2013
Vote 2008
SA IdV PD UdC PdL Others No vote
RC 15% 9% 2% 3% 0% 5% 1%
Bersani coalition 17% 33% 65% 13% 2% 2% 5%
Monti coalition 1% 11% 6% 35% 11% 1% 1%
Berlusconi coalition 1% 3% 2% 6% 48% 7% 5%
M5S 29% 37% 10% 14% 20% 53% 19%
Others 1% 1% 1% 2% 3% 5% 1%
No vote 37% 6% 14% 26% 15% 27% 69%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Table 2. Vote shifts in Rome: Sources from 2008 electorates of the votes in 2013 Chamber elections for various 
parties 
Vote 2013
Vote 2008
SA IdV PD UdC PdL Others No vote
RC 19% 17% 34% 4% 3% 11% 11%
Bersani coalition 2% 5% 83% 2% 3% 0% 5%
Monti coalition 0% 6% 26% 16% 48% 1% 3%
Berlusconi coalition 0% 1% 3% 1% 85% 2% 8%
M5S 4% 7% 15% 2% 31% 14% 27%
Others 2% 1% 22% 3% 48% 12% 12%
No vote 3% 1% 14% 3% 14% 4% 60%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
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candidate of the center-left coalition has been vot-
ed by 10 percentage points of 2008 PD voters more 
than the party national leader in the elections for 
the Chamber. Moreover, it has also received a sig-
nificant share of the center-right: 10% from PdL 
voters and one-third from the UdC. Finally, it has 
been favored more by remobilized voters. 
In conclusion, we observe also in Rome the abil-
ity of the M5S to catch votes across the entire spec-
trum of 2008 ideological continuum. In this case, 
the greater share of its votes proceeds from Ber-
lusconi’s electoral pool. Given the absence of the 
LN, which seemingly stands as the greatest con-
tributor to Grillo’s electoral success, we observe a 
sizable shift of the PdL’s voters.1 This effect is anal-
1 . See. Paparo and Cataldi in the Appendix.
ogous to the one observed in Palermo.2 
We have finally emphasized some clear traces 
of an outflow of strategic votes affecting the M5S 
and Monti’s coalition that granted advantage to 
Zingaretti with respect to Storace running for the 
presidency in the region.
Methodological note: All the analyses that have 
been presented were conducted on the basis of the 
Goodman model, corrected by the RAS algorithm. 
They have been performed separately for each of 
the 24 uninominal districts of Rome as defined by 
the Mattarella law and then aggregated in munici-
pal matrices. 
2 . See D’Alimonte and De Sio in this volume.
Table 3. Vote shifts in Rome: Destinations in the regional elections of the electorates at the Chamber in 2013 for 
various parties 
Regional elections 
2013
Chamber of Deputies 2013
Bersani 
coalition Monti coalition
Berlusconi 
coalition M5S Others No vote
Zingaretti 94% 42% 5% 20% 19% 2%
Bongiorno 1% 29% 2% 2% 5% 0%
Storace 0% 14% 86% 6% 10% 1%
Barillari 0% 4% 1% 66% 7% 1%
Other candidates 5% 2% 2% 4% 48% 1%
No vote 0% 9% 3% 2% 11% 96%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Table 4. Vote shifts in Rome: Destinations in the regional elections of the electorates at the Chamber in 2008 for 
various parties
Regional elections 
2013
Vote 2008
SA IdV PD UdC PdL Others No vote
Zingaretti 26% 49% 75% 31% 11% 7% 6%
Bongiorno 2% 4% 2% 18% 5% 1% 0%
Storace 2% 6% 2% 14% 49% 9% 3%
Barillari 31% 27% 6% 11% 18% 49% 8%
Other candidates 15% 6% 3% 5% 4% 11% 1%
No vote 24% 9% 13% 21% 13% 23% 81%
Total 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
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Vote shifts between the Chamber and the Senate: The rise of the 
M5S and fall of the PD among young people
Aldo Paparo and Matteo Cataldi
March 14, 2013
We have already seen how the electoral results 
between the Chamber of Deputies (the House) 
and the Senate differentiate from each other.1 In 
particular, we note how the coalitions led by Ber-
lusconi and Bersani fared better in upper house 
elections: approximately 1.5% better for Berlusconi 
and over 2% for Bersani. Consequently, the M5S 
won 25.6% of the seats in the Chamber and 23.8% 
in the Senate, whereas Monti and his coalition fell 
from 10.6% to 9.2%.
We must keep in mind the differences in the 
electoral system of the two assemblies and the ef-
fect those differences have on the outcome. In the 
Senate, specifically in the important swing regions 
that are crucial for the victory of competing politi-
cal coalitions, the need for strategic votes was much 
greater than in the Chamber. In fact, the center-left 
victory in the lower house could have been taken 
for granted, leaving more space for both genuine 
and protest voting. Another source of variation in 
the results from the two legislative branches lies in 
the different electorates. Over 4.5 million adults, 
age 18–24 who can only vote in Chamber elections, 
represent about 10% of the total number of voters 
for the lower house. Knowing the election results at 
a district level means it is possible to single out the 
electoral behavior of the 18- to 24-year-old demo-
graphic with statistical analysis. The fundamental 
element is that this group represents the exact dif-
ference between the electorates of the Senate and 
the Chamber. For this analysis, we have selected 
five regional capitals from various geographical 
areas: Turin, Milan, Florence, Rome, and Palermo. 
Table 1 shows the distribution of votes from the 
aforementioned demographic with respect to the 
distribution of municipal electorates as a whole.
1 . See. Maggini in this volume.
The most evident characteristic is the overrep-
resentation of the M5S among young voters, which 
counters the underrepresentation of the PD. This 
appears in all five cases with varying, but never 
marginal, magnitudes. The number of younger 
citizens voting for the Democratic Party is barely 
greater than a third of the whole electorate in Paler-
mo and Turin: therefore, the registered decline was 
greater than 60%; in the other three cases, the de-
cline varied between 30% and 40%. The M5S saw 
increased support among young people in Florence 
and Milan by about 25% in each region, followed by 
an increase of approximately 40% in the southern 
capitals and even by 70% in Turin. Since the move-
ment led by Beppe Grillo is ranked as the second 
most popular party in the overall electoral result 
of all five cities and with the Democratic Party be-
ing first among this young demographic, we note 
that the PD was only able to retain a majority in 
Florence. In the other cases, the M5S stands as the 
most popular party among voters aged between 18 
and 24 years old. In Palermo, the M5S was able to 
reach the absolute majority of valid votes in this 
age-group, while in Rome and Turin, two out of 
every five people in the age-group voted M5S.
It is interesting to observe the results of SEL. The 
party led by Vendola also saw good results among 
young voters. In Florence, within the younger age-
group, the SEL stands as the third most popular 
party with a vote share equaling a number about 
double that of the entire electorate. Also, in Turin, 
the SEL was significantly overrepresented; in Rome 
and in Milan, the overrepresentation is still evident 
but is somewhat diminished. It is well known that 
younger people tend to vote for more radical par-
ties than the median-aged voter. This being true, 
the PD must have surely lost some younger votes 
by entering a coalition with a left-leaning party. In 
any case, it seems that the alliance with the SEL 
has allowed the party, led by Bersani, not to suffer 
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heavy losses among young voters. The only excep-
tion is Palermo, where the slightly center-left coali-
tion barely exceeds 10% of all valid votes.
Like the PD, the other formerly dominant par-
ty, the PdL, does not perform well with younger 
voters. Not only did the PdL fail overall to be rep-
resented well, but in Palermo, Rome, and Milan, 
the party, along with its coalition partners, had 
very little success among the 18- to 24-year-old 
demographic.
In the case of the Monti coalition, the results 
are more ambiguous. In Palermo, it gathered less 
than 5% among the whole electorate and younger 
voters; in Milan and Florence, the coalition is bet-
ter represented by young people; however, in Turin 
and Rome, it suffered, although in a marginal way, 
to gather those votes. 
Finally, the decision to abstain from voting is 
the last possible choice to compare younger vot-
ers with the whole electorate. Excluding Turin, the 
data shows that younger citizens have been more 
prone to abstain from voting. This was true to a 
lesser extent in the capital, with more significant 
differences in Milan and Florence and even more 
so in Palermo. In the Sicilian capital, almost half 
of the voters between the ages of 18 and 24 decided 
not to cast their ballot.
Methodological notes: All the analyses have 
been conducted through the Goodman model, 
corrected by the Ras algorithm. In Rome, Milan, 
Turin, and Palermo, they were collected separately 
in every uninominal district of the Mattarella elec-
toral law for the Chamber and then aggregated city 
matrices. In Florence, however, the municipal level 
coefficients have been directly computed.
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Waves of support: M5S between 2010 and 2013
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April 9, 2013
The M5S has achieved a historical result in the 
last political elections. As we have already empha-
sized, its vote share is the highest ever reached in 
Western democracies in its first general elections.1 
However, the M5S did not present itself to the elec-
torate for the first time in 2013. In fact, although in 
2008 it was absent from electoral competition, dur-
ing the 16th legislature, it had already run several 
local and regional elections.
In 2008, Grillo decided not to run for the gen-
eral elections. But he had already joined, with his 
own candidates, some important electoral compe-
titions, among which the regional one in Sicily and 
the municipal elections in Rome, although with 
modest results. Then in 2009 the 5-Stars gained 
momentum. Civic candidates could get the ap-
proval from the movement provided that they 
fulfilled some requisites: as the residence in the 
municipality where the elections are held and no 
crime sentences. 
The movement was founded in September 2009, 
and its visibility grew in 2010. It presents its own 
candidates in 5 out of 13 regions having elections: 
Piedmont, Lombardy, Veneto, Emilia-Romagna, 
and Campania. The presidency candidate in Emil-
ia-Romagna, whose name is Favia, got the best re-
sult with 7% of the votes. In 2011, it runs basically 
in every province capital in the center and north 
of Italy while participating only a third of the local 
elections in southern Italy. 
The year 2012 represented the turning point: 
The movement’s presence in northern Italy be-
comes consolidated, and it participates in half of 
the local elections in the south.2 The movement 
scores its first successes: in Parma and in three oth-
er municipalities, 5-Stars’ mayors are elected. The 
very last electoral test before the general elections 
1 . See. Cataldi and Emenuele in the present volume. 
2 . On this point, see also De Lucia (2012).
has been represented by the renewal of the Sicilian 
parliament. The 5-Stars’ candidate came close to 
20% of the votes, scoring the first significant suc-
cess in the south.3 
In the present article, we engage in an outline 
of the various growth phases of the 5Ss during the 
last few years, making use of the electoral flows 
technique. We have selected some regional capitals 
densely populated in various parts of Italy where 
there have been elections in 2010 and 2013. We 
have then reconstructed the composition of M5S’s 
votes in the various elections in terms of the results 
of 2008. We are thus able to identify the source of 
the former electoral support for the movement and 
which groups have then increased it. For every re-
gional or local analysis, we have taken into account 
the results from the majoritarian election of the 
president or mayor. This choice comes from vari-
ous reasons of opportunity: the number of valid 
ballots is greater, thus reducing the non-voting 
voters portion and giving the most accurate result 
for each party or coalition in terms of shares of the 
whole electorate; competitors are fewer, and then 
the not-advisable aggregation of different political 
subjects is not needed; results for the candidates of 
the M5S are usually better than those of the party 
list, and they, thus, represent the greatest expan-
sion in a given local election and time.
Table 1 synthetically presents the empirical 
results. In the first part, results from the M5S or 
from its own candidates in the various elections 
are shown. The central part of the table reports the 
electoral shares that cast their ballot for the M5S in 
that election. The last column shows the electoral 
shares for the center-left in 2008 (including PD, 
IdV, SA) and for the center-right (PdL, LN, MpA) 
with respect to the M5S’s votes. 
3 . For a detailed analysis of the Sicilian electoral results, 
see Emanuele (2013a).
88
Aldo Paparo and Matteo Cataldi
In chronological order, we start from the data 
of the 2010 regional elections. At the dawn of its 
electoral experience, the M5S seems to gain from 
the disappointed voters of the center-left bloc. We 
have to consider that at the time, the Berlusconi IV 
government was still in charge, and Futuro e Lib-
ertà per l’Italia had not left the center-right coali-
tion. Therefore, the early M5S seems to derive from 
the center-left: as we can observe, they are about 
two-thirds of the total voters in Turin and Milan, 
while only about one-fifth come from the opposite 
political bloc (in particular, from the LN). 
The fact that the M5S registered its best result 
in Emilia-Romagna, the only historically “red” re-
gion where its lists were presented, can be read as 
further confirmation of such consideration. Even 
in 2008, the share of left-wing voters for the M5S 
in Emilia-Romagna remains the highest, while the 
LN’s is minimal. Finally, the three parties of the 
center-left coalition register the greatest coefficient 
toward the M5S in the Emilia-Romagna capital, 
Bologna. The first penetration of the movement ap-
pears to have affected particularly the smaller par-
ties of the center-left coalition rather than the PD, 
and in particular, it involved the Italia dei Valori 
party. In fact, in Milan and in Turin, more than 1 
out of 10 IdV 2008 voters cast their ballot for the 
M5S, and in Bologna, even half.
At the following year’s municipal elections, the 
electoral results of the 5S’s candidates had grown 
in all the three cases considered, although in a 
marginal way. In Turin and Milan, we can observe 
a convergence in the shares of former voters for 
the two main political coalitions: in both cases, 
the share of former LN supporters gets doubled, 
while the share of former PD’s voters decreases. 
Conversely, in Bologna, the former PD’s electorate 
represents an even greater share of the M5S’s voters 
Table 1. Vote shifts for the M5S between the 2008 general elections and various ones in Turin, Milan, Genoa, 
Bologna, and Palermo 
Municipality Election
Electoral result Destinations from 2008 electorates of various parties
Source 
c-l/c-r
votes % voters SA IdV PD UdC PdL LN/MpA Others
No 
vote
Turin Regional el. 
2010 17,217 2.4% 11 12 2 1 0 6 6 1 66/15
Municipal el. 
2011 22,403 3.2% 12 16 2 1 0 11 10 1 54/18
Chamber of 
Deputies 2013 128,149 19.3% 43 60 15 10 10 19 36 16 48/18
Genoa Mun. el. 2012 36,579 7.3% 23 35 10 10 1 22 1 1 77/16
Chamb. 2013 112,124 23.6% 43 62 24 0 3 63 73 16 53/14
Milan Reg. el. 2010 20,120 2.0% 6 10 3 2 0 3 4 1 64/19
Mun. el. 2011 21,228 2.1% 8 10 1 3 0 6 7 1 41/33
Chamb. 2013 121,408 12.8% 31 32 6 15 2 26 35 16 31/25
Bologna Reg. el. 2010 18,602 6.2% 20 54 5 0 0 18 12 0 80/10
Mun. el. 2011 19,969 6.6% 5 44 8 0 0 13 5 2 84/7
Chamb. 2013 43,636 15.1% 17 45 14 0 0 35 45 15 58/9
Palermo Mun. el. 2012 10,910 1.9% 7 7 5 0 1 0 6 0 67/23
Reg. el. 2012 55,966 9.9% 25 30 22 10 5 6 15 0 70/20
Chamb. 2013 105,714 19.5% 48 25 27 30 22 26 23 6 35/40
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with respect to the regional elections: if the share of 
switchers of former IdV and Sinistra Arcobaleno 
decreases, as is the case for the LN, the one con-
cerning the PD had substantially increased. 
The cases considered for 2012 are the cities of 
Palermo and Genoa. They both confirm the feature 
of the first M5S’s wave: more than two-thirds of 
its votes proceed from former center-left support-
ers, and this is even more true where the left was 
stronger (as in Genoa). It is interesting to empha-
size this consideration as it holds even some years 
of the initial stage of the movement when it had 
already expanded its potential electorate. A few 
months later, at the Sicilian regional elections, the 
M5S’s electoral support grew up to five times the 
earlier results, although it remains substantially 
unaltered in terms of the left-right composition.
If we look at the final wave of the 2013 general 
elections, we can observe that Grillo’s supporters 
that had cast their ballot for the center-left in 2008 
are directly proportional to the electoral strength 
of the left. This share is about one-third in Milan 
and in Palermo, about half in Turin and Genoa, 
and about 60% in Bologna. The same effect is dis-
cernible for the center-right: the proportion of its 
former supporter out of the total votes for the M5S 
is lower than one-tenth in Bologna, one-sixth in 
Genoa and Turin, one-fourth in Milan, and 40% 
in Palermo. During the six months between the 
regional and the general elections, there has been 
a sudden overturn in the political colors of the 
M5S’s electorate.4
The correlation between the result of the 2008 
coalition and the share of Grillo’s supporters reach-
es 0.92 for the center-left and 0.93 for the center-
right, both significant results at the 95% level. This 
dynamic seems to suggest the ability of the M5S 
in attracting different kinds of electorates in differ-
ent contexts. This was also made possible with the 
use of differentiated political messages mobilizing 
more the locally stronger political coalition. 
Obviously, the present analysis makes reference 
to a handful of cases chosen among big cities. We 
have seen that the M5S was able to mobilize across 
ideological lines and in a differentiated way: more 
from the center-left, where this coalition is more 
deeply rooted; more from the PdL in the Sicilian 
electoral barn; from the LN in the first stage, where 
it had recently grown; and finally also in Milan. 
4 . This is further underlined by Emanuele (2013c).
Precisely for this ability as well as for the substan-
tially stable results with respect to the dimension 
of the municipalities, we can infer that in smaller 
cities the M5S could have attracted the electorate 
of the stronger parties in such kind of cities.5 For 
all these reasons, it seems proper to argue that the 
nationwide composition results that have been pre-
sented here regarding the M5S’s electorate can be 
hardly extended to other kinds of elections.
In any case, some empirical findings remain 
particularly significant: in almost every case con-
sidered, the smaller center-left parties lose more 
votes than the PD, which, on the other hand, has 
lost growing vote shares approaching the general 
elections. A gradual reduction in the percent-
age share of Grillo’s supporters proceeding from 
the center-left in 2008 appears, while the former 
center-right share of voters increases progressive-
ly. Finally, the relative weight of the 2008 political 
coalitions on the total share of M5S’s supporters in 
the various municipalities is strongly linked to the 
electoral results registered five years ago. 
Methodological note: All the analyses that have 
been presented were conducted at the constituency 
level based on the Goodman model, corrected by 
the Ras algorithm. The estimates were computed 
separately by groups of homogeneous polling sta-
tions differently identified and then aggregated in 
municipal-level matrices.
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The newly elected Parliament is a Parliament 
very different from the previous one. Data tell us 
that there was not one so different from the previ-
ous one from the 1994 elections. Back then, only 
23.7% of the newly elected was made of outgoing 
parliamentarians. It was the end of the First Re-
public. In the four following elections, the political 
class has been structuring itself pretty rapidly, and 
the reelection rate has stabilized itself at around 
50%. Today, data lowered significantly: only 35.8% 
of the newly elected is composed of outgoing 
parliamentarians.
New parties that were not represented in the 
outgoing Parliament contribute massively to such a 
renewal: they are, namely, Five Star Movement and 
the SEL. One should not forget, though, that some 
of the political forces already represented have 
also significantly contributed to this turnover: the 
PD, the biggest parliamentary political force, has 
brought 262 newly elected to Palazzo Montecito-
rio and Palazzo Madama, and they will represent 
almost 65% of the new democratic parliamentari-
an groups. Also, Monti’s list has contributed to the 
renewal with almost 50 newcomers. Who has not 
succeeded in moving forward under this respect 
are the parties that have suffered the biggest reorga-
nization with regard to the number of elected par-
liamentarians: 72.3% of the parliamentarians of the 
PdL is composed of outgoing reconfirmed, while 
for the Lega Nord, this share goes down to 63.9%.
As a result, of the 945 outgoing parliamentari-
ans, only 339 have obtained to be reconfirmed. Of 
the others, 355 did not present themselves again: 
among them are Castagnetti, D’Alema, Parisi, Vel-
troni, Bianco, Rutelli, Cosentino, Frattini, La Mal-
fa, Scajola, Dell’Utri, Dini, Pera, Pisanu, Castelli, 
and Maroni (pretty busy with other things). Even 
though they have presented themselves as candi-
dates again, 251 people did not get the desired seats. 
Among them are three names of absolute national 
importance: the outgoing president of the Cham-
ber of Deputies, Gianfranco Fini; the ex-president 
of the Senate, Franco Marini; and the leader of IdV, 
Antonio di Pietro. Together with them, among the 
rejected, one can find Napoli, Paniz, Crosetto, and 
Miccichè for the center-right; all of FLI, with the 
exception of Della Vedova; important exponents 
of the UdC like Galletti, Poli, and Rao; the ex-PdL 
Figure 1. Percentage of outgoing parliamentarians reconfirmed over the total of elected parliamentarians in the 
Second Republic 
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Cazzola for Monti’s list; Donadi and the activist of 
civil rights Paola Concia for the center-left.
Another aspect of great relevance, besides the 
general renewal, is the huge percentage increase of 
women elected. They were 191 over 945 in 2008; to-
day, they are 290. One move from 20.2% to 30.8%: 
it is a historical record and a big jump forward, 
more than double compared with the period be-
tween 2006 and 2008.
The parties with the higher percentage of wom-
en are the PD and the M5S, with 38%. After these 
follows the SEL, with 27%. PdL and Monti’s list are 
a bit below 20%, while Lega is at 13.5%.
To conclude, the data for multiply elected candi-
dates are as follows: they have been 20 in total. They 
are Bersani, Marino, Letta, and Nardelli for the PD; 
Vendola and Boldrini for the SEL; Tabacci for Cen-
tro Democratico; Alfano, Berlusconi, and Barani for 
PdL; Tremonti for the Lega; Meloni, La Russa, and 
Rampelli for Fratelli d’Italia; and Bombassei, Ichino, 
Casini, Cesa, Catania, and D’Alia for Monti’s list. 
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Table 1. Parliament 2013: Outgoing, elected, reelected, and newly elected by party
N outgoing 
(1) N elected (2)
N reelected 
(3) N new (4) (4)/(2) (3)/(2) (3)/(1)
PD 290 407 145 262 64.4 35.6 50.0
SEL 0 44 0 44 100.0 0.0 0.0
Other C-L 26 16 7 9 56.3 43.8 26.9
PdL Area 382 206 149 57 27.7 72.3 39.0
LN 81 36 23 13 36.1 63.9 28.4
M5S 0 163 0 163 100.0 0.0 0.0
Monti 
coalition 102 67 14 53 79.1 20.9 13.7
Others 64 6 1 5 83.3 16.7 1.6
Total 945 945 339 606 64.1 35.9 35.9
Table 2. Parliament 2013: Fate of the outgoing parliamentarians disaggregated by political force 
PD Others C-L PdL Area LN Monti coalition Others Total
N % N % N % N % N % N % N %
Reelected 145 50 7 26.9 150 39.2 22 27.5 14 13.7 1 1.6 339 35.8
Failed to be 
reelected
44 15.2 11 42.3 104 27.2 28 35 43 42.2 21 32.8 251 26.7
Withdrawn 101 34.8 8 30.8 129 33.7 30 37.5 45 44.1 42 65.6 355 37.6
Total outgoing 290 100 26 100 383 100 80 100 102 100 64 100 945 100
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all’adattamento: accesso, circolazione e carriera dal 
1994 al 2006, in Rivista italiana di scienza politica, Il 
Mulino, 3/2006, December, pp. 455–478.
Figure 2. Women’s percentage over the total of elected parliamentarians in the Second Republic 
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Table 3. Parliament 2013: Feminine representation in the Italian political parties 
Elected 2013 Outgoing 2013
F Total % F Total %
PD 155 407 38.1 86 290 29.7
SEL 12 44 27.3
Other C-L 1 16 6.3 3 26 11.5
PdL Area 40 206 19.4 58 383 15.1
LN 5 36 13.9 15 80 18.8
M5S 62 163 38
Monti coalition 14 67 20.9 18 104 17.3
Others 1 6 16.7 24 62 38.7
Total 290 945 30.7 204 945 21.6
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PD, taking advantage of the majority’s bonus at 
the Chamber of Deputies, has obtained 297 depu-
ties (292 elected in Italy and 5 elected abroad). At 
the Senate, where it has won the majority’s bonus 
in 10 regions over 17, it has obtained 110 senators 
(1061 elected in Italy and 4 elected abroad). Hence, 
the overall PD’s delegation in Rome is composed of 
407 parliamentarians. The outgoing delegation was 
made of 290 members of the party. One should not 
consider here the other outgoing parliamentarians 
still registered in the PD’s parliamentary groups at 
the moment of the breaking up: the nine radicals, 
the eight passing from PD to Monti, and Beppe Lu-
mia, who, even if a Democrat, was a candidate and 
has been elected in the Crocetta’s Megafono list. 
Of the 290 outgoing parliamentarians, 145 (ex-
actly half of them) have withdrawn their candida-
cy. Of the other 145, 101 have succeeded in being 
reelected, and 44 did not make it. This way, the ree-
lected outgoing parliamentarians will be 145 over 
407 in this legislature, or 35.6%. These data are 
on average with the overall data and are also very 
low if one considers that the party has massively 
increased its representation and that it could have 
placed in an eligible status a much bigger number 
of outgoing parliamentarians. 
As the reader might recall, PD has had primary 
elections in order to establish the lists’ composi-
tion, even if the party’s secretary has reserved for 
himself the right to choose directly some of the 
candidates (124 to be precise). Of the 407 elected 
parliamentarians, 287 have been selected by the 
1 . In this calculation, only one out of the six elected par-
liamentarians of the center-left in Trentino-Alto Adige—
Giorgio Tonini—is considered part of PD. The other five 
belong to other parties: two belong to SVP, one to PATT, 
one is an independent, and one is from Monti’s list.
primary elections and 111 from the lists (to these, 
one should add the 9 parliamentarians elected 
abroad that cannot be included in any of the two 
categories). Hence, 72% of the Democrats elected 
in Italy have collected votes directly in the territory.
Of the 287 coming from the primary elections, 
96 (33.4%) are outgoing parliamentarians. Of the 
113 chosen by Bersani, 44 (39.4%) are outgoing par-
liamentarians, without considering the 5 parlia-
mentarians (out of 9) reconfirmed abroad. Regard-
ing the women, they are in total 155 out of 407, or 
38.1%. This is the highest percentage together with 
that of the M5S. In the outgoing group, they were 
29.6% (86 out of 290): the increase is remarkable, 
and this is a point on which the party has insisted 
a lot. They are 125 (43.6%) among the candidates 
coming from the territory and only 28 (25.2%) in 
Bersani’s list and two elected abroad. 
To conclude, let us try to investigate which is the 
political origin of the new democratic group in the 
Parliament in order to determine if something has 
changed with respect to the most recent past. In 
the total of the outgoing parliamentarians, the ex-
DS represented almost 59% and the ex-DL almost 
36%. There were also about 10 independents and 
some exponents of small parties. The changes that, 
Table 1. PD’s elected parliamentarians: PD’s outgo-
ing parliamentarians’ fate 
N %
Reelected 145 50.0
Failed to be 
reelected
44 15.2
Withdrawn 101 34.8
Total of the outgoing 290 100
98
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under this respect, were emerging in the new dem-
ocratic group at the Chamber of Deputies are not 
relevant but are still present: The ex-DS maintain a 
position of absolute preeminence with 57.3% of the 
members. The ex-DL remain almost unchanged as 
far as the numbers are concerned; therefore, they 
go down in percentage. The presence of independ-
ents, with whom Bersani has filled up the lists, goes 
up in a significant way. The component of the so-
called native Democrats made of politicians with 
no previous experience in the two founding parties 
makes its first appearance. These native Democrats 
come from the civic lists or are simply at their very 
first experience with politics. Socialists in the Par-
liament are five (plus one elected abroad).
The data concerning the supporters of Renzi 
have been foreseen: 50 elected in total, with 14 in-
serted in the lists by Bersani and 36 coming from 
the primary elections. 
Finally, with the surprising exclusion of Franco 
Marini, there are only four democratic parliamen-
tarians with more than 15 years’ experience in 
politics: Finocchiaro, Bindi, Fioroni, and Bressa. 
To these, one may add Beppe Lumia, a Democrat 
elected in Crocetta’s list.
References
Tronconi, F., and Verzichelli, L. [2007], Il ceto parlamen-
tare alla prova della nuova riforma elettorale, in Chi-
aramonte, A., and D’Alimonte, R. (eds.), Proporzionale 
ma non solo. Le elezione politiche del 2006, Bologna, Il 
Mulino, pp. 335–368.
Tronconi, F., and Verzichelli, L. [2010], Verso il ceto po-
litico della «terza repubblica»? la rappresentanza par-
lamentare nella XVI legislatura, in  Chiaramonte, A., 
and D’Alimonte, R. (eds.), Proporzionale se vi pare. Le 
elezioni politiche del 2008, Bologna, Il Mulino, 2010, 
pp. 173–202.
Verzichelli, L. [1995], Gli eletti, in Bartolini, S., and 
D’Alimonte, R. (eds.), Maggioritario ma non troppo, 
Bologna, Il Mulino.
Verzichelli, L. [1997], La classe politica della transizione, in 
Bartolini, S., and D’Alimonte, R. (eds.), Maggioritario 
per caso, Bologna, Il Mulino.
Verzichelli, L. [2002], Da un ceto politico all’altro. Il muta-
mento nel personale legislativo italiano (1992–2001), in 
Bartolini, S., and D’Alimonte, R. (eds.), Maggioritario 
finalmente?, Bologna, Il Mulino, 2002, pp. 319–362.
Verzichelli, L. [2006], La classe politica italiana, dalla crisi 
all’adattamento: accesso, circolazione e carriera dal 
1994 al 2006, in Rivista italiana di scienza politica, Il 
Mulino, 3/2006, December, pp. 455–478.
Table 2. PD’s elected parliamentarians: Disaggregation between lists and primary elections of the new PD’s 
elected parliamentarians (women and outgoing parliamentarians in the two groups)
List Primary Total Abroad
Women 28 25.2 125 43.6 153 38.4 2
Outgoing 44 39.6 96 33.4 140 35.2 5
Total 111 27.9 287 72.1 398 100 9
Table 3. PD’s elected parliamentarians: Political 
affiliation of the PD’s parliamentarians before and 
after the 2013 elections 
Outgoing Elected 2013
N % N %
DS 167 59.0 228 57.3
DL 101 35.7 106 26.6
Independent 10 3.5 31 7.8
Civic-PD 2 0.7 27 6.8
PSI 1 0.4 5 1.3
Moderates 1 0.4 1 0.3
MRE 1 0.4
Total 283 100 398 100
Abroad 7 9
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The center-right’s coalition was very broad at the 
last elections. The affiliated lists were numerous, and 
most of them had no chance of getting any seats. At 
the end, at the Chamber of Deputies, the succeed-
ing lists were only three: PdL and Lega Nord as lists 
going above the threshold and Fratelli d’Italia (FdI) 
as “fished out.” PdL has obtained 98 deputies; LN, 
18; FdI, 9. At the Senate, on the other hand, only 
PdL has managed to go above the threshold in all 
the regions, as it was foreseeable, and has obtained 
98 elected senators. LN has managed to get seats in 
Piedmont, Lombardy, and Veneto and has won the 
“fished out” in a proportional share in Trentino-
Alto Adige, with a total of 18 senators. Among the 
other parties, the Grande Sud’s list (GS) has man-
aged to get a seat in Calabria. Hence, overall, PdL 
has gotten 196 seats; Lega, 36; FdI, 9; and GS, 1.
The PdL’s outgoing parliamentarians were 302, 
but to these, one should have added a crowd of 
movements and small parties (among which the 
most important were FdI and GS) that, generally 
speaking, helped the PdL’s area to reach a total of 
383 deputies and senators. The space at disposal 
for such a political galaxy has been cut in half for 
the supporters of Berlusconi: from 383 to 206 (196 
elected parliamentarians of the PdL, the 9 parlia-
mentarians of FdI, and the single parliamentarian 
of GS). But let us see where the outgoing parlia-
mentarians are now. 
Of the overall 383 parliamentarians, 129 (33.7%) 
have found space in none of the lists affiliated to 
the center-right’s coalition. Of the remaining 150 
who have been reelected, one has gone out of the 
PdL’s area: Tremonti, who is now with the Lega 
Nord. Therefore, 149 out of 206 newly elected par-
liamentarians (72.3%) of the so-called PdL’s area 
are outgoing parliamentarians: this is a pretty high 
percentage, more than double compared with the 
overall average of the new Parliament. These ree-
lected 149 parliamentarians are divided into 142 
reelected in the lists of the PdL and 7 reelected in 
those of the FdI. 
Focusing now on the elected of the PdL’s list, 
there are 196 of them: among them, as we said, the 
outgoing parliamentarians are 142 (72.4%). The 
women are 39 in total, a bit less than 20%—a share 
significantly lower than the average in the new Par-
liament, but still higher than 16.5%, the old per-
centage of the outgoing PdL, an element that is not 
to be taken for granted considering the contraction 
of the representation. 
In FdI, the outgoing parliamentarians are seven 
out of nine, and Giorgia Meloni is the only woman 
of the delegation. A man and a novice in the Parlia-
ment, Giovanni Bilardi from Calabria, is the sole 
elected of Grande Sud.
Let us consider the political composition of the 
PdL’s area in order to see how much and in which 
Table 1. The fate of the outgoing parliamentarians of the PdL’s area 
PdL Area PdL Others (FdI, GS, etc.)
N % N % N %
Reelected 150 39.2 135 44.7 15 18.5
Failed to be reelected 104 27.2 65 21.5 39 48.1
Withdrawn 129 33.7 102 33.8 27 33.3
Total outgoing 383 100 302 100 81 100
100
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direction it has changed in comparison with the 
outgoing Parliament. 
Let us start with PdL considered as a party. Of 
the 296 PdL’s representatives elected in Italy (i.e., not 
considering the 6 parliamentarians elected abroad) 
that were holding their office until last week, 219 
(74%) came from Forza Italia, 55 (18.6%) from AN, 
11 from the neo-Christian Democrat components, 5 
from microcomponents, and 6 were independents. 
Today, out of 185 reelected party’s representatives, 
the component of Forza Italia has further increased 
in terms of percentages as to become substantially 
predominant. The ex-AN, already reorganized as a 
result of the resignation of Gianfranco Fini, have 
been divided into those that went with Meloni 
and La Russa to FdI and those that, together with 
Gasparri and Matteoli, have chosen to stay at the 
court of Berlusconi. The demochristian component 
resists, while among the others, only the new PSI 
of Caldoro and Lucio Barani gets a representation. 
The independent are five. 
Considering the residual component of the 
PdL’s area, as it was foreseeable, it is pretty much 
reorganized after the elections. From almost 70 
representatives, it goes down to a bit more than 20. 
In fact, many movements that used to be part of it 
were substantially coinciding with their founding 
parliamentarians, and therefore, they have disap-
peared once the founders have lost their place in 
the list or once the founders have found another 
place in lists too small to get a seat. Putting aside 
the ex-AN component that has found a home in 
FdI and the elected parliamentarian of Grande Sud 
in Calabria, only 10 candidates of other microcoa-
litions have gotten to be elected, infiltrated in the 
lists of the PdL: among them, Antonio Razzi and 
Domenico Scilipoti are worth mentioning.
To conclude, the Lega Nord has become pretty 
much changed and reorganized. It goes down from 
80 parliamentarians to 36. Of the 80 outgoing, 30 
have not been running for candidacy, and 28 have 
done it but have not managed to get a seat. Only 22 
(27.5%) and the ex-PdL Tremonti have conquered 
the reelection.
The elected parliamentarians of the Lega Nord, 
who were already sitting in the outgoing houses of 
Table 2. Elected C-R: Women’s representation and 
presence of reelected parliamentarians in the PdL’s 
list
N %
Outgoing 142 72.4
Women 39 19.9
Elected 2013 196
Table 3. Elected C-R: Parliamentarians’ political af-
filiation of the PdL’s area, before and after the 2013 
elections 
Outgoing Elected 2013
N % N %
FI 219 74 150 81.1
AN 55 18.6 21 11.4
Neo-Christian 
Democrats
11 3.7 8 4.3
Independent 6 2 5 2.7
Others 5 1.7 1 0.5
Total PdL 296 100 185 100
PdL 296 77.3 185 89.8
Abroad 6 1.6 1 0.5
FdI 30 7.8 9 4.4
GS 15 3.9 1 0.5
Others/“Infiltrators” in 
PdL
36 9.4 10 4.9
Total area PdL 383 100 206 100 Table 4. Elected C-R: Fate of the outgoing parlia-
mentarians of the Lega Nord 
N %
Reelected 22 27.5
Failed to be reelected 28 35.0
Withdrawn 30 37.5
Total outgoing 80 100
Table 5. Elected C-R: Women’s representation and 
presence of reelected parliamentarians of the Lega 
Nord
N %
Outgoing 23 62.2
Women 5 13.9
Elected 2013 36
101
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the Parliament, are thus 23 out of 36, the 62.2%. The 
rechange rate is pretty low if compared with the av-
erage, but it is not that low if one takes into account 
the cut in half of all the seats at their disposal.
Finally, only five are the women of the Lega, and 
they are all at the Senate. Nobody of big relevance 
has been excluded: both Bossi and Salvini get elect-
ed at the Chamber of Deputies, and both Calderoli 
and Tremonti get elected at the Senate.
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Pierluigi Bersani, Mario Monti, and Nichi Ven-
dola do not have the votes to form a government 
together. But they have the numbers to elect the 
president of the republic. This is one of the out-
comes of the last elections. In a globally confused 
and unstable scenario, such an outcome is one of 
the few elements of certainty. 
The president of the republic is elected by the 
Parliament in joint session of both houses. Three 
regional delegates for each region (elected by the 
regional council so as to guarantee representation 
for all localities and minorities) take part in the 
election. Aosta Valley only has one delegate. For 
the first three ballots, the law requires the majority 
of two-thirds of the assembly. After the third vote, 
the absolute majority suffices. These are the rules 
established by the constitution in Article 83. 
Let us go now from the rules to the numbers. 
At the Chamber of Deputies, the coalition that has 
won the majority bonus, PD-SEL, has 345 parlia-
mentarians. Its senators are 121. The total is 466 
votes in the assembly that will elect the new presi-
dent. To these votes, one should add the 49 deputies 
of the parties linked to Monti and the 22 senators 
of his civic list. The resulting total is 537. The re-
gional delegates are 58 in total. They have not been 
elected yet. But knowing the political color of the 
majorities in the councils and taking into account 
the rules in the constitution that set the represen-
tation of minorities, one may rightly conclude that 
among the 58 delegates, 30 will belong to the cent-
er-left, 26 to the center-right, 1 to M5S, and 1 to 
Aosta Valley. Provided these calculations, the to-
tal of votes available to the Bersani-Monti-Vendola 
coalition to elect the president is 568. Without con-
sidering the senators with life tenure, the electoral 
body is composed of 1,003 big electors. Finally, the 
votes of PD, SEL, and Monti’s list represent 56.6% 
of the assembly. Therefore, after the third ballot, 
these votes suffice. 
The reason for all this is to be found in the elec-
toral system. At the Chamber of Deputies, there is 
not a proportional system. With 29.5% of the votes, 
the Bersani coalition has obtained 54.8% of the 
seats. At the Senate, it has gone differently. In this 
House of the Parliament, the leader of PD has tak-
en 31.6% of the votes and 38.4% of the seats. But the 
bonus at the Chamber of Deputies, together with 
the 30 regional delegates, has been enough to cre-
ate the conditions to determine a reasonably reli-
able majority for the election of the new president.
We wish that such a majority did not have to be 
used and that the substitute of Napolitano could be 
elected with a broad consensus, going far beyond 
the numbers that we have indicated. In such a diffi-
cult phase for the country, it would be good for the 
parties to give proof of their capacity to cooperate 
on the choice of an institutional figure that, given 
the present difficult circumstances, will be neces-
sarily called to play an extremely delicate and deci-
sive role for the coming months, maybe years. One 
should not underestimate, though, the fact that if 
a broad consensus was not to be found (with the 
consequence of the impossibility to put together a 
“supermajority”), a majority still exists. This “ma-
jority” should serve to overcome any dangerous 
impasse that would end up destabilizing even more 
the already-uncertain political framework. 
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Table 1. The numbers for the elections of the President of the Republic
Chamber of 
Deputies Senate
Regional 
Delegates Total N Total %
PD+SEL+Monti 394 143 30 567 56.6
PdL 125 117 26 268 26.7
M5S 109 54 1 164 16.3
Others 2 1* 1 4 0.4
Total 630 315 58 1,003 100
* Senators for life are not included.
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There is a problem that several protagonists of 
the Italian politics and financial markets have not 
completely understood yet. Nowadays, Italy is in 
worse conditions than Greece of the most recent 
past. After an unavailing electoral round, Greeks 
went back to voting in very short time with the 
same electoral system, and they managed to form 
a government. In Italy, it is not possible to do the 
same. Voting again without changing the electoral 
law applicable to the Senate is tantamount to bet-
ting on roulette. The ball could end up in the right 
pocket of the wheel, but it could also end up in the 
wrong one. Still, the likelihood of a negative result 
is much higher than that of a positive result. So 
what do we do? Do we keep on voting until luck 
smiles on us? 
This is the third time that we have voted with 
the so-called Porcellum, and only in one circum-
stance—in 2008—has the system produced a real 
winner at the Senate. Back then, Berlusconi’s coali-
tion got 174 seats. It managed to get such a result 
because the competition was substantially two-
faceted, and Il Cavaliere, with his allies, obtained 
46.9% of the votes against 37.9% of Walter Veltro-
ni’s coalition. This asymmetry in the results was 
the decisive factor, even if not the only one, that 
allowed neutralizing the lottery’s effect of the 17 
regional bonuses. For these last elections, the sce-
nario has been completely different. The competi-
tion has been four-faceted, and there has not been 
a pole that clearly outdistanced the others. On the 
contrary, three out of four poles were of pretty sim-
ilar dimensions. 
It has gone like this: If one returned to voting in 
a few months, would the political scenario be that 
of 2008 or more likely that of last February 24–25? 
And on which basis could one imagine that the 
vote produced a different outcome? Is it possible 
that the political offer and the Italian’s preferences 
changed so drastically in such a short time as to 
allow for the creation of a new majority at the Sen-
ate too? Maybe this is what Beppe Grillo thinks; he 
already sees himself as the winner for all the 17 re-
gions. And this is also the belief of people who trust 
Matteo Renzi to do what Veltroni did not manage 
to do in 2008. These are two hypotheses that one 
cannot exclude a priori. But today, in a situation 
in such a state of flux, it is legitimate to raise some 
doubts about the possibility of this happening.
The main road toward governability is another. 
Before going back to new elections, the electoral 
reform and much more need to be done. Which re-
form and with which majority? These are questions 
that, at this very moment, have no answer. Intro-
ducing a bonus to be taken at the national level for 
the Senate would be the simplest thing to do. But 
this change alone would not be enough because in 
order to avoid the risk of having two different ma-
jorities in the two Houses of the Parliament, the 
right to vote should also be given to the 18-year-old 
people—a reform that should have been introduced 
a long time ago. This is a constitutional reform. 
Can it be approved in a short time? It is difficult. 
But again, even if one could do it, how could people 
go back to voting again with a system full of many 
other faults besides that of the regional bonuses? 
The simplest path is not always the best. In or-
der to set the foundations of a true governability, 
one should make clear choices on the voting sys-
tem, the form of government, and bicameralism. 
These are things said over and over again. It is 
time to choose between the Italian model and the 
French model. The first is that of the communes, 
provinces, and regions: direct election of the leader 
of the executive power (with one or two shifts) and 
majority of the seats granted to the winner (thanks 
to the majority’s bonus). The second is based on 
a double election: direct election of the president 
of the republic with two shifts and election of the 
parliamentarians in single-member constituen-
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cies with a two-round system. In both cases, one 
has to cut the number of parliamentarians and go 
beyond a perfect bicameralism, leaving the vote 
of confidence to the government to the Chamber 
of Deputies alone. On the electoral level, the Ital-
ian model has an advantage compared with the 
French model: it creates a majority in any condi-
tion of fragmentation of the parties. It is majority 
assuring. The advantage of the French model, on 
the other hand, is the majoritarian single-member 
constituency. 
Is it possible that the present crisis generates a 
government capable of facing issues like these? Let 
us hope so. Stability and functionality of our de-
mocracy depend on what the parties will be able 
to do with regard to the political and institutional 
reforms. These decisions cannot be postponed any 
longer. Also, M5S must assume its responsibilities 
under this respect. The alternative is to keep on 
betting on the roulette. And at the end, we—in-
cluding the croupier—will all lose. 
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Minority governments are neither an anomaly 
nor a rarity. What Pierluigi Bersani is trying to do 
at this very moment is something pretty common 
in many countries. First of all, one may think of 
Denmark, where these governments have been, 
in the past, more frequent than those of majority. 
Neither one may say that these governments func-
tion worse than the others. Again, the Danish case 
teaches. Italy, though, is a much different case. 
Minority governments are not formed by ac-
cident. They are born and function where there 
are favorable conditions. One of them is the vote 
of confidence required at the setup of the gov-
ernment. In Denmark, the government, once it is 
formed, does not have to ask for the Parliament’s 
vote of confidence. It is assumed that it has it. Only 
if the oppositions approve a vote of no confidence 
can the government be dismissed. In Italy, it is dif-
ferent. Article 94, the third subsection of the Ital-
ian constitution, sets forth that “within ten days of 
its formation the Government shall come before 
the Houses to get their confidence.” 
This is the most relevant formal obstacle to the 
creation of a minority government in our country. 
At the Chamber of Deputies, though, this obsta-
cle can be bypassed with the abstention. As a mat-
ter of fact, abstentions are not calculated against 
the government. Therefore, the case of abstention 
is implicitly to be considered in favor of the gov-
ernment. But at the Senate, it is not like that. The 
Senate is the House of Parliament where the dam-
ages of a chaotic electoral system add themselves to 
those of some particularly inflexible parliamentary 
rules. In this House of the Parliament, the absten-
tion counts as a vote against. As a consequence, 
to get the vote of confidence, having the majority 
of the valid votes does not suffice. One must have 
the majority of the expressed votes. It is also true 
that here one may resort to some alchemy to by-
pass the obstacle, but right now, they do not work. 
It is thus impossible that a minority government 
may be formed at the Senate. Also, those opposi-
tion’s parties that would be in favor to this solution 
cannot act. It is a mess raising the following ques-
tion: why on such a delicate point and in a system 
of perfect bicameralism are the two houses’ rules 
so different? 
For a series of reasons, if a newly formed gov-
ernment does not have to get the Parliament’s con-
fidence, the birth of a minority government is eas-
ier. In this case, the oppositions have to explicitly 
take the initiative. It is not to be taken for granted 
that political parties of different affiliations are able 
to do so. Besides that, for a party of the opposition, 
it is much simpler not to ask for the vote of confi-
dence than to vote in favor or to abstain. In the first 
case, there is nothing to do; in the second one, the 
party has to take a position anyhow. This is not a 
difference without importance, as Bersani has ex-
perienced with the M5S. Without the third subsec-
tion of Article 94 of the constitution, the likelihood 
that the M5S may allow a minority government 
would be greater. Could it join the PdL to express 
a vote of no confidence against the government? In 
Sicily, it was not like that. 
Rules make a big difference, but they are not 
everything. For a minority government to be 
formed and to also function, something more is 
needed. What is needed is a fundamental agree-
ment among all the biggest parties on the fact that 
this formula represents the right solution. For the 
PD today, it is like this. Maybe it could be like that 
also for the M5S, if one could overcome the obsta-
cle of the initial vote of confidence. But this is not 
the case for the PdL. Minority governments are 
based on the principle of mutual conveniences. A 
similar executive must be convenient not only to 
those who set it up but also to those who tolerate it. 
And which convenience could have the PdL form a 
minority government that would end up searching 
for consensus, especially from the M5S? In Den-
mark, the minority governments that have best 
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functioned are those alternatively supported by the 
different oppositions as to make approved meas-
ures on which establishing a broad consensus was 
not possible. In Italy, it would not be so. The obsta-
cle is the fundamental mistrust that separates the 
PD and PdL. On the other hand, if such mistrust 
was not there, what would prevent the two parties 
to form a broad consensus government? The con-
clusion is that, with or without Article 94 of the 
constitution, we are not Hamlet’s homeland.
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It is time to say how things really are. Those who 
think that today’s biggest problem is the reform of 
the electoral system are wrong. Indeed, the present 
system needs to be modified, but not before having 
reformed the Senate of the republic. This is the first 
reform to be put into being. And the alibi that such 
a reform implies a modification of the constitution 
does not hold. It is on this reform that the wise men 
should say firmly something clear to the parties 
and to the public opinion. The change of the elec-
toral law comes afterward, or it is to be undertaken 
together with the transformation of the Senate into 
a Chamber of the Regions or of the Autonomies. 
The new electoral system must be constructed as to 
function in a single House of the Parliament. The 
solution to the problem of the governability must 
start from here. 
There are good reasons to intervene on the re-
form of the Senate. The electoral system is one of 
them, but not the only one. But let us start from 
here. We have already said and repeated it all over 
again: it is impossible to elect two chambers having 
the same powers with two different electoral sys-
tems and two different electoral bodies. In the past 
(namely, in the First Republic), such a system could 
function because both the two electoral systems 
were proportional and young people between the 
age of 18 and 24 years who voted at the Chamber of 
Deputies and not at the Senate did not have political 
preferences highly different from the other genera-
tions of electors. They used to vote almost like their 
fathers. Besides that, there were structured political 
parties that were able to steadily orient the votes. 
Therefore, the results of the two chambers were 
very similar, even though not completely identical. 
Back then, the problem of a divided Parliament 
did not exist. Today, everything is different. In 
1993, a majoritarian voting system has been intro-
duced both at the Chamber of Deputies and at the 
Senate. Moreover, with the reorganization of the 
parties’ system of the First Republic, the electoral 
preferences have become more volatile. Old par-
ties disappeared. The youngest electors do not vote 
any longer like the others. The political offer has 
become more erratic and significantly diversified 
in the two chambers. In such a context, the use of 
majoritarian voting rules has the tendency to am-
plify the differences of small votes, creating big dif-
ferences in seats. In this way, the risk of having a 
Parliament with two different majorities becomes 
bigger and bigger or, like nowadays, with a major-
ity in a chamber, but not in the other. 
Data show it clearly: both those of the elections 
between 1994 and 2001—under the Matterella law—
and those of the elections between 2006 and 2013, 
which took place with Roberto Calderoli’s law, the 
so-called Porcellum. And so what are we waiting for 
before tackling this problem? Given the present po-
litical situation, there is no electoral system that is 
able to eliminate the risk that new elections did not 
lead us to the starting point. Talking about an elec-
toral reform which could provoke illusory expecta-
tions of governability does not make sense if we do 
not even tackle the reform of the Senate. Probably 
only with a radically new political offer, the present 
electoral system or eventually another better struc-
tured system could produce a clear result in favor 
of a certain political faction in both chambers. But 
this is an enormous risk that is not worth taking. 
The reasons to reform the Senate go beyond the 
sole reform of the electoral system. 
But is it possible that Italy is the sole Western 
parliamentary democracy with a Parliament with 
two houses empowered with the same competences? 
Why don’t France, Spain, the UK, and Germany have 
a perfect bicameralism and Italy has one? These, and 
others, are countries where the upper chamber does 
not give a vote of confidence to the government. It 
does something else. Not to mention those countries 
which do not have a second chamber, like Sweden, 
Portugal, and even Greece. What are the reasons to 
justify our expensive and risky diversity? 
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There are various models of imperfect bicam-
eralism. Let us choose one. Here, the wise men’s 
committee on the institutional reforms could pro-
vide a useful contribution. A proposal of this kind, 
which must not necessarily indicate a sole model, 
would serve to assign the parties their responsibili-
ties. People tend to talk about a reduction in the 
parliamentarians’ number and the simplification 
of the legislative procedures. Well, the reform of 
the Senate would also reach these aims. And then 
one will see which position those who continuous-
ly speak about changes, including the new senators 
of M5S, will take on such a subject. 
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Conclusions: what lies ahead?
Lorenzo De Sio, Vincenzo Emanuele, Nicola Maggini and Aldo Paparo
We introduced this book by suggesting the idea 
of a perfect storm: a unique combination of factors 
that led to the outcome of a dangerous stalemate. 
The empirical analyses of this book have detailed a 
result which can be quickly summarized. Despite 
the large defeat experienced by Berlusconi’s coali-
tion (losing almost half of its 2008 votes), the cen-
ter-left coalition led by Bersani has failed to achieve 
the clear success that was predicted by the polls, due 
(to a large extent) to the explosion of the anti-es-
tablishment M5S. This outcome in votes has then 
interplayed with the awkward electoral law, leading 
to the lack of a political majority in the Senate.
In terms of explanatory factors, how do the more 
detailed analyses of the book allow a more precise 
assessment of their relative importance? First of all, 
the largest phenomenon is the success of the M5S. 
The size of such success and its almost perfectly 
cross-cutting nature clearly suggest the emergence 
and relevance of a second spatial dimension, cen-
tered on anti-establishment stances. The choice by 
Mr. Napolitano, the Head of State, to not call early 
elections (which would reinforce a bipolar com-
petition), assembling instead both camps into an 
oversized majority supporting a technocratic gov-
ernment, has inevitably created the potential for 
this dimension to become relevant. Such potential 
has grown together with a low-responsibility, an-
ti-system opposition, somehow echoing memories 
of the party dynamics of Italy’s First Republic [Sar-
tori 1976, 131-132]. The tough austerity measures 
enforced by the Monti government, along with its 
clear loss of initiative after a few months (due to the 
inevitable mutual vetoes of its majority partners) 
have then converted this potential into actual polit-
ical support, leading to the huge success of the M5S.
We want to emphasize once again how this po-
tential explanation does not rest on particularly 
idiosyncratic, Italy-specific assumptions. It only 
assumes the common blame attribution, incum-
bent-punishment mechanism characterizing vot-
ers in virtually all contemporary democracies. It 
should be clear that, if all mainstream parties are 
involved in a government taking unpopular (and 
to some extent ineffective) measures, punishment 
of the incumbent will hit all of them, and reward 
an anti-system opposition. Said differently, this 
problematic vote outcome appears not as a strange 
behavior of Italian voters, but as a rational reaction 
by voters to a strange behavior of Italian political 
elites. Elites who apparently still assume that Ital-
ian voters behave differently from voters of other 
countries.
And this might also partially explain the sub-
par performance of the PD. First of all, the PD has 
inevitably ended up paying some cost-of-govern-
ment for supporting the Monti cabinet: a problem 
that already emerged in discussions within the PD 
in the year before elections. At the same time, the 
strategic campaign mistakes by the PD leadership 
cannot be overlooked. Crowned by successful and 
popular primary elections – where he also defeated 
the young competitor Matteo Renzi, mayor of Flor-
ence – Mr. Bersani was in the position to win elec-
tions without huge efforts. But then his campaign 
has appeared to not perform any effort: lacking 
clear policy choices, lacking media visibility, and 
most importantly with an unclear and ambiguous 
stance towards his centrist competitor Monti. Mr. 
Bersani even declared that the PD would behave as 
if having only 49% votes, even if obtaining a 51% 
– suggesting that they would seek an alliance with 
Mr. Monti even if not needed. No wonder then, 
that voters looking for clear-cut alternatives would 
turn to Grillo’s M5S.
After the vote, Mr. Bersani’s leadership finally 
collapsed after the collision with the impossibili-
ty to obtain the support of the M5S to a PD-led 
government (due both to the M5S rigidity and to a 
very cold reception of this scenario by the Head of 
State). As a result, the choice of an oversized ma-
jority revived, and PD and PdL were back in the 
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same government, headed by Enrico Letta, this 
time with a political majority where both parties 
express ministers.
What happened after is history of the present 
day. Berlusconi was – for the first time ever – of-
ficially condemned for a crime, with such verdict 
confirmed in all three degrees of judgment. This 
will likely result in its expulsion from the Senate, 
and an acceleration in the end of his political ca-
reer. To some extent a crucial development of this 
process happened in early October 2013, when – for 
the first time ever – the leadership of Berlusconi’s 
PdL (whose current secretary-general is Angelino 
Alfano) took a decision that was against Berlus-
coni’s will. Mr. Alfano refused to comply with Ber-
lusconi’s request to withdraw the party’s delegation 
from the current Letta government. Thus Alfano 
stopped Berlusconi trying this desperate move to 
possibly delay his expulsion as a senator.
The fact that a party places its very interests 
first – above those of its original founder – might 
signal the birth of an actual political party. How-
ever, the power struggle within the PdL is far 
from over. As the case of the French Fifth Repub-
lic shows, the institutionalization of a charismat-
ic party [Panebianco 1988] might prove complex 
and problematic. As a result, the PdL has recently 
split in two on the issue of supporting the Letta 
government. Mr. Alfano along with all PdL min-
isters has formed the NCD (New Centre-Right), 
with Berlusconi, along with radical anti-govern-
ment rightists, reviving the old Forza Italia name. 
To some extent, this has made visible the impossi-
bility for Berlusconi to accelerate the fall of Enrico 
Letta and call early elections – as the NCD alone 
provides the government with a majority. But, at 
the same time, the NCD and the PdL are careful-
ly containing mutual conflict only to the govern-
ment issue. They are fully aware that, in case of 
early elections, they would have to run together. 
Perhaps that might even prove more productive, 
as centre-right voters would be offered two alter-
natives – one for and one against the Letta govern-
ment. But it is clear that this would be inevitable, 
given the current electoral law. A law which does 
not appear easy to reform, as mutual vetoes pre-
vent the adoption of substantial changes.
What lies ahead? As Berlusconi’s expulsion 
from the Senate should materialize in the coming 
weeks, leadership in the centre-left may be also 
close to a change. The coming open elections orga-
nized by the PD for the choice of its secretary-gen-
eral1, to be held on December 8th, will likely see the 
victory of Matteo Renzi. Mr. Renzi, 38, is younger 
than most Italian political leaders and has openly 
challenged the current leadership of the PD. After 
last year’s defeat against Bersani, he has both capi-
talized on Bersani’s failure in the general elections, 
and slightly moved to the left his policy positions. 
However, its success will likely shift the party’s po-
sitions towards the center, and in the direction of 
a major turnover of political personnel. This might 
increase the appeal of the PD among former sup-
porters of Berlusconi and Grillo, but could cre-
ate problems with part of the current centre-left 
electorate. Also, a success of Mr. Renzi will like-
ly threaten the survival of the Letta government. 
Should Renzi become secretary-general, he might 
be interested into a premature end of that experi-
ence, although he assured his support to Letta, at 
least until the end of the Italian term for the Pres-
idency of the Council of the European Union, in 
December 2014. In this scenario, spring 2015 – at 
the latest – could see new elections, where a more 
competitive PD could attempt to win a majority in 
both Chambers. However, with the current elec-
toral law even a clear success might not be enough. 
And an electoral reform appears beyond the pos-
sibilities of the current parliamentary equilibria. 
As a result, two years after the fall of the last Ber-
lusconi government, uncertainty is still the main 
keyword to describe Italian politics.
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List of Italian parties and abbreviations
Main parties
PD – Partito Democratico (Democratic Party) was 
founded in 2007 by the merger of DS (Democratici 
di Sinistra - Democratic Left) and DL-Margherita 
(The Daisy – a Liberal and Christian-democratic 
party). It ran for the first time at the 2008 gener-
al election (33.2%). In the 2013 general election, its 
leader was Pierluigi Bersani. PD is the main cen-
ter-left Italian party.
PdL – Popolo della Libertà (People of Freedom) 
was launched by its leader Silvio Berlusconi for the 
2008 general election (37.4%) and officially found-
ed in 2009 by the merger of the former Berlusconi’s 
party, FI (Forza Italia - Go Italy) and the post-fas-
cist AN (Alleanza Nazionale – National Alliance). 
PdL is the main center-right Italian party.
M5S – Movimento 5 Stelle (Five Star Movement) 
was launched by the popular comedian and blog-
ger Beppe Grillo in 2009. It contested the Italian 
local elections of 2011 and 2012 and the regional 
elections of 2010. It ran for its first general election 
in 2013. The party refuses the left-right dimension 
and criticizes traditional political parties.
SC – Scelta Civica (Civic Choice) is a centrist polit-
ical party formed for the 2013 general election. Its 
leader is the former Prime Minister Mario Monti. 
The 2013 general election represents its electoral 
debut. At the Senate SC formed a joint list named 
“Con Monti per l’italia” (With Monti for Italy) 
along with UdC and FLI.
LN – Lega Nord (Northern League) is a regional-
ist party founded in 1991 by Umberto Bossi. Since 
2001, it has been continuously part of the cen-
ter-right coalition led by Silvio Berlusconi. In the 
2008 general election, it got 8.3% nationwide. Since 
2012, its leader is Roberto Maroni.
SEL – Sinistra Ecologia e Libertà (Left Ecology 
and Freedom) is a left-wing political party found-
ed in 2009 by its current leader Nichi Vendola. It 
emerged as a splinter from PRC (Partito della Ri-
fondazione Comunista – Party for the Communist 
Refoundation) and grouped former socialist, green 
and other left-wing politicians. It ran for its first 
general election in 2013 as the main ally of PD in 
the center-left coalition led by Bersani.
Minor parties abbreviations
Bersani’s coalition
CD – Centro Democratico (Democratic Center)
SVP - Südtiroler Volkspartei (South Tyrolese Peo-
ple’s Party)
PSI – Partito Socialista Italiano (Italian Socialist 
Party)
Berlusconi’s coalition
FdI – Fratelli d’Italia (Brothers of Italy)
LD – La Destra (The Right)
GS-MpA – Grande Sud-Movimento per le Auton-
omie (Great South – Movement for Autonomies)
Monti’s coalition
UdC – Unione di Centro (Union of the Center)
FLI – Futuro e Libertà per l’Italia (Future and Free-
dom for Italy)
Others
RC – Rivoluzione Civile (Civil Revolution)
FiD – Fermare il Declino (Stop the Decline)
Old parties
IdV – Italia dei Valori (Italy of values)
SA – La Sinistra – L’Arcobaleno (The Left – The 
Rainbow)
DS – Democratici di Sinistra (Left Democrats)
DL – Democrazia è libertà – La Margherita (De-
mocracy is freedom – The Daisy)
MRE – Movimento dei repubblicani europei 
(Movement of european republicans)
FI – Forza Italia (Go Italy)
AN – Alleanza Nazionale (National Alliance)
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